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November 1, 2024

**VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL**

Leslie Palmer  
Director, Safety and Enforcement Division  
California Public Utilities Commission  
505 Van Ness Avenue  
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Mr. Palmer:

As required by Resolution ESRB-8 and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) respectfully submits this report for the October 17-20, 2024, PSPS. This report has been verified by a PG&E officer in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Susan C. Martinez'. The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above a horizontal line.

Susan C. Martinez  
Director of Liaison, Regulatory Operations and Engagement

Enclosures

cc: Anthony Noll, SED  
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**Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC  
October 17 – 20, 2024 De-energization**

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**PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC  
October 17 – 20, 2024 De-energization**

**Section 1 – Summary and Overview**

**Section 1.1 - Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility’s Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers have been restored.**  
*(D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)*

**Response:**

High winds can cause tree branches and debris to contact energized electric lines, and potentially damage our equipment causing a wildfire. As a result, we may need to turn off power during severe weather to help prevent wildfires. This is called a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS). PG&E will not take any chances with customer safety. For the safety of our customers and communities, PSPS continues to be a necessary tool as a last resort. We know that turning off the power disrupts lives, and do not take this decision lightly.

On October 11, 2024, PG&E’s Meteorology Team identified potential fire weather in forecast models and notified the acting Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Commander. The first scope was developed on the night of October 14, and on October 15, the EOC was activated for a PSPS, and we began to notify Public Safety Partners. On Tuesday, October 15 and Wednesday, October 16 we further refined the PSPS scope based on updated meteorological forecasts, notified Public Safety Partners and customers in the areas anticipated to be impacted, readied the grid, and prepared Community Resource Centers (CRCs) and other customer support.

We also coordinated with Southern California Edison (SCE) as their customers served by a PG&E circuit were in scope for de-energization. These customers are referred to as “shared customers.” Throughout this EOC activation, we were in constant contact with SCE regarding scope and notifications for these areas and customers.

We closely monitored weather conditions across 20 Time Places (TPs),<sup>1</sup> as shown in Figure 1, and ultimately PG&E decided to move forward with de-energizing customers, due to unfavorable weather conditions.

On October 17, 2024, at 12:57 PDT, PG&E began de-energizing its assets and customers to mitigate catastrophic wildfire risk across portions of the Sacramento Valley, eventually de-energizing portions of the Sierra Nevada, elevated Bay Area terrain, and the Tepequet area of the Central Coast. Wind gusts near 88 mph were recorded during the period of concern.

On October 18, 2024, at 07:26 PDT, the first Weather “All-Clear” was issued for a portion of the All-Clear zones once winds subsided with the last All-Clears being declared on October 19, at 15:20 PDT. During this PSPS, we ultimately de-energized 17,367 customers<sup>2</sup> in 16 TP across 21 counties.

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<sup>1</sup> A TP is a portion of the PG&E grid that is electrically and geographically coherent and is forecast to experience consistent timing for severe fire weather. TPs are identified for each PSPS and receive consistent treatment for notifications and de-energization. Once actual weather conditions occur, Weather “All-Clear” and service restoration times may vary due to actual weather conditions within a TP.

<sup>2</sup> Customers refers to active service points (meters).


During patrol and inspections, we identified two instances of damages and one hazard caused by weather. Figures 2 – 4 show the fire spread simulation of what a wildfire might have looked like, and the potential damage or impact caused, if a PSPS had not been initiated. See Section 4 for more information regarding damages and hazards.

During this PSPS, PG&E mitigated and avoided the de-energization of approximately 169,289 customers in the final scope through the use of sectionalization, distribution switching, temporary microgrids, and backup power support. PG&E notified those customers who required de-energization and contacted 662 community representatives to ensure that communities could prepare before the PSPS.

PG&E opened 29 CRCs that were operated within the impacted counties, which hosted approximately 4,200 visitors from October 17 – October 20. Additionally, PG&E partnered with local organizations to provide resources and support to our Access and Function Needs (AFN)<sup>3</sup> customers. See Section 6.5 for more details.


Customers were re-energized safely and as quickly as possible. Within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear, 95% of customers’ power had been restored. The average restoration time for this PSPS was 5.2 hours.

**Figure 1: PSPS Timeline**



<sup>3</sup> Access and Functional Needs is defined by the CPUC as individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking, older adults, children, people living in institutional settings or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including but not limited to those who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.



**Figure 2: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Napa County)**



## Impact Analysis

<b>Size (ac)</b>	13,151.82
<b>Initial Attack Assessment</b>	1 - Low
<b>No. of Buildings</b>	633
<b>Total Population</b>	1,308
<b>No. of Places</b>	27


**Figure 3: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Santa Cruz County)**



## Impact Analysis

<b>Size (ac)</b>	4,258.75
<b>Initial Attack Assessment</b>	4 - Very High
<b>No. of Buildings</b>	188
<b>Total Population</b>	92
<b>No. of Places</b>	9

**Figure 4: Fire Spread Simulation Hazard to Equipment (Santa Cruz County)**



## Impact Analysis

<b>Size (ac)</b>	3,585.7
<b>Initial Attack Assessment</b>	3 - High
<b>No. of Buildings</b>	159
<b>Total Population</b>	64
<b>No. of Places</b>	8



**Section 1.2 - A table including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed (D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

Table 1 identifies the maximum number of customers notified and de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of Medical Baseline (MBL) Program customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; and number of Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) de-energized.

**Table 1: Customers Notified and De-energized<sup>4</sup>**

Total Customers			MBL Program Customers	Counties	Tribes	Circuits			Damage/Hazard Count	CFI De-energized
Notified	De-energized	Canceled	De-energized	De-energized	De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Unique Distribution Circuits in Any Version of Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized		
35,072 <sup>5</sup>	17,367 <sup>6</sup>	17,850 <sup>7</sup>	1,136	21	3	3	133	97	2 damages 1 hazard	601

<sup>4</sup> The information, times and figures referenced in this report are based on the best information available at the time of this report's submission. The information, times and figures herein are subject to revision based on further analysis and validation.

<sup>5</sup> Of the 35,072 customers notified of planned PPS impact, 77 customers received a notice that they may be de-energized, did not receive a cancellation notice and are not counted as a de-energized customer. This customer set is comprised of false positive notifications as reported in Section 5.5, customers mitigated from experiencing long-duration PPS outages, and customers who stopped service or stopped having valid contact information by the time of cancellation notifications or de-energization.

<sup>6</sup> Of the 17,367 customers de-energized, 222 customer did not receive any notifications before de-energization. This is comprised of 169 notification failures and 53 customers with no valid contact information at the time of these notifications. See Section 5.5 for more information.

<sup>7</sup> This count includes customers canceled without being de-energized. This does not include the 15 customers who received cancellation notifications and were also de-energized, which includes 10 cases of false negative communications as reported in Section 5.7 and five customers who were properly notified that they were back in scope after the previous cancellation.

**Section 1.3 - A PDF map depicting the de-energized area(s) (SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

During the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS, we de-energized 17,367 customers in 16 TPs. The final de-energization footprint is shown in Figure 5.

**Figure 5: De-energization Footprint Map**



## Section 2 – Decision Making Process

**Section 2.1 - A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)**

### **Response:**

See Appendix A for a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS.

**Section 2.2 - Decision criteria and detailed thresholds leading to de-energization including the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description (*D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.*)**


### **Response:**

This section provides an overview of the criteria and threshold evaluation process that were used in the decision to de-energize customers during the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS.

### PSPS Preparation and Scoping Process

At a high level, Figure 6 shows the process used to prepare for a PSPS. PG&E utilized and referenced the following protocols and tools during the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS to determine the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Appendix A includes anticipated parameters based on the latest forecast used to develop the planned de-energization scope versus actual weather parameters for each circuit.

**Figure 6: PG&E's High-level PSPS Process Steps**



PG&E considers executing a PSPS when strong gusty winds, critically low humidity levels, and low fuel moisture levels pose an unacceptable risk of causing fast-spreading, catastrophic wildfires. Assessments begin several days before the weather event is forecasted to take place.

We identify weather conditions that could create high fire potential by using a combination of high outage and ignition potential, high-resolution internal and external weather forecasting models and data from federal agencies that include the following:

- Ignition Probability Weather (IPW): Determines the potential of an outage due to weather conditions, and then for that outage to lead to an ignition.
- Fire Potential Index (FPI): Assists with fire model development and calibration.
- Technosylva: Provides fire spread modeling via data inputs.

Through partnerships with external experts, we developed our machine learning models using historic datasets and advanced forecast models that provide a better understanding of historical weather events and improve our weather forecasting. These models use the following:

- Precise location data points across our service territory to conduct hourly weather analyses using high-resolution, historical data.
- Over 100 trillion data points of historical weather and fuel.
- Hourly weather data such as temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, precipitation, pressure, and dead and live fuel moisture.
- Data storage and processing via the PG&E-Amazon Web Services Cloud.

Our thresholds and guidance for identifying critical fire risk and outage/ignition potential are determined by analyzing and rigorously testing our current PSPS protocols and criteria through decades of historical weather data in and around California.

External forecast information from the National Weather Service (NWS) (e.g., Red Flag Warnings) and other forecast agencies are examined carefully. Furthermore, we coordinate with these agencies during high-risk periods via daily conference calls to ultimately decide whether to de-energize portions of the grid for public safety.

#### Tools and Technology


PG&E partners with Technosylva, an external expert in the wildfire modeling field to test and deploy cloud-based wildfire spread model capabilities. This helps us better understand where we might need to turn off power.

Each day, PG&E delivers our wildfire conditions datasets to Technosylva, who then perform over 100 million fire spread simulations to provide fire spread scenarios that help to identify circuits that may be at risk during dry, windy weather. These are done every three hours, for the five days ahead.

#### Decision Criteria and Thresholds for Distribution PSPS Protocols

When determining whether to turn off power for safety, we start with the distribution system. These powerlines are closer to communities and are generally more susceptible to dry, windy weather threats. The PSPS guidance values presented in Figure 7 were developed using 10 years of PG&E's high-resolution climate data to help understand wildfire risk and the potential customer impacts of PSPS. We evaluate within a small geographic area (700 square kilometers) and if any of the measures are forecasted to be met, we scope the circuit segments within that region for de-energization. There is no single criterion or threshold that will require turning off power to a distribution circuit. For event-specific thresholds, see Appendix A. Our process is outlined in Figure 7.

**Figure 7: PSPS Protocols for Distribution**



**Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions**

The first step to determine the scope of a PSPS is evaluating the Minimum Fire Potential Conditions (mFPC). This ensures that PSPS is only executed during wind events when atmospheric conditions and fuels are dry. A PSPS is evaluated if the mFPC noted in Step 1 of Figure 7 above are met.

These values were established from an examination of historical fire occurrence in the PG&E service area, PSPS sensitivity studies using historical data viewed through the lens of both customer impacts and wildfire risk mitigated, as well as information published by federal agencies regarding fire behavior and criteria used to issue warnings to the public.

**Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk**

If all minimum fire conditions are met, we conduct an in-depth review of fire risk using three separate measures. If the criteria for any of these measures are met, we may need to turn off power for safety. We evaluate all of the factors below together, rather than isolating any specific factor to assess fire risk against the potential harms of de-energization. For event-specific factors, see Appendix A.


- Catastrophic Fire Probability:** This model combines the probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the electric system with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. It is the combination of the FPI and the IPW. The Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFP<sub>D</sub>) model accounts for changes over time based on actual performance data. Thus, the model will address positive and negative trends in grid performance and reliability year-over-year, incorporating grid improvements such as system hardening, and enhanced vegetation management based on their performance at mitigating outages over time.

  - IPW Model: A system comprised of two machine learning models. These models are used to evaluate the probability of outages across several outage classes (Outage Probability Weather (OPW) model) and the probability of that outage becoming an ignition (Ignition Given Outage Probability Weather Model (IOPW)). These models are combined for each location at each hour to ascertain the ignition probability. These machine

learning models use 10 years of weather data to correlate approximately 500,000 outages occurring on PG&E's distribution grid. The model analyzes the potential for several types of power outages in each weather event, as well as the potential for that outage to be the source of an ignition. IPW learns from and accounts for changes on the grid from year-to-year.

- FPI Model: This model outputs the probability that a fire will become large or catastrophic and is used as a daily and hourly tool to drive operational decisions to reduce the risk of utility caused fires. It was enhanced in 2024 with additional data and improved analytic capabilities.
- **Tree Considerations:** Our PSPS protocols utilize a machine learning model to integrate the potential for trees to strike the lines into our OPW Model and IPW Model. This helps our Meteorology Team more accurately analyze risk posed by trees and how that translates to increased ignition probability. See Figure 8 explaining OPW modeling. Scenarios with a high risk of an IPW and a high FPI value will always warrant a PSPS. However, power may be turned off in other scenarios to avoid catastrophic wildfires.

**Figure 8: Incorporating Tree Strike Potential into PSPS Modeling**



- **Catastrophic Fire Behavior (CFB):** We also evaluate areas that are meeting mFPC (windy and dry conditions) but are not meeting our CFP guidance values by utilizing dynamic wildfire spread simulations from Technosylva. This allows us to consider potential ignition events that are rarer and more difficult to forecast such as animal and third-party contacts, or external debris impacting electrical lines. These locations are only considered once the mFPC are met, ensuring that conditions are sufficiently windy and dry.
  - **Fireline Intensity:** The U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station did a study of fire line intensity which is determined by the size and components of flames. It is measured as the rate of heat energy released (Btu) per unit length of the fire line (ft) per unit (s). It is also

calculated by estimating the flame length, the distance measured from the average flame tip to the middle of the fire's base. Internal studies that evaluated historical fire simulation outputs to actual fire events, damages, and fatalities showed that outputs of flame length and rate of spread were best correlated to historical fire outcomes. Studies, as mentioned above, have shown that more intense fires with higher flame lengths and higher rates of spread are more difficult to control. Thus, we evaluate fire simulation data that indicates where fast-spreading and intense fires could manifest and incorporate that into our PSPS decision making process.

- Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues may increase the risk of ignition. If an area is forecasted to experience minimum fire conditions and there are known issues with equipment or vegetation that have not yet been addressed, we may need to turn off power.

### PSPS Protocols for Transmission

In addition to analyzing distribution circuits that may need to be de-energized for safety, we also review the transmission lines and structures in areas experiencing dry, windy weather conditions. Transmission lines are like the freeways of the electric system, carrying high voltage energy across long distances. Similar to our distribution protocols, there is no single factor or threshold that will require turning off power to a transmission line.

#### **Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions**


When determining whether to turn off power for safety on transmission lines, we review the same minimum fire potential conditions as with distribution circuits. If these conditions are met, we will review the criteria below to determine whether a transmission line must be turned off.

#### **Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk**

- Catastrophic Fire Probability – Asset (CFP<sub>T</sub> – Asset): We use computer models to assess the likelihood of equipment failure during a given weather event, and the subsequent risk of catastrophic wildfires if a failure occurs. This model uses a combination of the Operability Assessment (OA) and FPI Models, both in time and space, at every transmission structure to form the Transmission Catastrophic Fire Probability model for asset failures. The OA Model combines historical wind speeds for each structure, historical outage activity, Bayesian updating, and the condition of assets based on inspection programs to help understand the wind-related failure probability of each structure. The OA Model can be driven with forecast wind speeds to output the probability of failure at the structure level.
- Catastrophic Fire Probability – Vegetation (CFP<sub>T</sub> – Veg): The transmission-specific vegetation risk model is a calibrated probability of vegetation risk built internally using data collected and managed by PG&E vegetation management and external contractors such as NV5 and Formation Environmental. This model leverages aerial LiDAR data to map the location and attributes of trees near transmission lines. The transmission vegetation risk model is based on several factors such as overstrike, the amount of unobstructed fall paths to a wire, the slope between tree and conductor, and tree exposure. The transmission vegetation risk model is combined with the FPI Model in space and time to form CFP<sub>T</sub> – Veg.

- **CFB:** We may de-energize customers where the consequence of a potential wildfire ignition would be extreme, even if the probability of a power line or equipment failure is low.
- **Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations:** We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues are present that may increase the risk of ignition. Figure 9 provides a quantitative summary of our PSPS Protocols for Transmission.

**Figure 9: PSPS – Protocols for Transmission**



### Step 3: Determining the Outage Area

Transmission lines meeting the criteria above then pass to the next stage of review. We conduct a Power Flow Analysis on the in-scope transmission lines (if applicable) to analyze any potential downstream impacts of load shedding.

### Reviewing Impact and Forecasted Weather

After determining the outage area both for Distribution and Transmission, PG&E reviews the forecasted customer impacts of each circuit against the forecasted wildfire risk of each circuit. If there's reasonable risk for ignition on the distribution circuits or transmission lines during the forecasted weather event, it is included in the PSPS scope. We then share this analysis internally during key decision-making points to inform PSPS decision making and further risk modeling.

Starting 12 hours before the forecasted PSPS de-energization time, we transition from evaluating forecast data to observing the weather in real-time. Based on real-time observations and analysis, we continually evaluate all the outage areas identified in the previous steps and use external tools and analysis to determine whether to initiate PSPS de-energization.

### Decision-Making and Analysis to Validate if PSPS is Necessary

During high-risk periods, PG&E Meteorologists participate in daily interagency conference calls that commonly include multiple NWS local offices, the NWS western region headquarters, and representatives from the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC), also known as



Predictive Services. This call is hosted by the Northern California and/or Southern California GACC offices.

During these calls, the external agencies present their expert assessment on the upcoming periods and locations of risk, wind speeds and fuel moisture levels, and any other relevant factors to consider.

During a PSPS, PG&E's Lead Meteorologist, called the Meteorologist-in-Charge (MIC), summarizes these forecasts and discussions for the PG&E Officer-in-Charge (OIC), who ultimately makes the decision to execute a PSPS.

The following sources and tools are considered before initiating a PSPS by the MIC:

- Fire Weather Watches and Red Flag Warning (NWS - Federal)
- Significant fire potential for wind (GACC - Federal)
- Storm Prediction Center (part of NOAA - Federal)
- Daily interagency conference call with agencies during high-risk periods
- Field observer information
- Live weather data from weather stations
- Location of existing fires
- External weather model data

Based on the above analyses, we can determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization, and further investigate mitigation options, such as advanced switching solutions, sectionalization, the use of islanding, alternative grid solutions, and temporary generation, to support customers who could lose upstream power sources but are in areas that may be safe to keep energized.

We monitor and forecast weather over a multi-day horizon, so we can anticipate when a PSPS may be needed and activate our EOC as far in advance as possible. Our internal weather model and external modeling are updated multiple times per day. PG&E's Meteorology Team constantly evaluates both internal and external weather models for changes in weather timing, strength, and potential locations impacted. We then incorporate these changes into a new weather scope generally once per day.

Weather shifts may force changes to PSPS scope and impacts at any point in time during PSPS planning and execution; this may allow us to avoid de-energization in some areas if fire-critical conditions lessen but can also cause some areas and customers to move into de-energization scope late in the process if forecasted fire-critical weather footprints change or increase. Possible changes in PSPS scope and impact are driven by the inherent uncertainty in weather forecast models.

**Section 2.3 - A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

The quantitative factors that were used in the decision to de-energize customers for safety are provided in Appendix A. Below, we outline a detailed description of the qualitative factors that were provided by our Meteorology Team when determining to de-energize customers.

PG&E Meteorology Team Review

On Friday, October 11, 2024, weather models indicated a dry offshore wind flow event developing about six days out to October 17. On Friday, October 11, PG&E’s Meteorology Team, Emergency Planning and Response Team, and EOC Commander met to discuss the potential PSPS.

Based on the emerging risk of a PSPS, we entered EOC readiness posture at 16:15 PDT on October 14 and activated the EOC at 05:00 PDT on October 15.

The first PSPS scope was developed on the evening of October 14, reflecting the risk of dry winds mostly along the Sierra Nevada foothills, western Sacramento Valley, elevated Bay Area terrain, and elevated terrain in portions of the Central Coast.

The weather forecast and PSPS models were closely monitored to adjust the scope leading up to the PSPS and continued to be refined on Tuesday, October 15 and Wednesday, October 16.

During the morning hours of October 14, federal forecast agencies began to highlight the upcoming weather conditions:

- NWS Sacramento issued a Fire Weather Watch for the Sacramento Valley and surrounding foothills below 1,000ft for the morning of October 17 through the evening of October 19.
- NWS Eureka also issued a Fire Weather Watch for portions of Lake, Napa, and Sonoma Counties for the morning of October 17 through the evening of October 19.
- NWS San Francisco Bay Area issued a Fire Weather Watch for the entire Bay Area, North Bay interior mountains and valleys, Marin Coastal Range, Sonoma Coastal Range, Santa Cruz Mountains, and Central Coast for the morning of October 17 through the evening of October 19.

All Fire Weather Watches were upgraded to Red Flag Warnings the following morning on October 15. North Ops Predictive Services included in their forecast High Risk due to wind for the Sacramento Valley and adjacent foothills (NC05) for October 17 – October 19, Diablo and Santa Cruz Mountains (NC03B) for October 18-19, Bay Marine (NC03A) for October 18 – October 19, and Mid Coast to Mendocino (NC02) for October 18 – October 19.

High Resolution PSPS Models Guidance

The tools and models outlined in Section 2.2 are part of the decision criteria that PG&E’s Meteorologists consider for PSPS scope. Longer range weather forecast model data are used to determine the location and timing of a PSPS. Typically, these weather forecasts are less certain

the farther the observed date. This is akin to the well-known hurricane “cone of uncertainty” in which the potential track of a hurricane is represented by an area that expands farther out in time, which resembles an expanding cone. Thus, there is an inherent tradeoff between the further out the forecasts are for a PSPS and the uncertainty in the PSPS scope and waiting until forecasts become more certain. Forecast uncertainty leads to changes in PSPS scope as weather forecast models are updated, and the scope is refined closer to the period of concern.

As the PSPS unfolds in real-time, PG&E’s Meteorologists transition to real-time observations of weather stations, satellite data, pressure gradients, and live feeds from Alert Wildfire Camera. These observations help to evaluate if the weather is behaving as expected. In many instances, models trend stronger or weaker with each model iteration leading up to a PSPS.

### External PSPS Decision Inputs

Meteorological analyses establish that high winds in California create significant fire threat and exacerbate fire spread. The NWS issues a Red Flag Warning to indicate critical fire weather conditions under which any fire that develops will likely spread rapidly; California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) states, “the types of weather patterns that cause a watch or warning include low relative humidity, strong winds, dry fuels, the possibility of dry lightning strikes, or any combination of the above.” As noted previously, PG&E’s PSPS outages consistently occur during periods and in areas where federal, state, and local authorities have identified as having extreme fire risk including the presence of strong winds.


We compare our fire risk forecasts against those of external agencies, for validation that there is shared recognition of high fire risk across the California meteorology community. Between October 17, 2024, and October 19, 2024, our analysis of fire risk justifying a PSPS was validated by multiple sources including:

- Red Flag Warnings from the National Weather Service (NWS) were issued from three local NWS offices: NWS Sacramento, NWS Eureka, NWS San Francisco Bay Area (Figure 10).
- NOAA’s Storm Prediction Center’s Fire Weather Outlooks indicated elevated fire-weather conditions across California (Figure 11).

**Figure 10: NWS Red Flag Warning Coverage from the Sacramento, Eureka, San Francisco Bay Area, and Hanford Weather Offices.**




**Figure 11: NOAA – Storm Prediction Center (SPC) Forecasts of Elevated and Critical Fire Weather Conditions.**




We also review forecasted wind speeds in the potential PSPS-impacted counties to evaluate the need for a PSPS. Figure 12 also shows the Utility Fire Potential Index (FPI) Ratings for Fire Index Areas (FIAs) in PG&E’s service area for October 17 – 20, 2024. We determine the scope for PSPS outages within those FIAs with fire risk rating R5-Plus from PG&E’s FPI model. In Figure 13, the PSPS scope can be compared with other agencies to vet the fire weather risk.

**Figure 12: PG&E Utility Fire Potential Index Ratings for October 17 – 20, 2024**



**Figure 13: Comparison of Federal Agency Severe Fire Weather Warning Footprints to Final PSPS Scope**



**Section 2.4 - An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing. The utility must identify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

For the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS, PG&E used the PSPS Risk Model using the latest scope prior to the first potential de-energization. As discussed in detail below, based on the scoping of this PSPS, our Risk Model supported initiating a PSPS based on the forecasted impact information that indicated that each of the 106<sup>8</sup> distribution circuits and two<sup>9</sup> transmission lines in the latest scope surpassed the analysis threshold of one to support a PSPS. Note the PSPS Risk Model calculations are based on forecasted conditions.

PG&E’s PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, which is further detailed below, addresses the CPUC’s requirements presented in the 2019 PSPS OI.<sup>10</sup> This decision requires California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to quantify the risk/benefits associated with initiating or not initiating a PSPS for our customers.

PG&E incorporated the aforementioned risk-benefit analysis into our PSPS execution process to help inform our PSPS decision-making process. Our risk-benefit tool aligns with California

<sup>8</sup> Includes Monticello 1101, which occurs in TP5 and TP7, and is therefore counted twice and includes one distribution circuit with zero customers impacted (Wishon 1101).

<sup>9</sup> Excludes Elk Creek Tap (City of Santa Clara) (non-PG&E), which is counted in and includes one transmission circuit with zero customers impacted (Elk Creek Tap – PG&E).

<sup>10</sup> D. 21-06-014.

IOUs Multi-Attribute Value Function (MAVF) framework, as defined through the Safety Modeling Assessment Proceeding (SMAP), which specifies how various consequences are factored into a risk calculation. Utilizing this framework, we incorporate PSPS forecast information into our PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, which is further described under the “Risk Assessment” section below.

The output of the tool is a ratio that compares the calculated PSPS potential benefit from initiating de-energization (i.e., mitigation of catastrophic wildfire consequence) to the risks associated with PSPS (i.e., impact to customers resulting from a PSPS outage). Key inputs in the risk-benefit analysis include results from Technosylva wildfire simulations specific to the distribution circuit and transmission lines in scope for a potential de-energization, the number of customers forecasted to be de-energized, and the forecasted number of customer minutes across each identified circuit in scope for a potential de-energization.

After the potential de-energization scope is determined, including the identification of potentially impacted circuits for the potential PSPS in question, this scope and the Technosylva wildfire simulation outputs are used as inputs into the Risk-Benefit tool, which quantifies the potential public safety risk and wildfire risk resulting from the forecasted impacts of the pending PSPS. Note, that the Wildfire Risk Score is based on an 8-hour simulation from Technosylva and while useful, in some cases this can significantly understate the risk. Thus, the MIC may still recommend to de-energize circuits where the Risk-Benefit tool shows higher PSPS risk than Wildfire risk.

### Risk Assessment

As referenced above, PG&E’s PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool utilizes California IOU agreed approach utilizing the MAVF framework that captures the safety, reliability, and financial impact of identified potential risk events, as outlined in our Enterprise Risk Register.<sup>11</sup> The tool’s calculations use a non-linear scaling of consequences reflecting our focus on low-frequency/high-consequence risk events without neglecting high-probability/low-consequence risk events. Developed by the PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, MAVF scores are used to compare the potential de-energization risk from a forecasted PSPS to the potential risk of catastrophic wildfires from keeping the circuits energized, specific to the potentially impacted circuits being considered for PSPS de-energization.

The following inputs are used in calculations to build MAVF risk scores for PSPS outages and wildfires, which are ultimately weighed against one another:

- Technosylva Wildfire Simulation Data: Fire simulation forecasts on the consequence of a potential wildfire’s impact on customers, wildlife and infrastructures on each circuit for every three hours. These values are based on Technosylva’s proprietary and sophisticated wildfire modeling, using real-time weather models, state-of-the-art fuel, and 8-hour fire spread modeling.
- Forecasted Circuits: The final list of the distribution circuits and transmission lines identified to be in-scope for a potential PSPS.
- Customer Minutes: Forecasted outage duration the customers will face by the potential PSPS.

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<sup>11</sup> Full details of the MAVF methodology are provided through the Risk Assessment and Modeling Phase (RAMP) Report RAMP Report, pp. 3-3 to 3-15, and General Rate Case (GRC) workpapers in response to Energy Division GRC-2023-PhI\_DR\_ED\_001\_Q01Supp01.

- Customers Impacted: Forecasted number of customers anticipated to be impacted by the potential PSPS.
- Customer Category and Critical Customer Adjustment Factor: The type of customer (e.g. MBL Program, etc.) is incorporated into the analysis through the use of a “critical customer adjustment factor,” which is applied to the customer outage duration to reflect a higher risk score for customers who are at a greater adverse risk of a potential de-energization.

Once the above data are made available and incorporated into the tool, the modeling considerations described below are used to estimate the consequence of the: 1) potential wildfire risk and 2) PSPS risk at the per-circuit level. Throughout the tool, a variety of modeling considerations are made to facilitate calculations which are included in Table 2 and summarized in Figure 14.

**Table 2: 2024 PSPS Risk-Benefit Consequence Modelling Considerations**

Consequence Type	Wildfire Consequence Considerations	PSPS Consequence Considerations
<b>Safety</b>	Calculated based on maximum population impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a fatality ratio based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data.	Calculated from an estimate of Equivalent Fatalities (EF) per Million Customer Minutes Interrupted (MMCI). The EF/MMCI ratio is estimated from previous PG&E PSPS outages and other large external outage. <sup>12</sup>
<b>Reliability</b>	N/A	Calculated directly from the potential number of customers impacted and outage duration based on customer minutes interrupted.
<b>Financial</b>	Calculated based on maximum building impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a cost per structure burned previously evaluated in 2020 RAMP Report. <sup>13</sup>	Calculated based on two financial estimates, 1) distribution of a lump sum cost of execution across all relevant circuits and 2) an estimated proxy cost per customer in scope per PSPS. <sup>14</sup>

### Potential Wildfire Risk

Wildfire consequence impacts are calculated based on the outputs of the Technosylva simulations. Variables include 1) population impacted by wildfire and 2) structure impacted by wildfire used to calculate natural unit values for two consequence components:

- Wildfire Safety Consequence: EF
- Wildfire Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of Wildfire (in dollars)

<sup>12</sup> Previous PG&E PSPS include 2019-2021 events, and other large external outage events include the 2003 Northeast Blackout in New York City, 2011 Southwest Blackout in San Diego, 2012 Derecho Windstorms, 2012 Superstorm Sandy, 2017 Hurricane Irma, 2021 Blackout event.

<sup>13</sup> See A.20-06-012.

<sup>14</sup> The assumptions used in these calculations, including the proxy cost per customer per PSPS, are subject to be updated and are not intended to prejudge or create precedent with regard to the development of more precise values of resiliency or cost of PSPS metrics being considered in other ongoing proceedings at the California Public Utilities Commission, such as the Risk-Based Decision-Making Rulemaking [R.20.07.013] and the Microgrid and Resiliency Strategies.


## Potential PSPS Risk

PSPS consequence impacts are based on the following values: duration of de-energization by circuit, and number of customers impacted by de-energization on each circuit. These input values are used to calculate natural unit values for three consequence components:

- PSPS Safety Consequence: EF as an output of Customer Minutes interrupted
- PSPS Electric Reliability Consequence: Customer Minutes Interrupted  $\times$  Critical Customer Adjustment Factor
- PSPS Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of PSPS (in dollars)  $\times$  Critical Customer Adjustment Factor

Once the consequence values (safety, reliability, financial) are estimated, they are converted into MAVF risk scores. Once the Risk-Benefit tool calculates the impacts between the PSPS and a wildfire, it is summarized in Figure 15 by indicating if the adverse impact from a PSPS outweighs the risk of a wildfire.

**Figure 14: Visual Representation of PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool**





**Figure 15: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence**

<b>PSPS Potential Risk Consequence</b>	121.5
<b>PSPS Potential Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)</b>	165,153
<b>Potential Benefit : Potential Risk</b>	1,360
<b>Recommended Approach</b>	Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk
<b>Risk Ratio Per Circuit (&gt;1, PSPS Benefit Outweighs Risk)</b>	Dx Circuits: 106 (of 106 <sup>1,2</sup> ) Tx Circuits: 2 (of 2 <sup>3,4</sup> )
As defined in PLAN_D-03	

Aggregated to event-level

**Key Factors**

- **PSPS Consequence**
  - Safety consequence factors in planned and unplanned widespread outage events across the US.
  - Reliability consequence based on customer minutes interrupted
  - Financial consequence based on execution and fixed customer cost per event
  - Assumes maximum duration for each customer per circuit
- **PSPS Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)**
  - Safety consequence based on population impacted from fire spread simulation
  - Reliability consequence not considered
  - Financial consequence based on buildings impacted from fire spread simulation
  - Assumes an ignition on each circuit based on the maximum consequence modeled by TechnoSylva

<sup>1</sup> Includes Monticello 1101, which occurs in TP5 and TP7, and is therefore counted "twice" in PSPS Situation Report.  
<sup>2</sup> Includes 1 Dx circuit with zero customers impacted – Wishon 1101.  
<sup>3</sup> Excludes Elk Creek Tap (City of Santa Clara)(non-PG&E), which is counted in PSPS Situation Report.  
<sup>4</sup> Includes 1 Tx circuit with zero customers impacted – Elk Creek Tap (PG&E).

$\frac{\text{PSPS Potential Benefit (wildfire risk)}}{\text{PSPS Potential Risk}} > 1$	Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk
$\frac{\text{PSPS Potential Benefit (wildfire risk)}}{\text{PSPS Potential Risk}} < 1$	Indicates potential risk may outweigh potential benefit

**Section 2.5 - Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative.**  
 (D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)

**Response:**

After reviewing the meteorological information that indicated a potential for catastrophic wildfire and the impacts on customers through de-energization, we considered whether alternatives to de-energizing, such as additional vegetation management and disabling automatic reclosers, could adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire thus lowering the need for de-energization. We determined these measures alone did not reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire in areas within the PSPS scope sufficiently to protect public safety.

Leading up to the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS, PG&E readied de-energization mitigations, reviewed alternatives to de-energization and took the following steps:

- Our Operations team reviewed asset and vegetation tags that included incremental customers into PSPS scope and worked to correct these tags.
- Conducted hazard tree mitigation efforts on circuits potentially in PSPS scope in the days leading up to the PSPS. Tree-trimming near a utility line can keep limbs and trunks from nearby trees from falling into a line, but it does not mitigate against broken limbs from distant trees outside the vegetation management perimeter that could blow into a line or break utility equipment.
- Conducted ongoing pre-patrols of potentially impacted transmission facilities in the days leading up to the time of anticipated de-energization. While pre-patrols can help identify and correct asset tags on impacted transmission lines, even transmission lines in fully healthy condition may still pose a wildfire risk. Thus, pre-patrol of potentially impacted transmission facilities was not considered a sufficient alternative to PSPS.
- Enabled Enhanced Powerline Safety Setting (EPSS) and disabled automatic reclosing in Tier 2/Tier 3 High Fire Threat District (HFTD) areas. This reduces the ignition risk from attempts to re-energize circuits via automatic reclosing.
- Prepared to reduce the public safety impacts of de-energization by employing granular scoping processes to significantly reduce the public safety impacts of de-

energization by de-energizing smaller segments of the grid within the close confines of the fire-critical weather footprint, rather than de-energizing larger amounts of customers in more populated areas.

- Prepared to reduce the public safety impacts of de-energization by employing granular scoping processes to significantly reduce the public safety impacts of de-energization by de-energizing smaller segments of the grid within the close confines of the fire-critical weather footprint, rather than de-energizing larger amounts of customers in more populated areas.
- Reviewed opportunities for islanding, sectionalization, temporary generation, backup-generation, and alternate grid solutions to reduce and mitigate the number of customers de-energized.
- Prepared to reduce the public safety impacts of de-energization by providing local CRCs closest in proximity to support customers in those impacted communities.
- Supported vulnerable customers through California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC) and Community Based Organizations (CBO) resource partners that offered various services to customers impacted by this PSPS. Further information is detailed in Section 6.5.
- Notified impacted customers via extensive use of Advanced Notifications and outreach tools of the expected de-energization.
- Increased our restoration efforts including helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to conduct line safety patrols after the Weather All-Clear, readied and prepared equipment for patrols and needed repairs to restore service to lines that were deemed operationally safe to power.

## **Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers**

**Section 3.1 - The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable** (*Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

**Response:**

The PSPS occurred over the timeframe of October 17 – 20, 2024, in 16 TPs located in 21 counties.

**Section 3.2 - A zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS event polygons of de-energized areas. The file should include items that are required in Section 3.3. (SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

A zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS polygons of final de-energized areas combined with the PSPS data can be found in the attachment, “*PGE\_PSPS\_EVENT\_10172024.gdb.zip.*”

**Section 3.3 - A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet** (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

- **County**
- **De-energization date/time**
- **Restoration date/time**
- **“All Clear” declaration date/time**
- **General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non- High Fire Threat District**
- **Total customers de-energized**
- **Residential customers de-energized**
- **Commercial/Industrial Customers de-energized**
- **Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized**
- **AFN other than MBL customers de-energized**
- **Other Customers**
- **Distribution or transmission classification**

**Response:**

A total of 17,367 customers were de-energized during the PSPS. Of the customers de-energized, there were 14,370<sup>15</sup> residential, 2,181 commercial/industrial, 1,136 MBL Program customers, 3,190 AFN other than MBL, and 814 customers in the “Other”<sup>16</sup> category. Additionally, three PG&E defined transmission-level<sup>17</sup> customers were de-energized. Appendix B lists de-energized circuits and the relevant information relating to each circuit. Delayed restoration time due to reclassification and/or damages are further noted for each circuit.

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<sup>15</sup> MBL Program and AFN customers are included within the count of residential customers affected.

<sup>16</sup> ‘Other’ includes customers that do not fall under the residential or commercial/industrial categories such as governmental agencies, traffic lights, agricultural facilities, and prisons.

<sup>17</sup> PG&E defines transmission-level customers as customers being served by 60 kV assets or higher. The customer impacted in this PSPS was not under CAISO Control, thus would not meet the definition of a transmission customer per D. 21.06.034.

## **Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities**

**Section 4.1 – Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility’s overhead facilities in the areas where power is shut off. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)**

### **Response:**

During the period of concern, weather stations near the PSPS areas recorded wind gusts as high as 88 miles per hour. These are shown in Table 23 and Figure 31 in Section 12.

During patrols of the de-energized circuits prior to restoring power, PG&E found two incidents of wind-related damages and one incident of a wind-related hazard. Damages are conditions that occurred during the PSPS, necessitating repair or replacement of PG&E’s asset, such as a wire down or a fallen pole. Hazards are conditions that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed, such as a tree limb found suspended in electrical wires. The damages and hazard locations are illustrated in Figure 16 – 18 and mapped in Figure 19.

**Figure 16: Wind Related-Damage in Santa Cruz County – Broken tie wire**



**Figure 17: Vegetation-Damage in Napa County – Tree fell on primary conductor**



**Figure 18: Vegetation-Hazard in Santa Cruz County – Tree branch on primary conductor**



**Section 4.2 - A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. (*SED Additional Information.*)**

**Response:**

A table of damages and hazards within the de-energized areas can be found in Appendix C.

**Section 4.3 - A zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS event damage and hazard points. The file should include items that are required in Section 4.2. (SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**


A zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS damage and hazard points can be found in attachment, “PGE\_PSPS\_EVENT DAMAGES\_HAZARDS\_10172024.gdb.zip.”

**Section 4.4 - A PDF map identifying the location of each damage or hazard. (SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

See Figure 19 for a map identifying the location of the damages and hazard.

**Figure 19: Map of Damage and Hazard Incidents During October 17 – 20, 2024 PSPS**



## **Section 5 – Notifications**

**Section 5.1 - A description of the notice to public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3. D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SED Additional Information.)**

### **Response:**

Throughout the PSPS, PG&E made significant efforts to notify Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, CBOs (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers in accordance with the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.<sup>18</sup>

PG&E followed the Notification Plan included in our [PG&E's 2024 Pre-Season Report, Appendix C: Notification Plan](#), pp. 70-79. In addition, PG&E completed the following:

- Worked with telecommunications service providers throughout the PSPS to effectively coordinate, share information, and manage the weather event. PG&E also provided telecommunications service providers with a dedicated PG&E contact in the EOC known as the Critical Infrastructure Lead (CIL), who shared up-to-date PSPS information and answered specific, individual questions. These partners were able to reach the CIL 24/7 during a PSPS by e-mail or phone. In addition, PG&E proactively reached out to 17 telecommunications service providers<sup>19</sup> via email or phone as weather changes or new information regarding the PSPS became available.
- In accordance with the Phase 3 PSPS Guidelines,<sup>20</sup> provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that served known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons. All notifications to paratransit agencies included a link to the PSPS emergency website updates page, [pge.com/pspsupdates](http://pge.com/pspsupdates) and a section called “Additional Resources” with a link to a map showing areas potentially affected by the shutoff. This site also directs users to other webpages, such as the CRC page, which includes CRC information such as CRC locations, hours, and services available (see Section 9). The PSPS emergency website updates page also includes two prominent buttons at the top of the page, allowing customers to look up an address to determine impact, and a map showing areas potentially affected by the shutoff.
- Directs customers to [pge.com/pspsupdates](http://pge.com/pspsupdates) via each PSPS notification, which includes a link to CRC information. This website prominently highlights the dedicated CRC page, which includes CRC locations, hours of operation, services available at each site, information regarding how to find local CRCs and via the PSPS outage map and where to access electricity during the hours CRCs are closed.
- PG&E considers multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community as part of our All Customers (including MBL Program customers and Self-

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<sup>18</sup> D.19-05-042.

<sup>19</sup> American Tower, AT&T Corporation, Century Link, Charter Communications, Comcast Corporation, Crown Castle International, Frontier Communications Corp, Pinnacles Tel Co, SBA Towers, Suddenlink Communications, TDS Telecom, T-Mobile-Sprint, Verizon Wireless, Ducor Telephone Co, Mediacom California LLC, Ponderosa Telephone Co, Sierra Telephone Company Inc.

<sup>20</sup> D.21-06-034.



Identified Vulnerable (SIV)<sup>21</sup> Program customers) recipient group. For information on PG&E’s outreach and community engagement with master-metered owners, property managers, and building account holders, refer to [PG&E’s AFN Quarterly Progress Report](#) of activities between April 1, 2024, and June 30, 2024.

- During this PSPS, PG&E identified two circuits with shared customers (SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101 and Auberry 1101) that were in scope for potential de-energization. SCE and PG&E collaborated closely to ensure situational awareness of PG&E’s PSPS so that SCE could successfully execute PSPS notifications to these shared customers.

Table 3 provides a description of the notifications PG&E sent to Tribal/Local Governments Public Safety Partners, and all customers in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.<sup>22</sup>

**Table 3: Notification Descriptions**

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
<p><b>PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization</b></p>	<p>Public Safety Partners and CBOs,<sup>23</sup> transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities</p>	<p>On October 14, 2024, PG&amp;E’s Meteorology Team noted a potential PSPS and updated the weather forecast on <a href="http://pge.com/weather">pge.com/weather</a> to “elevated” in certain parts of the service area. At this time, local PG&amp;E representatives called each County Office of Emergency Services (OES) in PG&amp;E’s electrical service area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that PG&amp;E is monitoring an increased potential of PSPS outages.</p> <p>Following PG&amp;E’s activation of its EOC, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PG&amp;E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&amp;E’s EOC has been activated and that PG&amp;E is monitoring for potential PSPS.</li> <li>• PG&amp;E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners<sup>24</sup> via call, text, and e-mail; these notifications included the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Estimated window of the de-energization time.</li> <li>○ When weather is anticipated to pass.</li> <li>○ Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<sup>21</sup> SIV Program is inclusive of customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and “certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected.” In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” in an effort to identify customers “above and beyond those in the medical baseline population” to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account indefinitely.

<sup>22</sup> D.19-05-042.

<sup>23</sup> Phase 3 D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A9, Section G. MBL Program and AFN Communities, No. 4, Each electric investor-owned utility must provide proactive notification and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during a PSPS.

<sup>24</sup> Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Links to the PSPS Portal where PSPS-specific maps and information are available.</li> <li>● Local PG&amp;E representatives called potentially impacted County OES and select Tribes to inform them that PG&amp;E is monitoring an increased potential of PSPS.</li> </ul>
<p><b>WATCH NOTIFICATION:</b> 24-48 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers) transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities</p>	<p>During this time, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● PG&amp;E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES.</li> <li>● PG&amp;E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers, municipal utilities, and all customers via call, text message and e-mail; these notifications included the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Estimated window of the de-energization time.</li> <li>○ When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass.</li> <li>○ ETOR.</li> <li>○ For Public Safety Partners only: Links to the PSPS Portal.</li> <li>○ For Customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS Updates webpage with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, language support and the Portable Battery Program.</li> <li>○ For Transmission Customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation.</li> </ul> </li> <li>● PG&amp;E sent notifications to MBL Program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV Program customers every hour until the customer confirmed receipt of the notification.</li> <li>● PG&amp;E also sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope; this was to inform them that power would not be shut off.</li> </ul> <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to get PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&amp;E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
<p><b>WARNING NOTIFICATION:</b> 1-4 hours in advance of</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers</p>	<p>During this time, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● PG&amp;E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&amp;E has made the decision to de-energize.</li> </ul>

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
<p><b>anticipated de-energization, if possible</b></p>	<p>(including MBL Program customers, SIV Program customers) transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PG&amp;E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers, and customers; these notifications included the same key PSPS timing information and resource links as the “Watch Notification.”</li> <li>• PG&amp;E sent notifications to MBL Program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts and SIV Program customers every hour until the customer confirmed receipt of the notification.</li> <li>• PG&amp;E also sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope; this was to inform them that power would be shut off.</li> </ul> <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&amp;E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
<p><b>POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-energization is initiated</b></p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers), transmission-level customers<sup>25</sup>, and municipal utilities</p>	<p>When shut off was initiated, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PG&amp;E submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC to notify them that de-energization has been initiated.</li> <li>• Agency Representatives of PG&amp;E conducted a live call and/or sent an e-mail, as appropriate, to County OES representatives that were within the potential PSPS scope area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that customers within their jurisdiction were beginning to be de-energized.</li> <li>• PG&amp;E Grid Control Center (GCC) conducted live agent calls to impacted transmission-level customers.</li> <li>• PG&amp;E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, municipal utilities, transmission-level customers and customers via call, text messages, and e-mail, which included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Impacted addresses (for customers only).</li> <li>○ De-energization time.</li> <li>○ When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass.</li> <li>○ For Customers Only: Links to the PSPS Updates webpage with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the Portable Battery Program.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

<sup>25</sup> Transmission-level customers receive a GCC live call before de-energization and prior to re-energization.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		<p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&amp;E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
<p><b>WEATHER “ALL-CLEAR”/ETOR UPDATE NOTIFICATION: Immediately before re-energization begins</b></p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities</p>	<p>After the weather had passed and areas were deemed safe to begin patrols and restoration, PG&amp;E completed the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&amp;E is initiating re-energization patrols.</li> <li>• Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers<sup>26</sup>, municipal utilities and customers via call, text message and e-mail; these notifications included the ETOR.</li> <li>• Sent “PSPS update” notifications to customers if their ETOR changed; two ways that an ETOR may change include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ New field or meteorology conditions.</li> <li>○ Damage was found during patrols and repair is needed.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to get PPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&amp;E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
<p><b>RESTORATION NOTIFICATION: When re-energization is complete</b></p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, and All Customers (including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities</p>	<p>GCC conducted live agent calls to notify impacted transmission-level customers of restoration. Once customers, including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers, were restored, they received notifications via call, text and e-mail. This was done using an automated process that issued customer notifications every 15 minutes upon restoration of service. Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&amp;E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications.</p> <p>Once all customers were restored, PG&amp;E submitted the final PPS State Notification Form to Cal OES, sent an e-mail to the CPUC confirming restoration of PPS outages</p>

<sup>26</sup> Transmission lines serving impacted Transmission-level Customers and Municipal Utilities may cut across multiple Fire Index Areas (FIAs) and will only be notified when all those FIAs that the line cuts across have been given the All-Clear.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		and reclassification of customers if applicable, and sent a notification to Public Safety Partners via call, text and e-mail. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.

In addition to providing notifications to Tribal and local governments, Public Safety Partners, CBOs (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers, PG&E alerted the public in advance of de-energization, via media and PG&E’s website.

Media Engagement

From the time PG&E publicly announced the potential PSPS until power was restored, we engaged with customers and the public through the media described below.

- Proactively issued 10 local news releases or written information directly to news outlets about the PSPS. This included:
  - Five, to integrated multicultural news outlets.
  - Five, to local or national news outlets.
- Responded to 108 media inquiries, either from media outlets that contacted PG&E’s 24-hour media line, or direct calls/emails to field media representatives. This included:
  - 18 integrated multicultural news outlets.
  - 90 local or national news outlets.
- Participated in 72 media interviews (i.e. live, recorded or unrecorded phone interviews) to provide situational updates and preparedness messages for the PSPS. This included:
  - 10 integrated multicultural news outlets.
  - 62 other local or national news outlets.
- As of October 20, 2024, PG&E identified 354 unique prints, online, and broadcast stories. This included:
  - 58 integrated multicultural news outlets.
  - 296 local or national news outlets.

PG&E Website

During this PSPS, PG&E placed an Informational Alert on the [pge.com](https://www.pge.com) home page that drove customers to PG&E’s PSPS site and implemented tools to maintain stability of the PSPS emergency website/PSPS updates page [pgealerts.alerts.pge.com/psps-updates](https://pgealerts.alerts.pge.com/psps-updates). Visits to the emergency website peaked on October 17, 2024, with 132,197 visits and 306,705 page views. The emergency website saw a total of 467,356 visits and 1,023,802 page views from the time the PSPS began to the time all customers had been restored.

We remain committed to the continuous improvement of our websites to better meet the diverse needs of its customers. As we launch new features and functionality to [pge.com](https://www.pge.com) and to [pgealerts.alerts.pge.com](https://pgealerts.alerts.pge.com), we test to help ensure compliance with updated WCAG 2.1AA standards. We also seek to improve customer experience with user testing for key components. Where possible, we remediate accessibility issues that customers or stakeholders have brought to our attention.

The following content was available on PG&E’s PSPS updates pages or on links from those pages:

- Straightforward, simplified PSPS information available in 16 languages, with clear updates about the planned scope of the PSPS, including location (e.g., list of impacted Tribes, cities, and counties), duration of the PSPS, including estimated times of de-energization and re-energization at the individual address level, and overall, for the PSPS.
- PDFs of potentially impacted areas, shape and KMZ files for Public Safety Partners to use with their own mapping applications, and city/county lists with shutoff and restoration summaries.
- CRC details were made available as soon as sites were confirmed, including locations listed by county, resources available at each center, type of CRC (e.g., indoor, outdoor), health and safety policies, and operating hours. CRC locations were also indicated on the PSPS impact map.
- Links to additional resources including Electric Vehicle (EV) charging location map, videos in ASL (American Sign Language), locations of ILCs, resources for customers with accessibility, financial, language, and aging needs, backup power safety tips, MBL Program information, and more.
- Webpage, available in 15 non-English languages, that describes our language support services for customers during a PSPS at [pge.com/pspslanguagehelp](http://pge.com/pspslanguagehelp).
- Survey to provide input about the website and PSPS communications.
- Address look-up tool that a customer and the public could use to identify specific potential PSPS impacts.
- Address-level alerts, available in 15 non-English languages, that allow non-PG&E-account holders to receive notifications via a phone call or SMS text for any address where they do not receive a bill (e.g., workplace, child’s school, renters, mobile home parks, etc.). This is also a valuable communication tool for renters and tenants of master metered accounts, such as mobile home parks. See [pgealerts.alerts.pge.com/outage-tools/get-psps-alerts/](http://pgealerts.alerts.pge.com/outage-tools/get-psps-alerts/) and Figure 20 below.

**Figure 20: PG&E PPS Address Alert Sign-Up Webpage**

**Get Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) alerts**

Get a phone call or SMS text in the event a power shutoff is needed to prevent a wildfire.

For my account ▼

For another address (e.g., your work, your child's school, a relative's home) ▲

Service Address Report an Issue Find meter ID

Start typing an address... 🔍

Can't find your address? [Report it](#) or call [1-800-743-5002](tel:1-800-743-5002).

To unsubscribe from automated call address alerts, call [1-800-896-9654](tel:1-800-896-9654) using the phone number you enrolled.

To unsubscribe from SMS text address alerts, text UNENROLL to 97633.

**Section 5.2 – Notification timeline including prior to de-energization, initiation, restoration, and cancellation, if applicable. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)**

**Response:**

Table 4 describes notifications and the time the notification was sent in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines,<sup>27</sup> to Tribal and local Governments, Public Safety Partners, and all customers prior to de-energization, initiation, and restoration.

In accordance with Phase 1 and Phase 3 guidelines, PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notice of potential de-energization “whenever possible” and to the extent it is operationally feasible within the CPUC’s minimum timeline requirements.<sup>28</sup> We were unable to issue Priority Notifications to Public Safety Partners in two jurisdictions (Santa Clara and Fairfield) due to emergency weather conditions and scope changes. However, we notified these Public Safety Partners as soon as it became operationally feasible in accordance with PSPS guidelines<sup>29</sup> on Wednesday, October 16 at 09:45 PDT. See Table 4 below for notification timestamps.

**Table 4: Customer Notification Timeline Summary**

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
<b>Pre-De-energization (Prior)</b>	72-48 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/15/2024 7:21	Priority		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/15/2024 21:17	Priority		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/16/2024 9:53	Priority		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/15/2024 6:45	Priority		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/15/2024 11:45	Priority	Only Shared Customers that are Public Safety Partners received this notification (SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101).	SCE

<sup>27</sup> D.19-05-042.

<sup>28</sup> D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.

<sup>29</sup> D.19-05-042, D.21-06-034.

<sup>30</sup> D.19-05-042, Appendix A, Timing of Notification.

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		Public Safety Partners**	10/15/2024 21:10	Priority		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/16/2024 9:45	Priority		PG&E
	48-24 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/15/2024 19:56	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/15/2024 19:33	Watch	SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101	SCE
		Public Safety Partners**	10/15/2024 19:40	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/16/2024 8:08	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/16/2024 10:26	Watch	SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101	SCE
		All Customers***	10/15/2024 19:33	Watch	Auberry 1101	SCE
		All Customers***	10/15/2024 19:33	Watch	SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101	SCE
		All Customers***	10/15/2024 19:42	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/16/2024 8:07	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/16/2024 10:25	Watch	Auberry 1101	SCE
		All Customers***	10/16/2024 10:26	Watch	SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101	SCE
		24-12 hours <sup>31</sup>	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/16/2024 7:58	Watch	
	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*		10/16/2024 17:09	Watch		PG&E
	Public Safety Partners**		10/16/2024 18:03	Watch		PG&E
	Public Safety Partners**		10/16/2024 18:27	Watch		PG&E

<sup>31</sup> While not a CPUC requirement, PG&E provides an additional 24-12-hour notification to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners and Customers.



Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 10:26	Watch	SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101	SCE
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 4:14	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/16/2024 17:52	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 09:34	Watch	Auberry 1101	SCE
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 10:26	Watch	SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101	SCE
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 4:09	Watch		PG&E
	4-1 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/17/2024 7:49	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/17/2024 9:49	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/17/2024 12:50	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/17/2024 14:10	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/17/2024 16:37	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/17/2024 18:12	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/17/2024 21:05	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/17/2024 22:06	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/18/2024 1:42	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/18/2024 13:36	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 7:58	Warning		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 10:01	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 13:05	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 14:18	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 17:15	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 18:15	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 20:38	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 22:12	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 23:03	Warning	SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101	SCE
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 1:50	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 13:34	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 7:54	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 9:59	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 13:04	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 14:17	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 17:15	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 18:15	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 20:38	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 22:09	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 22:56	Warning	Auberry 1101	SCE
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 23:03	Warning	SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101	SCE
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 1:48	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 13:33	Warning		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
<b>Initiation (During)</b>	When De-energization is initiated	Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 13:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 13:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 13:31	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 13:45	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 14:02	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 14:19	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 14:31	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 15:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 15:31	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 16:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 16:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 17:20	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 17:39	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 17:40	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 17:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 18:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 18:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 18:31	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 18:45	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 19:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 19:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 19:31	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 19:46	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 20:06	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 20:31	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 20:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 21:03	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 21:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 21:30	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 22:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 0:15	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 0:30	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 0:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 1:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 2:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 3:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 3:15	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 8:30	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 17:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 20:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 20:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 20:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 13:00	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 13:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 13:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 13:45	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 14:02	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 14:19	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 14:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 15:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 15:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 16:00	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 16:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 17:20	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 17:39	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 17:40	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 17:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 18:01	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 18:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 18:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 18:45	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 19:00	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 19:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 19:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 19:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 20:06	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 20:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 20:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 21:03	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:	
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 21:16	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 21:30	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 22:01	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 0:15	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 0:30	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 0:46	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 1:00	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 2:46	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 3:01	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 3:15	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 8:30	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 17:00	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 20:00	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 20:16	Power Off		PG&E	
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 20:31	Power Off		PG&E	
		Immediately before re-energization	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/18/2024 11:41	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	First All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
			Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/19/2024 14:36	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	Last All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
			Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 16:59	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	First All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
			Public Safety Partners**	10/19/2024 16:55	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	Last All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 16:59	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	First All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/19/2024 16:55	Inspecting / Weather All-Clear	Last All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 15:40	ETOR Update	First ETOR Update Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/20/2024 12:21	ETOR Update	Last ETOR Update Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 15:40	ETOR Update	First ETOR Update Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/20/2024 12:21	ETOR Update	Last ETOR Update Notification sent.	PG&E
<b>Restoration (After)</b>	After re-energization was completed	Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 14:46	Restore	First initial Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/20/2024 17:03	Restore	Last initial Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 14:46	Restore	First initial Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/20/2024 17:03	Restore	Last initial Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/20/2024 16:59	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/16/2024 6:55	Cancel	Only Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
					removed from scope received cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made on 19/16/2024 at 05:41 AM.	
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/17/2024 2:38	Cancel	Only Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs removed from scope received cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made on 19/17/2024 at 02:15 AM.	PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/18/2024 15:20	Cancel	Only Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs removed from scope received cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made on 10/18/2024 at 03:06 PM.	PG&E



Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	10/19/2024 9:50	Cancel	Only Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs removed from scope received cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made on 10/19/2024 at 09:35 AM.	PG&E
Cancellation	Within 2-hours of decision to cancel	Public Safety Partners**	10/15/2024 18:30	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made at 18:08.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/16/2024 7:00	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made at 05:41.	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		Public Safety Partners**	10/17/2024 2:57	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made at 02:15.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 5:34	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made at 5:20.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/18/2024 15:29	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made at 15:06.	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
		Public Safety Partners**	10/19/2024 10:40	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made on 10/18/2024 at 9:35.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	10/19/2024 11:43	Cancel	Only Shared Customer Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers (SO. CAL EDISON NO. 3 1101).	SCE
		All Customers***	10/15/2024 18:30	Cancel	Only Customers removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
					was made at 18:08.	
		All Customers***	10/16/2024 7:00	Cancel	Only Customers removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made at 5:41.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/17/2024 2:57	Cancel	Only Customers removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made at 2:15.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 5:34	Cancel	Only Customers removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made at 5:20.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/18/2024 15:29	Cancel	Only Customers removed from scope received the	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
					cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made at 15:06.	
		All Customers***	10/19/2024 10:09 AM	Cancel	Only Shared Customers removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers (Auberry 1101).	SCE
		All Customers***	10/19/2024 10:40	Cancel	Only Customers removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers was made at 9:35.	PG&E
		All Customers***	10/19/2024 11:43	Cancel	Only Shared Customers removed from scope received the cancel notification. The decision to descope these customers (SO. CAL	SCE

Event Order	Minimum Timeline <sup>30</sup>	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Distributed by:
					EDISON NO. 3 1101).	
<b>Ad Hoc Notification</b>	N/A	Customers incorrectly notified	10/18/2024 6:54	Ad Hoc	Only customers who received the incorrect restoration notification received this ad hoc notification.	PG&E

\*A subset of Public Safety Partners, including Tribes, cities, counties, and community choice aggregators.

\*\*A subset of Public Safety Partners, including water, wastewater, and communication service providers.

\*\*\*All Customers, including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers.

**Section 5.3 - For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following template to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)**

**“Notification attempts made” and “Successful positive notification” must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers that need positive notifications, the utilities must explain the reason. In addition, the utilities must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. (SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

Table 5 includes metrics associated with PG&E notifications provided to customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted. PG&E interprets the number of customers that need positive or affirmative notification as customers the company seeks confirmation from, namely MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers.

**Table 5: Notifications to Customers where Positive or Affirmative Notification was Attempted<sup>32</sup>**

Designation	Total Number of customers <sup>33</sup>	Notification Attempts Made <sup>34</sup>	Timing of Attempts <sup>35</sup> (PDT)	Who made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification <sup>36</sup>
MBL Program <sup>37</sup>	1,948	1,927 Watch Notifications	10/15/2024 19:43	PG&E	1,859 Watch Notifications
		1,527 Warning Notifications	10/16/2024 20:10		1,273 Warning Notifications
		3,454 Overall Notifications	10/15/2024 19:43		3,132 Overall Notifications
MBL behind a master meter <sup>38</sup>	18	18 Watch Notifications	10/15/2024 19:43	PG&E	16 Watch Notifications
		12 Warning Notifications	10/16/2024 17:59		9 Warning Notifications
		30 Overall Notifications	10/15/2024 19:43		25 Overall Notifications
SIV Program	928	928 Watch Notifications	10/15/2024 19:43	PG&E	869 Watch Notifications
		719 Warning Notifications	10/16/2024 20:08		565 Warning Notifications
		1,647 Overall Notifications	10/15/2024 19:43		1,434 Overall Notifications

For this PSPS, MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers received automated calls, texts, and emails at the same intervals as the general customer notifications. PG&E provided

<sup>32</sup> Counts of Notification Attempts Made will not reflect the actual total number of customers notified as both MBL Program and SIV Program customers can appear in both subset groups.

<sup>33</sup> Total number of customers notified where notification was attempted. Count includes customers that may have been removed from scope or received Cancellation Notifications prior to de-energization, but still received Watch and/or Warning notifications.

<sup>34</sup> Count of Warning Notifications includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

<sup>35</sup> Initial start time notification was sent.

<sup>36</sup> PG&E considers successful positive notifications as those in which the notification was successfully delivered to the customer (i.e., no bounce back) and the customer acknowledges receipt of the notification.

<sup>37</sup> Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for Medical Baseline quantities. The Medical Baseline category for the purposes of Table 5 does not include MBL Program customers who are master meter tenants.

<sup>38</sup> PG&E has additional processes in place to ensure MBL Program customers are notified. Master meter tenants are contacted directly to be considered a positive notification. Contacting the property or building manager does not count as a positive notification.

unique PSPS Watch and PSPS Warning Notifications to MBL Program customers<sup>39</sup> and SIV Program customers.

These customer groups also received additional calls and texts at hourly intervals until the customer confirmed receipt of the automated notifications by either answering the phone, responding to the text, or opening the email. If confirmation was not received, a PG&E representative visited the customer’s home to check on the customer (referred to as the “doorbell ring” process) while hourly notification retries continued. If the customer did not provide confirmation to PG&E following the check-in, the PG&E representative left a door hanger providing additional PSPS notification and information at the home to indicate PG&E had visited. In each case, the additional door hanger notification was considered successful.<sup>40</sup>

At times, PG&E also made Live Agent phone calls in parallel to the automated notifications and doorbell rings, as an additional attempt to reach the customer prior to and/or after de-energization.

PG&E shared the lists of the MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers who had not confirmed receipt of their notifications with the appropriate county and Tribal emergency managers twice daily via the PSPS Portal. PG&E proactively notified agencies that the data was available on the PSPS Portal and encouraged them to inform these customers of the resources available to them. PG&E is unable to track and report on notifications made by Public Safety Partners, as notification systems and/or platforms used by Public Safety Partners are out of PG&E’s purview; PG&E encourages Public Safety Partners to include PSPS messages on all of their platforms. PG&E describes its engagement with Public Safety Partners in Section 6.

Table 6 and Table 7 include metrics associated with the notifications to de-energized MBL Program customers.

**Table 6: Outcomes of Notifications to De-energized Medical Baseline Program Customers**

Count	Type of Notifications to De-energized MBL Program Customers <sup>41</sup>	Description
1,116	<b>Total De-energized MBL Program Customers</b>	The number of customers de-energized who participate in PG&E’s MBL Program.
1,116	<b>Total Notifications Attempted / Sent</b>	The total sum of automated notifications attempted via call, text, and e-mail, in-person doorbell ring visit attempts and/or Live Agent phone calls.
0	<i>Total Notifications Not Attempted / Sent</i>	<i>Total MBL Program customers de-energized that PG&amp;E did not attempt to notify.</i>
1,114	<b>Total Notifications Delivered</b>	The total sum of automated notifications sent via call, text, and e-mail.
2	<i>Total Notifications Not Delivered<sup>42</sup></i>	<i>Total MBL Program customers de-energized whose notification was not delivered.</i>

<sup>39</sup> Including MBL Program customers who are master-metered tenants (e.g., renters or tenants in mobile home park).

<sup>40</sup> For MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers, the in-person door ring visit where a door hanger is left, but no contact made with the customer is considered “successful contact,” but not confirmed as “received.” If the representative makes contact with the customer, then it is considered “received.”

<sup>41</sup> Based on SPID.

<sup>42</sup> Customers received Doorbell Rings.



Count	Type of Notifications to De-energized MBL Program Customers <sup>41</sup>	Description
762	<b>Total Notifications Initially Acknowledged</b>	The total sum of automated notifications sent via call, text, and email where notification was acknowledged.
2,146	<b>Total In-Person Visits/Doorbell Rings and Live Agent Phone Calls</b>	Total attempted doorbell ring for impacted MBL Program customers where PG&E made contact with the customer (either in person or via phone call in advance of visit) or left a door hanger. <sup>43</sup> This includes call attempts made by Live Agent representatives to MBL Program customers that had not yet confirmed receipt of their automated notification or answered the door during PG&E's in-person visit. Refer to Table 7 for the detailed breakdown of this category.
1,103	<b>Total Notifications Received</b>	Customers who acknowledged their notification by taking one of the following actions: answered an automated or Live Agent phone call, responded to a text message, opened an e-mail, or greeted an in-person doorbell ring (excludes voicemails left, text message delivered only and not confirmed, door hanger left).
13	<i>Total Notifications Not Received</i>	<i>Total MBL Program customers who did not confirm receipt/acknowledge their automated notifications, Live Agent phone calls or in-person doorbell ring. Customers who did not answer a doorbell ring were left a door hanger.</i>

**Table 7: Count and Type of Additional Notifications to De-energized Medical Baseline Program Customers**

Count	Type of Additional Notifications to Impacted Medical Baseline Customers <sup>44</sup>	Description
542	Total In-Person Visits / Doorbell Rings	Doorbell ring attempts to impacted MBL Program customers where PG&E made contact with the customer (either in person or via phone call in advance of visit) or left a door hanger. <sup>45</sup>
1,604	Live Agent Phone Calls	Calls made by Live Agent representatives to MBL Program customers that had not yet confirmed receipt of their automated notification or answered the door during PG&E's in-person visit.

<sup>43</sup> Customers may have confirmed receipt of their notifications in multiple channels (e.g., automated notification and/or doorbell ring); therefore, the counts of total attempted and successful notifications are not mutually exclusive.

<sup>44</sup> Based on SPID.

<sup>45</sup> Customers may have confirmed receipt of their notifications in multiple channels (e.g., automated notification and/or doorbell ring); therefore, the counts of total attempted and successful notifications are not mutually exclusive.

**Section 5.4 - A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

Please reference attachment, “PGE\_PSPS\_Event\_Notifications\_10172024.pdf” for a copy of notification templates, the timing of the notifications and methods of notifications that PG&E and SCE sent during the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS. Additional information on the timing of notifications sent during this PSPS can be found in Section 5.2.

PG&E provides Tribal, city, county, CCAs, Public Safety Partner, transmission-level customers, and municipal utility notifications in English only. All other customer notifications are delivered in-language if a customer’s language preference is on file. If there is no language preference on file, the notification is delivered in English, with information on how to get PSPS information in translated languages. For more information on notifications provided to customers in customer-set language preferences, see Table 13.

**Section 5.5 - If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. (D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notifications whenever possible in accordance with the PSPS Phase 1, Phase 3 and 2019 PSPS OII guidelines, weather and other factors permitting.

During this PSPS, 169 customers were unable to receive notifications as no valid contact information was provided by the customer to PG&E at the time of notification. These customers are not included in Table 8. Following the PSPS, PG&E will send these customers postcards and encourage them to update their contact information for future notifications.

**Table 8: Notification Failure Causes**

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
Public Safety Partners excluding CFI <sup>46</sup>	Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	0	No failures.

<sup>46</sup> Only includes Tribes, cities, counties, and CCAs.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.
CFI <sup>47</sup>	Facilities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification	14	See Table 8A and 8B.
	Facilities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification	2	See Table 8A.
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	2	See Table 8A.
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	29	See Table 8D and 8E.
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	197	See Table 8D and 8F.
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	10	See Table 8D and 8G.
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.
All other affected customers	Customers who did not receive 24–48-hour advance notifications	167	See Table 8A.
	Customers who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notifications	168	See Table 8A and 8C.
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	167	See Table 8A.
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization initiation	324	See Table 8D and 8E.
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization	4,146	See Table 8D and 8F.

<sup>47</sup> Includes Public Safety Partners who are critical facilities and infrastructure customers.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization is complete	294	See Table 8D and 8G.
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0 PG&E Customers 2 SCE Customers	SCE's notification vendor located a special character in the cancel message causing processing issues. Once the special character was removed, the notification re-launched and delivered the notification eight minutes after the 2-hour compliance window.

**Table 8A: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Any Notifications Before De-Energization**

Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
2	165	<p>These customers were not planned to be de-energized based on the normal circuit configuration. However, these customers were on an abnormal switching configuration that was not properly accounted for at the time of de-energization, and therefore, did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization.</p> <p>We will review our processes to properly account for abnormal switching with the responsible personnel and consider additional training.</p>
0	2	<p>Our data system for pre-outage PSPS notifications had not yet registered that these customers were in service. Therefore, these customers were not identified as impacted by PSPS and did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization.</p> <p>However, these customers did receive notifications at the time of the outage and post-outage.</p>

**Table 8B: Explanation of Failures for CFI Who Did Not Receive 48-to 72-Hour Priority Notification**

Count of Critical Facilities	Explanation
12	The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation with our notification vendor. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

**Table 8C: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 1-4-Hour Imminent Notifications**

Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
1	A custom notification file provided to our vendor (Message Broadcast) was not launched.  We plan to coordinate with Message Broadcast to address this process error.

**Table 8D: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Were Not Notified at De-energization Initiation, Immediately Before Re-energization, and When Re-energization was Complete**

Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
4	24	For these customers, our internal outage management system used for in-outage and post-outage notifications was not aligned with actual field conditions. Therefore, these customers did not receive notifications after their outage began.  We plan to correct our systems for these customers to ensure they align with actual field conditions.
2	2	These customers were impacted by a non-PSPS outage shortly before the start of the planned PSPS outage. We are still investigating why this resulted in these notification failures for the PSPS outage.  We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.
0	5	The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

**Table 8E: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Were Not Notified at De-energization Initiation**

Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
23	292	<p>These customers were not notified at de-energization initiation.</p> <p>The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.</p>
0	1	<p>This customer did receive a delayed de-energization initiation notification.</p> <p>The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.</p>

**Table 8F: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Were Not Notified Immediately Before Re-energization**

Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
11	80	These customers were not notified immediately before re-energization due to a categorization error in our internal outage platform.
160	3,128	The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation with our notifications vendor. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.
19	837	The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.
1	70	<p>These customers did not receive this notification until after restoration. This was because the categorization change in our internal outage platform was performed shortly prior to re-energization, and did not leave enough time for this notification to be sent prior to re-energization. This categorization change can only be performed after All Clear has been declared and patrolling has begun.</p> <p>For 58 “Other Affected Customers” in this group, this was because these customers were restored less than one hour after All Clear was declared.</p>

**Table 8G: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Were Not Notified When Re-energization was Complete**

Count of Critical Facilities	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
4	257	The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation with our notifications vendor. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.
0	6	The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

**Section 5.6 - Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures.** (D.21-06-014, page 286.)

**Response:**

We have reviewed the notifications for this PSPS and have identified or are in the process of identifying corrective actions as discussed in Table 8.

Regarding the shared customer notification failures, PG&E will request SCE to launch shared customer notifications immediately following the decision to cancel, instead of launching notifications in parallel to PG&E customer notifications, to ensure shared customers are notified within the 2-hour compliance window.

**Section 5.7 - Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data.** (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)

**Response:**

For this PSPS, we identified five cases of false positive communications including:

- Big Sandy Rancheria inadvertently received an All Clear or Restore Notification. Due to a human error, the entire jurisdiction of Fresno County was selected for these notifications despite Big Sandy Rancheria being previously canceled and removed from scope.
- The City of San Luis Obispo (SLO) received a Watch Notification shortly after receiving a Cancel Notification. Due to internal miscommunication between shifts, the Warning Notification payload, which excluded SLO, was not properly relayed, causing SLO to receive this notification. Note, SLO was removed from scope during this EOC shift transition.
- Three customers received false positive communications. For these three customers, our data systems were not aligned with actual field conditions. Therefore, these customers received false positive communications. We plan to correct our systems for these customers to ensure they align with actual field conditions.

We identified 11 cases of false negative communications for customers in this PSPS.

- We identified 10 cases of false negative communications for customers that were de-energized after receiving a Cancel Notification. These customers were removed in the final meteorology scope and sent a cancellation notice. However,

during de-energization, a prior version of the playbook was inadvertently utilized which resulted in these customers being de-energized.

- A categorization error occurred while operating a device at the time of de-energization, resulting in one customer incorrectly receiving a restoration notification prior to actual outage restoration without any additional advisement of the error. After completion of actual outage restoration, this customer did receive the anticipated restoration notification after power was restored.



## **Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement**

**Section 6.1 - List the organization names of public safety partners including, but not limited to, local governments, tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted prior to de-energization, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)**

### **Response:**

Please see Appendix D for a list of Public Safety Partners including Tribal representatives, local governments, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities notified with the date and time of the initial notification, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3.

As stated in our [2023 Safety Outage Decision Making Guide](#), we use a HFRA classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope. In Appendix D, we begin by identifying HFTD area assigned to Public Safety Partners. Any area outside of HFTD is re-classified as HFRA. PG&E's circuits can run miles long and span across multiple jurisdictions. Some Public Safety Partners outside of HFRA and HFTD were also in the potentially impacted scope in order to deenergize areas within HFRA and HFTD for safety.

**Section 6.2 - List the names of all entities invited to the utility's Emergency Operations Center for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility's emergency operation center. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)**

### **Response:**

On October 15, 2024, at 05:37 PDT, PG&E invited the CPUC via email to virtually embed in the EOC for the duration of the activation. Additionally, the County Monitor and IBEW joined certain briefings virtually. Other entities preferred to work with their PG&E point of contact directly.

PG&E also provides communication service providers with a dedicated PG&E contact in the EOC known as the CIL, who shares PSPS updates and answers specific questions. They can reach the CIL 24/7 during a PSPS by e-mail or phone at PG&E's Business Customer Service Center.

As part of our PSPS Pre-Season outreach,<sup>48</sup> PG&E provides water infrastructure and communication service providers in PG&E's electrical service area with information on how to request representation at PG&E EOC's. Alternatively, some partners may also request PG&E representation at their jurisdiction's activated Operations Emergency Center (OEC).<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> See 2024 PSPS Pre-Season Report, pp 70-71.

<sup>49</sup> D.19-05-042.

**Section 6.3 - A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)**

**Response:**

In preparation for a potential PSPS, PG&E sent automated notifications with links to the PSPS Portal, which provides PDF maps and GIS data to Public Safety Partners at the times outlined in Table 4. In addition, when PDF maps and GIS data were updated on the PSPS Portal due to scope changes, Portal users were notified via e-mail at the times outlined in Table 9.

After the EOC was activated, PDF maps and GIS data on the PSPS Portal were determined accurate and updated in a timely manner following changes to geographic scope or customer impacts.

**Table 9: PSPS Portal Time & Date for Map Sharing**

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
10/15/2024	05:53
10/15/2024	18:00
10/16/2024	06:47
10/17/2024	09:45*
10/18/2024	15:22
10/19/2024	09:51

\*PG&E’s ability to share GIS and PDF Maps on the PSPS Portal was delayed by a systemwide outage by our vendor, Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc. (ESRI). This outage was reported on October 16, 2024, at 17:37 and resolved on October 17, 2024, at 09:30. During this period, PG&E’s Public Safety Specialists had appropriate maps and information available to share with agency partners impacted by this PSPS.

**Section 6.4 - A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. (D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)**

**Response:**

Below is a description of the engagement with state CPUC, Cal OES, CAL FIRE and local (i.e., Tribes, cities, counties) Public Safety Partners:

- Submitted the PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES twice a day (07:00 PDT and 15:00 PDT), if there was a significant change to scope and at least once for each of the five PSPS stages: Activating PSPS Protocols/Potential to De-energize (Stage 1), Decision to De-energize (Stage 2), De-energization Initiated (Stage 3), Initiating Re-energization Patrols (Stage 4) and All PSPS Lines Re-energized (Stage 5). See Table 10 below.

**Table 10: PSPS Notifications Submitted to Cal OES**

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
10/15/2024	05:49
10/15/2024	06:40
10/15/2024	14:42
10/16/2024	06:25
10/16/2024	15:01
10/17/2024	02:26
10/17/2024	06:41
10/17/2024	11:13
10/17/2024	14:23
10/17/2024	17:08
10/17/2024	19:04
10/17/2024	20:44
10/17/2024	22:03
10/18/2024	01:19
10/18/2024	03:22
10/18/2024	07:01
10/18/2024	09:09
10/18/2024	11:07
10/18/2024	15:09
10/18/2024	15:24
10/18/2024	23:30
10/19/2024	07:06
10/19/2024	09:59
10/19/2024	11:21
10/19/2024	14:27
10/20/2024	08:41
10/20/2024	13:33

- Sent e-mails to the CPUC at least once for each of the five PSPS stages listed above. See Table 11 below.

**Table 11: PSPS Notifications Submitted to CPUC**

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
10/15/2024	05:37
10/16/2024	05:57
10/17/2024	02:33
10/17/2024	08:34
10/17/2024	13:33
10/17/2024	16:39
10/17/2024	17:33
10/17/2024	18:43

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PDT)
10/17/2024	19:35
10/17/2024	20:13
10/17/2024	21:11
10/17/2024	23:53
10/18/2024	02:15
10/18/2024	07:42
10/18/2024	08:49
10/18/2024	15:15
10/18/2024	19:54
10/19/2024	09:45
10/19/2024	15:27
10/20/2024	16:55

- Hosted daily State Executive Briefings with invitees including Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, Governor’s Office, U.S. Forest Service, and other state agencies to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions. A deck with key PSPS information was provided to participants.
- Hosted the daily Systemwide Cooperators Call, where all Public Safety Partners in the service area were invited to join for situational awareness.
- Hosted Tribal Cooperators Calls with potentially impacted Tribes to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions.
- Hosted Operational Areas Cooperators Communication Calls to provide situational awareness updates and answer questions.<sup>50</sup>
- Conducted ongoing coordination with Tribal and local County OES contacts through dedicated Agency Representatives. This includes but is not limited to providing the latest PSPS information, coordinating CRC locations, and resolving local issues in real-time.
- Provided links to the PSPS Portal that included planning and PSPS-specific maps, situation reports, critical facility lists and MBL Program customer lists at each notification and when scope changed. Note that the Situation Report was provided twice a day and at scope changes prior to de-energization and hourly once restoration began.
- Sent automated and live call notifications to agency partners before, during and after de-energization.
- Offered local and state agencies to be embedded in PG&E’s EOC, as well as offered PG&E Agency Representatives to be embedded virtually in local EOCs.
- A dedicated State Operations Center Agency Representative provided ongoing support to Cal OES to ensure all questions were addressed.

PG&E considers the advanced outreach and notification to local and state Public Safety Partners during this EOC activation successful but with minor improvements needed. This is based on the number and various types of outreach conducted (see list above), the feedback received from Public Safety Partners through the post-PSPS survey and the success rate of automated agency notifications. Of the responses given, PG&E received the following positive comments from in-scope Public Safety Partners regarding PSPS outreach:

<sup>50</sup> May vary in cadence and type based on County OES.

- “I appreciate all of the improvements that PG&E has made since the first PSPS event years ago.”
- “The portal is great, very easy to use and understand.”

Leading up to de-energization, we sent 100% of our automated notifications to Tribal and local governments within the required timeframes. Figure 21 shows the post-PSPS survey results when Public Safety Partners were asked to “evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the outage.” We received 24 responses to the survey. PG&E will continue to refine the agency notification process to ensure accurate and timely information sharing.

**Figure 21: Evaluation of Public Safety Partner Engagement**  
 How would you evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the 10/17/24 PSPS?



**Section 6.5 - Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information)**

**Response:**

To ensure PG&E provides adequate support to AFN communities, we engage with local communities through paratransit agencies, media partnerships, and CBOs to share coordination efforts, notification plans, CRC information, PSPS-specific information and more. See below for details on this engagement.

Engagement with Paratransit Agencies

In accordance with the Phase 3 Guidelines,<sup>51</sup> PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons needing access to a CRC during the PSPS. PG&E provided proactive notifications<sup>52</sup> to 220 paratransit agencies for the October 17 – October 20 PSPS. All notifications included a link to the PSPS emergency website updates page, [pge.com/pspsupdates](http://pge.com/pspsupdates) and a section called “Additional Resources” with a link to a map showing areas potentially affected by a shutoff. For more information on ADA-compliant CRC locations, see Section 9.

<sup>51</sup> D.21-06-034.

<sup>52</sup> For this PSPS, paratransit agencies received the Watch, Warning, Cancellation, and Restoration Notification. A list of zip codes was provided four times.

## Community Engagement

We engaged with over 500 “information-based” CBOs during the PSPS, sharing courtesy notification updates, fact sheets, and other relevant information that they could share with their constituents to expand our reach of communications, including infographic videos with relevant PSPS updates in 16 languages and ASL that the organizations could use to educate their consumers.

CBO resource partners were invited to the daily cooperator calls for Public Safety Partners, hosted by members from PG&E’s EOC who provided a situational update about the latest scope of the PSPS and an overview of the services available to customers. We hosted additional daily coordination calls with the CBO resource partners supporting the PSPS to provide an open forum to answer questions, offer suggestions for supporting their consumers best, and facilitate more localized coordination among the partners.

## Programs/Support for AFN Customers

PG&E provided a variety of resources to AFN customers before and during this PSPS. These resources include:

- Ad-Hoc AFN Backup Generation Solutions: During the October 17 – 20 PSPS, PG&E granted temporary generation exceptions to five AFN customers experiencing critical circumstances. This included transportation limitations and medical device requirements that CBO resources were unable to resolve during this PSPS. After exploring all viable options to support these customers, PG&E permitted the delivery of backup generation for these individual customers who rely on power for their health and safety. These specific situations do not meet our typical temporary generation process and procedures standards. However, given the unique circumstances, we went beyond our usual practices to ensure safety for our customers. Follow-ups will be conducted with these customers to introduce programs aimed at offering more permanent mitigation solutions for future PSPS impacts.
- Disability Disaster Access and Resource Program (DDAR):<sup>53</sup> We continued our collaboration with the CFILC to implement the DDAR Program for this PSPS. Through DDAR, we have supported AFN customers with the delivery of backup portable batteries (since July 2020) to eligible customers who need power during a PSPS. Through DDAR, PG&E provided the following resources for the October 17 – 20 PSPS.
  - 13 local ILCs provided aid to 818 customers who rely on power for medical or independent living needs. The direct assistance resources provided included 64 food vouchers, two generator fuel vouchers, and 64 hotel accommodations. PG&E is evaluating intervenor comments regarding how the ILCs aided customers reliant on power and will update the 2025 AFN Plan accordingly.
  - 3,247 batteries were previously distributed in affected counties, and one battery was delivered to potentially impacted customers. PG&E is evaluating intervenor comments regarding engagement with customers and battery delivery requests through DDAR and will update the 2025 AFN Plan accordingly.

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<sup>53</sup> For more information on the types of aid ILCs provided and how the delivery of aid was coordinated among DDAR, ILCs and the customers, refer to PG&E’s [2024 AFN Plan](#).

- Portable Battery Program (PBP).<sup>54</sup> Our PBP provides free portable battery systems for customers who live in Tiers 2 and 3 HFTDs and are enrolled in the MBL Program. For this PSPS, 469 customers in scope were supported by batteries received through the PBP (delivered in 2020, 2021, and year-to-date 2022). Since July 2020, a total of 25,354 battery units have been delivered through the PBP across the entire PG&E service area.
- Food Bank Partnerships: We continued to fund local food banks to provide food replacement to families during the PSPS and three days following service restoration. For this PSPS, we partnered with 21 local food banks that serve 29 of the 33 impacted counties to provide boxes of food replacement for families. For this PSPS, local food bank partnerships included:
  - Alameda County Food Bank
  - ATCAA Food Bank
  - Central California Food Bank
  - Clear Lake Gleaners Food Bank
  - Community Action Agency of Butte County
  - Community Action of Napa Valley Food Bank
  - Community Food Bank of San Benito
  - Dignity Health Connected Living
  - El Dorado Food Bank
  - Food Bank for Monterey County
  - Food Bank of Contra Costa & Solano
  - Food Bank of Nevada County
  - Interfaith Council of Amador
  - Merced County Food Bank
  - Placer Food Bank
  - Redwood Empire Food Bank
  - Second Harvest Food Bank of Santa Cruz
  - Second Harvest Food Bank of Silicon Valley
  - Second Harvest Food Bank San Joaquin & Stanislaus
  - The Resource Connection
  - Yolo Food Bank
- Meals on Wheels Partnerships: We continued our partnership with Meals on Wheels to provide additional support and services to customers in need during a PSPS. For this PSPS, we partnered with 23 Meals on Wheels Organizations that would be able to provide services to customers within the 33 counties in scope. Meals on Wheels Organizations partnerships included:
  - Chico Meals On Wheels
  - Clearlake Senior Center
  - Coastal Seniors (Mendocino)
  - Coastal Seniors (Sonoma)
  - Community Action Agency of Napa Valley
  - Community Bridges
  - Council on Aging, Sonoma County
  - Dignity Health Connected Living
  - Gold Country Community Services
  - J-Sei (Alameda)
  - J-Sei (Contra Costa)
  - Lakeport Senior Center
  - Liveoak Senior Center
  - Meals on Wheels Diablo Region
  - Meals on Wheels Monterey Peninsula
  - Meals on Wheels Solano County
  - Middletown Senior Center
  - Passages
  - Petaluma People Services
  - Service Opportunity for Seniors
  - Spectrum Community Services
  - Tehama County Community Action Agency
  - West Contra Costa Meals on Wheels

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<sup>54</sup> For more information about the PBP Program, refer to PG&E's [2024 AFN Plan](#).

- **211 Referral Services:** PG&E has a long-standing relationship with 211 through our charitable grant program. As of August 13, 2021, PG&E has a partnership with the California network of 211s to connect customers with resources before, during, and after a PSPS. For this PSPS, PG&E worked with 211 to assist 794 customers with information and resources.<sup>55</sup> Direct assistance resources provided included food vouchers for 132 customers, generator fuel vouchers for nine customers, accessible transportation for one customer, and hotel accommodations for 10 customers.
- **Accessible Transportation Partnerships:** We are partnered with Accessible Transportation organizations to provide customers with transportation to and from PG&E’s CRCs. For this PSPS, we successfully partnered with four organizations in preparation for the possibility of any transportation needs.<sup>56</sup>

### Communications to Customers with Limited English Proficiency

PG&E provided translated customer support through its customer notifications, website, call center, social media and engagement with CBOs, and multicultural media partnerships. Customers with their language preference set, received in-language (translated) notifications. For customers with no language preference set, notifications were provided in English with information on how to receive PSPS information in 15 non-English languages. See language preferences for this PSPS in Table 12.

**Table 12: Customer Notifications Based on Language Preference**

Language	Total Notifications <sup>57</sup>	Percent
English	1,880,483	99.5%
Spanish	8,152	0.4%
Chinese (Mandarin & Cantonese)	259	0.014%
Vietnamese	36	0.002%
Korean	28	0.001%
Portuguese	28	0.001%
Arabic	19	0.001%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,889,005</b>	<b>100%</b>

Customers with limited English proficiency have access to translation phone numbers on our PSPS website, highlighting that translation services are available in over 200 languages. Table 13 includes call center-related metrics associated with this PSPS.

**Table 13: Call Center Support Services<sup>58</sup>**

Total Calls Handled	PSPS Calls Handled	Average Response Time for PSPS-related Calls (seconds)	Number of Calls Handled by Call Center Translation Services	Number of Languages Supported by Call Center Translation Services
94,319	1,133	6	1,276	240+

<sup>55</sup> Additional information on 211s is not available within the PSPS Post-Event Report timeline. More information will be available in the [2024 AFN Plan](#).

<sup>56</sup> PG&E partnered with the following list of Accessible Transportation Organizations for this PSPS: Dignity Health Connected Living, Vivalon, El Dorado Transit, Fresno Economic Opportunities Commission.

<sup>57</sup> Total notifications do not include doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

<sup>58</sup> Metrics are provided from October 15, 2024, through October 20, 2024.



PG&E continued support and engagement with multicultural media organizations and in-language CBOs to maximize the reach of in-language communications to the public. Prior to the PSPS, we reached out to 37 multicultural media organizations to provide outreach in translated languages throughout the impacted 33 counties. These organizations covered the translated languages above and languages spoken by communities that occupy significant roles in California’s agricultural economy (e.g., Nahuatl). Additionally, we shared information and updates on PSPS with these media outlets, including news releases and social media infographics in English, translated languages and ASL, for their use and distribution. We also shared our new PSPS Language Resources page ([www.pge.com/pspslanguagehelp](http://www.pge.com/pspslanguagehelp) available in 16 languages) with organizations to share with their constituents. Highlights from our coordination with multicultural media organizations and CBOs during this PSPS includes coverage from KSTS-Telemundo<sup>59</sup> and News for Chinese.<sup>60</sup> See Figure 22 and Figure 23 below.

**Figure 22: News coverage on KSTS-Telemundo**



**Figure 23: Update on News for Chinese website**



<sup>59</sup> [KSTS-Telemundo Link](#)

<sup>60</sup> [News for Chinese Link](#)

**Section 6.6 - Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)**

**Response:**

The information requested is included in Sections 6.6a – 6.6f. For questions related to backup power, customers can email [TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com](mailto:TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com).

**Section 6.6a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.**

**Response:**

Table 14 lists the generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

**Table 14: Generators Available for Critical Facilities and Infrastructure Customers**

Generator Type	Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.) <sup>61</sup>	Description
Diesel Generator	2	.065	31	2 units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	1	.125	25	1 unit on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	4	.200	22.9	4 units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	1	.275	26	1 unit on reserve in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	2	.570	24.1	2 units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	1	1.5	10	1 unit on reserve in Martinez.
Diesel Generator	7	1.0	35	3 units pre-staged at an ICU Hospital, 4 units on reserve in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	8	1.14	24	8 units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	13	2.0	27.7	13 units on reserve, 5 at San Leandro and 8 at Sacramento.

<sup>61</sup> Estimated based on a 75% load. Barring mechanical failure and refueling the temporary generators have the ability to operate continuously throughout a typical PSPS.

**6.6b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.**

**Response:**

Table 15 lists the power capacity and maximum duration of operation of the generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

**6.6c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer's site immediately before and during the PSPS.**

**Response:**

During and immediately before the PSPS, 20 backup generators were activated to energize CFI customers that did not have an existing mitigation plan in place.

**6.6d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer's site.**

**Response:**

As a general policy, PG&E does not offer backup generation to individual facilities. However, PG&E's policy allows for granting exceptions for critical facilities when a prolonged outage could have a significant adverse impact to public health or safety.

Deployment of temporary generation is contingent upon the following circumstances: the expected duration to perform permanent repairs is significantly longer than the expected duration to install backup generation, the expected customer outage is 50,000 or more customer minutes, and the outage affects a distribution circuit serving multiple customers without a functional back-tie.<sup>62</sup>

PG&E has pre-arranged commitments with critical facility and infrastructure customers to provide temporary generation in case of a PSPS and evaluated requests received during the PSPS according to the prioritization described in Section 6.6e.

**6.6e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.**

**Response:**

PG&E prioritizes the deployment of available generation by first meeting existing commitments to individual facilities in the following order.

- Intensive care unit (ICU) hospitals, pre-identified by PG&E in partnership with the California Hospital Association (CHA) and Hospital Council of Northern and Central California (HC).
- Pandemic Response sites classified as medical stations and shelters. Additional facilities prepared to support public safety such as but not limited to First/emergency responders at the Tribal, local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected community choice aggregators, publicly-

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<sup>62</sup> 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about 8 hours.

owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.<sup>63</sup>

- Deployment of available generation is then followed by customers with special needs in the following order:
  - Life support, MBL, and temperature sensitive.
  - Large customers, economic damage customers, and danger to health and safety customers.
- Deployment of available generation is then followed by other customers based on maximizing relief based on the number of customers times expected duration.

**6.6f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.**

**Response:**

During this PSPS, PG&E utilized its rental fleet of temporary generators to mitigate the impacts of PSPS on its customers. This fleet was used to support 13 stand-alone facilities serving public safety and one indoor CRC. CFI customers that received backup generation are listed in Table 15.

**Table 15: Critical Facility and Infrastructure Customers Energized with Backup Generation**

County	Site Type	Generation Deployed	Duration of Operation (Hrs.)	Reason Deployed
Shasta	Cal Fire Happy Valley Fire Center	.125	0:00	High risk to Essential Emergency Response and Support Facilities.
Tehama	Cal Fire Red Bank Station	.056	38:45	High risk to Essential Emergency Response and Support Facilities.
Monterey	San Antonio Public School	.200	44:03	High risk to public safety.
Williams	Cortina Rancheria Indian Reservation	.056	72:45	High risk to public safety.
Colusa	Cortina Rancheria Indian Reservation	.056	73:45	High risk to public safety.
Colusa	Cortina Rancheria Indian Reservation	.056	74:30	High risk to public safety.

<sup>63</sup> The term “emergency response providers” includes federal, state, and local governmental and non-governmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities.

County	Site Type	Generation Deployed	Duration of Operation (Hrs.)	Reason Deployed
Solano	Residence Vacaville	.100	62:05	High risk to public safety.
Sonoma	City of Cloverdale Wastewater Treatment Plant	.570	0:00	High risk of environmental hazard.
Butte	Residence Yankee Hill	.056	45:17	High risk to public safety.
Colusa	Elk Creek Elementary School	.200	75:15	High risk to public safety.
Colusa	Elk Creek Junior High School	.350	77:05	High risk to public safety.
Tehama	Flournoy Elementary School	.200	68:30	High risk to public safety.
Napa	Angwin Distribution Microgrid	.500	63:35	High risk to public safety.
Glenn	Residence Orland	.065	67:05	High risk to public safety.
Colusa	Stonyford Community Hall	.032	Intermittent 10/17/24 - 10/19/24	High risk to public safety.

## Section 7 – Complaints & Claims

**Section 7.1 - The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06-014, page 304.)**

### **Response:**

Table 16 provides the number and nature of complaints received from customers and Public Safety Partners, submitted to both the CPUC and PG&E, for the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS.<sup>64</sup> Any complaints received after October 17 – 20, 2024, for this PSPS will be included in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

**Table 16: Number and Nature of Complaints due to the October 17 – 20, 2024 PSPS**

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
<p><b>Communications/Notifications</b> Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to get information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, Representational State Transfer (REST)/Digital Asset Manager (DAM) sites (as applicable).</p>	78
<p><b>PSPS Frequency/Duration</b> Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS, including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamics of weather conditions.</p>	109
<p><b>Safety/Health Concern</b> Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL Program populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern.</p>	42
<p><b>General PSPS Dissatisfaction/Other</b> Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PSPS and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PSPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.</p>	287
<p><b>Outreach/Assistance</b> Including, but not limited to complaints regarding CRCs, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers and other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PSPS.</p>	17

<sup>64</sup> PG&E Post-Event Reports are based on the CPUC template. Additional information regarding complaints and claims will be provided in the PSPS Post-Season Report.

Claims

As of October 24, 2024, PG&E received 28 claims for the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS.

**Table 17: Count and Type of Claim(s) Received**

Description of Claims	Number of Claims
Business Interruption / Economic Loss	4
Food Loss Only	22
Property Damage	2

## Section 8 – Power Restoration


### **Section 8.1 - A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power (*Resolution ESRB-8 page 5*)**

#### **Response:**

During the PSPS, the PG&E EOC Command and meteorology teams monitor real-time and forecasted weather conditions based on weather models, weather station data, and field observations while patrol crews and helicopters are pre-positioned in anticipation of the Weather All-Clear to begin patrols. Weather All-Clears are called based on pre-defined, geographic areas and mapping of each weather station in each zone to that area. This is known as the All-Clear Zone methodology, which based on past PSPS outages, was an improvement compared to issuing Weather All-Clear by FIAs.

All-Clear Zones align with known meteorological phenomena, such as mountain tops and wind gaps which may experience longer periods of extreme weather. This allows for further granularity in calling Weather All-Clears, thereby helping areas less prone to wind gusts or adverse conditions to be cleared and restored more quickly. PG&E monitors the conditions in each of these All-Clear Zones and as they fall below our minimum fire potential conditions the PG&E meteorologists will recommend areas for restoration.

**Figure 24: Map of FIA & TPs De-energized for October 17 – 20, 2024 PSPS**



As Weather All-Clears are issued, restoration crews patrol electrical facilities to identify and repair or clear any damage or hazard before re-energizing. Using the Incident Command System (ICS) as a base response framework, each circuit is assigned a taskforce consisting of supervisors, crews, trouble men, and inspectors. This structure allows PG&E to patrol and perform step restoration in alignment with the centralized control centers.



During restoration, PG&E issued nine Weather All-Clears and deployed approximately 244 personnel and 37 helicopters to patrol the lines in advance of restoration. Patrols were conducted on approximately 2,084 miles of distribution circuits and 52 miles of transmission lines that had been de-energized. Power was restored to customers as patrol completion verified the safe condition of each line.

**Section 8.2 - The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

PG&E issued Weather All-Clears for All-Clear Zones at the times noted in Table 18.

**Table 18: Weather All-Clear Times**

All-Clear Zones	Weather All-Clear Date and Time (PDT)
241B, 245C, 180C	10/18/2024 7:26
246D, 246B	10/18/2024 14:55
170B, 177D, 180D, 180H, 180J, 241A, 245A, 246C, 247C, 248B, 295A, 525, 530F, 530F, 530J, 565, 570B	10/19/2024 5:28
180I, 180J, 241C, 247A, 247C, 280A, 280B, 518B, 520C, 530E, 553, 585	10/19/2024 8:53
175C, 175E, 177B, 177E, 177F, 177G, 246A, 246G, 280C, 280G, 540A	10/19/2024 10:09
154D, 175D, 245B, 246I, 248A, 285A, 520B, 530A, 530D	10/19/2024 12:00
175B, 177C, 530C, 530B	10/19/2024 13:07
175F, 175G, 177A, 246H, 280H	10/19/2024 14:23
175H	10/19/2024 15:20

**Section 8.3 - For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.)**

**Response:**

PG&E was unable to restore one circuit within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear, which impacted approximately 952 customers. These customers were restored between two minutes and one hour eighteen minutes past the 24-hour mark.

**Table 19: Circuits PG&E was Unable to Restore within 24 Hours of the Weather All-Clear**

Circuit Name	Reason the Utility was Unable to Restore the Circuit Within 24 Hours
SILVERADO 2104	A portion of Silverado 2104 was not restored within 24 hours due to rugged mountainous terrain in portions of the circuit. Additionally, per our procedures, <sup>65</sup> we are not able to perform helicopter patrols past sunset due to safety concerns. Therefore we reconvened patrols during sunrise on October 20, 2024. Restoration of the entire circuit was completed around 13:18 PDT.

<sup>65</sup> Helicopter Operations Field Manual AVI-3001M Rev 2, Section 1.14.2, dated 10-21-24.

## **Section 9 – Community Resource Centers**

**Section 9.1 - The address of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.*)**

**Response:**

During the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS, PG&E opened 29 CRCs in 16 counties. The sites were visited by 4,186 people. A full list of CRC locations, assistance available, operating days and hours, and attendance is reported in Appendix F.

CRCs are typically open from 08:00 to 22:00 PDT during the time the power is shut off until customers are restored. Visitors were provided with PSPS information by dedicated staff, ADA-compliant restrooms, physically distanced tables and chairs, power strips to meet basic charging needs for personal medical devices and other electronics, snacks, bottled water, Wi-Fi, and cellular service access. For visitors who did not wish to remain on site, “Grab and Go” bags with a PSPS information card, water, non-perishable snacks, a mobile battery charger, and a blanket were available. Bags of ice and privacy screens were also available at indoor locations.

During this PSPS, onsite visitors requested and received:<sup>66</sup>

- 4,984 snacks
- 4,239 bottled waters
- 3,912 device chargers
- 181 bags of ice
- 2,334 blankets

“Grab and Go” bags were delivered to El Dorado, Mendocino, and Yolo counties at their request.

Additional information about our CRC operations, including coordination with Tribal and local governments, CRC types and resources, and more is available in the CRC Plan located in Appendix A of [PG&E’s 2024 Pre-Season Report](#), pp. 47-61.

**Section 9.2 - Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. (*SED Additional Information.*)**

**Response:**

Due to the timing of power restoration on October 19 and October 20, the hours of operation at CRCs listed in Appendix F deviated from standard operating hours of 08:00 to 22:00 PDT.

**Section 9.3 - A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas (*SED Additional Information.*)**

**Response:**


See Figure 25 for a map of the CRC locations. Based on the CRC survey conducted for this PSPS, 113 respondents traveled less than two miles to the nearest CRC location. Additional CRC

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<sup>66</sup> PG&E does not provide hotel vouchers at CRC locations. For more information on vouchers, see Section 6.5.

location information can be found at [PG&E Emergency Site – View Outage Map](#). Customers can find specific information using the ‘Address Search’ or ‘City/County Search’ functions.

**Figure 25: Location of CRCs Readied During October 17 – 20, 2024 PSPS**



## Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact


**Section 10.1 - Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids, permanent backup generation, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event (D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.)**

**Response:**

### Mitigations to Reduce Impact

PG&E employed multiple measures to avoid de-energizing approximately 169,289 customers. Figure 26 depicts the impact each mitigation measure had on the total number of customers.

**Figure 26: Reduction in Number of Impacted Customers Driven by Mitigation Efforts**



### Community Microgrids

A community microgrid is a group of customers and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries with the ability to disconnect from and reconnect to the grid. These microgrids are typically designed to serve the portions of communities that include community resources, like hospitals, police and fire stations, and gas stations and markets. PG&E continues to own and operate the distribution system within the microgrid. More information about PG&E's microgrid solutions or how to begin developing a community microgrid can be found at [www.pge.com/cmep](http://www.pge.com/cmep).

No community microgrids were utilized during the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS.

### Transmission Line Segmentation

Transmission lines are segmented using switches enabled with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), when possible, if only a portion of a line is required to be de-energized due to PSPS. Leaving segments of transmission lines energized allows PG&E to still reduce fire risk where needed and provide service to stations fed off the non-impacted segments during the PSPS.

During this PSPS, transmission segmentation enabled one substation to remain energized by only de-energizing transmission lines segments rather than whole transmission line.

#### Distribution Switching

Depending on fire risk patterns, distribution switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through the fire risk area. Depending on PSPS scope, we may be able to use back-tie switching to bypass the distribution circuits that pass through the de-energization area to keep customers energized from a different set of lines.

During this PSPS, distribution switching was used to mitigate approximately 668 customers.

#### Sectionalization

PG&E has installed new sectionalization devices near the borders of the CPUC-designated HFTD Tier 2 and Tier 3 to reduce the number of customers affected by PSPS outages.

PG&E used sectionalization devices on 92 circuits which reduced the customer impact by approximately 168,559 customers for this PSPS.

#### Islanding

In some cases, PG&E can leverage islanding capabilities to keep some customers islanded apart from the rest of PG&E's transmission system and energized by generation located within the island.

During this PSPS, no transmission islanding was used.

#### Temporary Substation Generation

The objective of temporary substation microgrids is to enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS at distribution substations resulting from transmission line outages. An interconnection is made at the substation, energizing entire circuits where downstream assets are not at weather risk and generator capacity is sufficient. If there are downstream assets at risk, this mitigation is combined with distribution sectionalization to energize only safe areas. For reporting purposes, customers mitigated in the latter case will be documented in this category and not in sectionalization to avoid duplication. On average, customers served by temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes for the power source switchover from transmission to temporary generation and go-back from temporary generation to transmission.

During this PSPS, no temporary substation generation was used.

#### Temporary Microgrids

The objective of temporary microgrids is to enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during PSPS outages where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation. While temporary microgrids do not often support large numbers of customers, the community resources served by temporary microgrids include fire stations, local water and waste companies, markets, post offices, and medical facilities. On average, when utilized, customers served by temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes for the switchover from grid to microgrid and go-back from microgrid to the grid. Thirteen temporary microgrid sites are

currently ready for operation in PG&E’s service area. One PG&E temporary distribution microgrid was in scope for this PSPS.

PG&E safely provided power to portions of one de-energized community where we pre-installed equipment to safely island and energize temporary microgrids. The objective of temporary microgrids is to enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during PSPS where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation. Table 20 lists the temporary microgrids operated during this PSPS.

**Table 20: Temporary Microgrids**

Temporary Microgrid	Generation Deployed	Customers Energized
Angwin (Napa County)	0.5 MW	48

Backup Power Support:

PG&E used temporary generation to support 14 stand-alone customers. Table 15 lists the facilities that received backup power support during the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS.

Covered Conductor:

The effects of grid-hardening and covered conductors are accounted for in our IPW model, which predicts the probability of utility-caused ignitions. Overhead system hardening is expected to reduce the probability of outages and ignitions in recently hardened sections. The IPW model more heavily weighs ignition and outage rates in recent years which will result in areas with fewer ignitions (e.g., areas that may have been recently hardened, being less likely to be de-energized for PSPS as there is a lower chance of ignition based on historical ignitions and outages).

## **Section 11 – Lessons Learned from this Event**

**Section 11.1 - Threshold analysis and the results of the utility’s examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. (D.21-06-014, page 305-306.)**

### **Response:**

This section addresses our examination of the adequacy of our PSPS protocols and guidance thresholds. As prescribed in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is based on the best judgment of the IOU and is dependent on many factors including and not limited to fuel moisture; aerial and ground firefighting capabilities; active fires that indicate fire conditions; situational awareness provided by agencies; and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.<sup>67</sup> Based on our current PSPS modeling and thresholds, as applied in this PSPS and explained in Section 2, we believe our current PSPS thresholds continue to be adequate and were correctly applied for the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS. See Appendix A for detailed information on our PSPS criteria and thresholds.

PG&E begins its threshold evaluation with a robust historical analysis that is described in detail below. This established the guidance values to be applied for PSPS, which has been optimized to capture data from past catastrophic fires to mitigate customer impacts. To do so, Meteorologists use internal and external tools and subject matter expertise to decide.

Typically, before de-energization, the PSPS customer risk is also evaluated against the wildfire risk on a per circuit basis to further evaluate the adequateness of the PSPS. Additionally, during the PSPS, the advanced weather modeling systems from our network of more than 1,300 weather stations is able to forecast and track weather conditions in real time. Finally, data and post-PSPS analysis results are collected and provided as part of the PSPS Post-Event Report.

### **Establishing Threshold through Historical Analysis**

Our PSPS guidance was established by calibrating a granular, historical dataset. We built our verification dataset by creating, or “backcasting,” the PSPS guidance through our historical dataset. We extracted values for all recent fires that have occurred in PG&E’s service area from 2012 to 2020. We aimed to capture as many historical fires as possible that were caused by PG&E equipment during high wind events (e.g., Camp, Nuns, Kincade, Zogg) while limiting the number of historical PSPS outages to minimize customer impacts. Our analysis included:

- Hourly review of past incidents
- Verification of hypothetical PSPS dates
- PSPS guidance values testing
- A robust guidance sensitivity and calibration analysis

### **Historical Analysis: CFP<sub>D</sub> Quantification**

Based on this analysis, PG&E uses a CFP<sub>D</sub> value of seven as the quantitative threshold guidance value to consider for PSPS on PG&E’s distribution system.

To establish the CFP<sub>D</sub> threshold of nine, we performed multiple sensitivity studies in “backcast” mode for calibration and validation. This involved running 68 different versions of the combined distribution PSPS guidance through hourly historical data throughout multiple years to calibrate

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<sup>67</sup> See Resolution ESRB-8, p. 8-9.


PSPS guidance. This included simulating and learning from more than 2,500 virtual PSPS outages. Through this “lookback” analysis, we evaluated:

- The potential size, scope, and frequency of PSPS outages
- Potential customer impacts
- The days PSPS outages would have occurred
- Whether utility infrastructure would have qualified for de-energization

The mFPC and CFP<sub>D</sub> guidance that is determined from Technosylva was also evaluated using this process.

The CFP<sub>D</sub> guidance value of seven is shown in Figure 26 with respect to recent large fires since 2012. Fires above the CFP<sub>D</sub>7 curve tend to be wind driven fire, while non-wind driven fires tend to exist below the CFP<sub>D</sub>7 curve. Any fires above nine that meet mFPC indicate PSPS would have been executed, had these models and guidance been in use during these historic events. The results show that deployment of this model could have prevented wildfires, such as Camp, Tubbs, Nuns, Atlas, Kincaide and Zogg fires, if implemented in 2012.<sup>68</sup>

**Figure 26: CFP<sub>D</sub> Guidance**



This analysis was a critical step to ensure the most catastrophic historical incidents are identified by PSPS guidance while considering the significant impacts to customers from PSPS outages across multiple dimensions (e.g., duration and frequency). This ensures that future PSPS outages will capture conditions similarly during the most catastrophic fires while also balancing impacts to customers.

<sup>68</sup> Note that the inclusion of a fire in this analysis does not indicate that PG&E is directly responsible for or caused a fire. Instead, the fires are included for the purpose of analyzing the impact of PG&E’s current PSPS Protocols.



### Historical Analysis: Execution

To execute the analysis at this scale, we utilized cloud computing resources to run PSPS model guidance for every hour at every 2 x 2 km grid cell across the historical data set to determine the number of times and locations PSPS guidance is exceeded. Each location exceeding guidance is then grouped into events to determine the location and size of each PSPS given the weather and fuels present at that time under the parameters of the study version. This allows us to determine if synoptic-driven events (e.g., Diablo wind events) are being identified, and if historical fires attributable to PG&E equipment may have been mitigated.

### Verification of PSPS Protocols

In addition to these sensitivity studies, PG&E performed extensive verification of the PSPS protocols using several internal and external datasets. The goal of these analyses was to first determine if certain weather events are being captured (e.g., Diablo and offshore wind events), and second, to determine if lines that have been implicated in historic catastrophic fires would have been identified by the guidance.

The following internal datasets were used in the analysis:

- Climatology of Diablo wind events.
- Hourly high-resolution wind maps from the climatology data set.
- Distribution and transmission outage history.
- The weather signal database.
- Exploratory and dynamic dashboards created with internal and external data.

The following external datasets were used in the analysis:

- National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) North American Regional Reanalysis Archive (NARR) synoptic weather maps.
- Historical fire occurrence data compiled by federal agencies.
- RFWs from the NWS.
- High risk of potential large fires due to wind from the GACC.

The paragraphs below explain how we leveraged external and internal data to verify our PSPS protocols guidance thresholds.

### NARR Archive

PG&E has acquired the NARR archive data dating back to 1995 and produced over two million maps that can be utilized to study past events. These maps are also useful to study the past conditions leading up to the PSPS, such as the extent of precipitation events and heat waves. When the PSPS models are run through the climatology, each PSPS identified is compared against the NARR archive by a Meteorologist to determine the large-scale atmospheric features present for each event.

### Climatology of Diablo Wind Events

PG&E also leverages the latest academic research on Diablo wind events that use surface-based observations to create a climatology of Diablo wind events. We adapted the criteria and processed it hour-by-hour through the 31-year weather climatology to determine the frequency, magnitude, and timing of Diablo winds. The output of this analysis was a 31-year calendar of Diablo wind events experienced in the PG&E service area. As it relates to PSPS directly, the strongest Diablo wind events were evaluated to verify if PSPS guidance also selects these days

for potential PSPS outages. Using the days identified by PSPS guidance and the Diablo PSPS list, a high-level comparison was completed to evaluate overlap of the events.

Any events that did not meet PSPS guidance were evaluated further using additional data sources described in this section. For example, the NARR archive proved useful, as antecedent conditions such as rainfall before a PSPS and the magnitude of the PSPS could be evaluated.

#### PG&E's Weather Signal Database

PG&E's Meteorology team built, and continues to maintain, a 'weather signal' database that flags each day from January 1, 1995 to present that experienced any weather-related outages on the distribution system. It also lists the main weather driver (e.g., heat, low-elevation snow, northeast wind, winter storm, etc.) for these outages. If distribution outage activity is not driven by weather, the day is classified as a "Blue Sky"<sup>69</sup> day. This dataset combines weather and distribution outage activity that allows rapid filtering of events based on the main weather drivers. To validate PSPS guidance, we used a combination of "Northeast" wind days and "Blue-Sky" days.

The PSPS guidance was validated against all Northeast wind days in the database. This is similar, but complimentary to the Diablo PSPS analysis as it also accounts for outage activity observed on those days. Events were also compared against "Blue Sky" days to ensure that PSPS would not be recommended for a high percentage of non-weather-impact days where little to no outage activity was observed.

#### Red Flag Warnings from the National Weather Service

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against RFWs from the NWS. RFWs mean warm temperatures, very low humidity, and stronger winds are expected to combine to produce an increased risk of fire danger. These RFWs were collected from 2015 – 2020 in shapefile format and used to evaluate the timing and spatial extent of historical RFWs against PSPS guidance. It should be noted that each NWS office in the PG&E service area has different RFW criteria, making direct and quantifiable comparison challenging. However, this dataset is used to evaluate whether RFWs were issued when PSPS guidance was met. Based on historical PSPS analysis, RFWs are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than the area covered by PSPS outages.

#### High Risk of Potential Large Fires due to Wind from the Geographic Area Coordination Center

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against historical "High Risk" days from the GACC. The GACCs issue High Risk Day alerts when fuel and weather conditions are predicted that historically have resulted in a significantly higher than normal chance for a new large fire or for significant growth on existing fires. Examples of critical weather conditions are high winds, low humidity, an unstable atmosphere, and very hot weather. Similar to the RFW analysis, this dataset was used to evaluate if High Risk days were issued when PSPS guidance was high. Blue Sky Day is defined as "The same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)." Similar to RFWs, based on historical PSPS analysis, High Risk Days are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than PSPS.

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<sup>69</sup> The definition of a Blue Sky Day is as follows: "Blue Sky Day is defined the same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)."

### Hourly High-Resolution Wind Maps from PG&E Climatology Data Set

PG&E created hourly maps from high-resolution climatology and a web-based application to display any hour across 30 years. For each PSPS that meets PSPS guidance in the climatology, these maps were evaluated by a Meteorologist to better understand the nature of the event, wind speeds, antecedent conditions, and the spatial extent of strong winds. It's important to note forecast wind speeds are available in the same exact format, allowing Operational Meteorologists to put forecast events in perspective with historical events using the same model.

### Detailed PSPS Dashboards

To evaluate the thresholds, Meteorologists and data scientists utilized the data sources described above to evaluate historical PSPS hour-by-hour to verify the locations and times that are being flagged as meeting PSPS guidance. These dashboards determine if historical fire events would have been flagged by PSPS guidance. Meteorologists evaluated these data sources hourly to verify model performance of the IPW model and suitability for operations. The PSPS guidance can be evaluated spatially using the dashboard map integration, while the size and timing of the PSPS can be evaluated using the timeseries integration.

### **Section 11.2 - Any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility (SED Additional Information.)**

#### **Response:**

PG&E collects lessons learned input from staff during and after every PSPS EOC activation to identify best practices and opportunities for improvement. See Table 21 for lessons learned from the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS.

**Table 21: Lessons Learned from the PSPS**

<b>Issue</b>	<b>Discussion</b>	<b>Resolution</b>
Customer Notifications	Due to an oversight during a manual review of abnormal circuit conditions, 167 customers were not notified of de-energization (as reported in Table 8A).	We plan to review processes with responsible personnel and consider additional training.
Technology	ESRI experienced an enterprise-wide technology disruption that impacted a Python script PG&E utilizes to share customer maps on the PSPS Portal.	PG&E detected the issue on October 16 at 17:37 PDT and resolved it on October 17 at 09:30 PDT.  PG&E has implemented a new process for sharing PDF Maps and limited GIS layers on the PSPS Portal in the event technology is down during a future PSPS.


## **Section 12 – Other Relevant Information**

Table 22 and Figure 27 show the maximum wind gust speeds recorded by weather stations in each county included within PSPS scope.

**Table 22: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded October 17 – 20, 2024 in Impacted Counties**

<b>County</b>	<b>Maximum Wind Gust (mph)</b>	<b>Station ID</b>	<b>Station Name</b>
Alameda	53	PG674	Mt. Alison
Alpine	52	011PG	Bloods Ridge
Amadore	31	PG404	China Gulch Road
Butte	47	JBGC1	Jarbo Gap
Calaveras	52	STUC1	Cottage
Colusa	77	595PG	Goat Mountain
Contra Costa	56	PG696	Diablo-Blackhawk
El Dorado	75	287PG	Leek Spring Hill
Fresno	88	QUPC1	Upper Providence
Glenn	40	PG845	Road 65
Lake	72	PG652	Santa Fe Geothermal
Madera	35	MTTC1	Minarets
Mariposa	38	PG184	Jordan Creek Road
Mendocino	54	PG990	Cahto Peak
Merced	35	KMER	Castle Air Force Base
Monterey	41	PG360	Williams Hill
Napa	49	PG358	Knoxville
Nevada	61	472PG	Grouse Ridge Lookout
Placer	57	PG698	Cisco Buttes
Plumas	45	498PG	Mount Hough
Sacramento	36	KSAC	Sacramento Executive Airport
San Benito	41	SRTC1	Santa Rita
San Joaquin	37	KSCK	Stockton Metropolitan Airport
San Luis Obispo	52	PG633	Old Creek Road
Santa Barbara	61	MTIC1	Montecito
Santa Clara	60	PG608	Mt. Umunhum
Santa Cruz	52	PG370	Ormsey Cutoff Trail
Shasta	41	PG070	Roud Mountain – Shasta
Sierra	61	SLEC1	Saddleback
Solano	57	PG880	Blue Ridge Road South
Sonoma	79	PG132	Mt. St. Helena West
Stanislaus	49	045PG	Mt. Oso
Tehama	55	CBXC1	Colby Mountain
Tuolumne	42	MOUC1	Mount Elizabeth
Yolo	54	PG490	Bald Mountain Tower
Yuba	39	KMYV	Yuba County Airport

**Figure 27: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded October 17 – 20, 2024 in Impacted Counties**



**APPENDIX**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX A

SECTION 2 – DECISION MAKING PROCESS

## Appendix A: DECISION MAKING PROCESS

**Table A-1.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the October 17 – 20, 2024 PSPS Event**

\* Please see Table A-1.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

\*\* Note: PSPS decision making on Distribution does not occur at a per-circuit level, and instead occurs at the level of our 2 x 2 km weather and fuels model grid. These outputs are used in a GIS system to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Distribution Assets Health Specialists review to scope the event. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting model. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast										Agency			Observed										PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		ws_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_8hr	rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr	rh_2m	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_100hr	lfm_chamise_new	cfpd	NOAA	RFW	GACC_High Risk	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	open_pspstags	Tx impacts_yes_no	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
ARBUCKLE 1101	TP4	20	83	9.2	55.1	8.7	0.409	0.05	0.093	52	1.8	707	707	707	25	34	77	13	14	20	78	20	Yes	No	0.1	249.5
BIG BEND 1101	TP14	18	81	9.2	42.8	10.1	0.663	0.051	0.102	60	4.2	2	328	122	30	47	80	11	26	42	82	13	Yes	No	0.9	198.6
BRENTWOOD 2105	TP8	22	79	11.4	148.7	12.6	0.254	0.052	0.106	59	2.0	2845	2842	2845	39	53	77	9	17	22	68	20	Yes	No	0.5	2557.4
BUCKS CREEK 1103	TP14	28	71	8.4	31.9	13.2	0.376	0.061	0.128	66	11.8	No	352	No	22	41	71	13	16	29	71	15	Yes	No	08	7.5
CALISTOGA 1101	TP7	32	85	40.7	67.6	7.9	0.631	0.048	0.104	63	25.0	No	1697	1697	61	79	90	6	23	32	90	14	Yes	No	0.6	225.4
CALISTOGA 1102	TP7	17	83	5.6	25.6	8.6	0.473	0.049	0.113	64	3.7	No	2235	2235	30	43	87	6	10	20	87	13	Yes	No	0.1	604.6
CALPINE 1144	TP7	23	78	11.4	56.4	9.2	0.643	0.053	0.101	63	7.3	No	22	22	60	72	85	5	22	32	85	13	Yes	No	0.1	253.1
CALPINE 1146	TP7	20	76	10.7	36.3	9.8	0.634	0.056	0.11	64	7.8	No	1	1	60	72	82	8	22	32	82	19	Yes	No	0.0	1248.6
CANTUA 1103	TP12	20	78	10.1	121.6	13.6	0.203	0.048	0.091	56	0.8	201	8	16	28	45	81	9	18	30	81	11	Yes	No	0.0	245.9
CASTRO VALLEY 1108	TP17	21	79	14.1	50.2	10.7	0.437	0.054	0.124	68	8.1	5300	5300	5300	39	53	77	8	17	22	77	13	Yes	No	0.3	188.2
CAYETANO 2109	TP8	30	77	11.3	145.8	12.8	0.451	0.05	0.105	58	5.4	3150	3150	3150	39	56	76	10	26	35	74	13	Yes	No	0.7	3049.3
CLAYTON 2212	TP8	24	78	14.7	150.1	12.3	0.52	0.052	0.102	57	5.5	3446	3446	3446	31	48	76	10	26	31	72	15	Yes	No	3.4	271.8
CLAYTON 2213	TP8	21	78	8.9	64.1	12	0.377	0.053	0.113	61	3.5	3232	3232	3232	34	46	91	5	13	23	92	11	Yes	No	0.0	11416.1
CLOVERDALE 1102	TP7	20	86	12.6	54.6	7.6	0.676	0.049	0.104	62	5.7	No	2470	2538	26	46	68	12	11	19	53	16	Yes	No	0.3	1067.6
COALINGA NO 2 1105	TP12	30	79	14.3	127.6	13	0.245	0.048	0.091	55	2.4	196	193	129	26	39	80	8	18	25	82	19	Yes	No	0.3	93.6
CORNING 1101	TP2	21	83	9.6	110.4	9.8	0.575	0.05	0.093	52	4.6	2226	2226	2226	31	47	82	3	17	25	83	20	Yes	No	4.4	119.9
CORNING 1102	TP2	23	83	12.6	148.5	9.7	0.616	0.049	0.085	52	3.5	1693	1646	1693	23	36	80	8	18	28	81	17	Yes	No	1.4	152.4
CORTINA 1101	TP4	20	84	10.8	76.6	8.3	0.466	0.048	0.089	51	1.5	259	259	259	30	47	73	11	26	42	74	14	Yes	No	0.1	258.4
CRESTA 1101	TP14	19	73	6.9	29.6	12.1	0.48	0.058	0.117	64	10.6	No	8	No	24	38	83	7	14	25	83	14	Yes	No	0.0	108.5
DUNBAR 1101	TP19	25	84	13	50.6	8.8	0.634	0.047	0.108	61	9.1	No	2420	2420	34	46	83	3	27	38	85	11	Yes	No	0.8	429.6
DUNBAR 1103	TP19	24	84	13.4	54.5	8.6	0.588	0.049	0.118	63	12.9	No	2464	3297	25	34	77	13	14	20	78	20	Yes	No	0.4	1441.5
DUNNIGAN 1103	TP4	19	82	8.9	43.3	8.8	0.557	0.05	0.093	52	2.1	306	306	899	32	46	83	5	22	34	83	17	Yes	No	0.1	250.2



Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast										Agency			Observed										PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		ws_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_8hr	rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr	rh_2m	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_100hr	lfm_chamise_new	cfpd	NOAA	RFW	GACC_High Risk	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	open_pspstags	Tx impacts_yes_no	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
ELK CREEK 1101	TP3	23	82	16.7	112.1	9.3	0.525	0.048	0.088	50	2.9	896	858	No	9	26	73	10	4	7	73	11	Yes	Yes	4.6	71.4
FRENCH GULCH 1101	TP1	15	77	9.9	52.9	13.5	0.593	0.058	0.102	66	4.2	253	No	No	16	30	77	8	10	16	77	9	Yes	No	0.9	46.1
FRENCH GULCH 1102	TP1	19	79	9.1	39.5	12.4	0.463	0.055	0.098	63	1.9	38	No	1233	60	72	90	5	22	32	90	13	Yes	No	0.3	40.9
GEYSERSVILLE 1102	TP7	22	87	13.5	83.8	7.3	0.619	0.049	0.102	63	7.3	No	1233	1163	20	35	78	6	14	22	78	8	Yes	No	0.5	439.7
GIRVAN 1101	TP1	19	82	9.6	94.5	10.8	0.604	0.049	0.084	55	1.8	1280	991	1965	25	37	82	3	18	26	83	14	Yes	No	1.6	575.6
GLENN 1101	TP3	23	83	11.3	138.7	9.3	0.49	0.049	0.089	51	4.2	1965	4476	4476	40	60	75	10	30	40	65	14	Yes	No	2.0	47.2
HICKS 2101	TP18	16	76	17.6	57.2	12.1	0.47	0.054	0.123	65	3.3	4476	3652	3652	32	46	85	6	15	24	85	16	Yes	No	0.4	2712.3
HIGHLANDS 1102	TP7	16	80	14	67	9	0.593	0.053	0.108	57	1.9	16	2424	2424	33	49	80	6	24	45	80	15	Yes	No	0.1	4127.8
HIGHLANDS 1103	TP20	24	79	11.1	54.2	9.3	0.643	0.054	0.102	57	5.4	35	2290	2290	21	35	81	8	12	26	82	14	Yes	No	0.2	3446.5
JAMESON 1102	TP6	23	81	19.8	47.9	10.1	0.519	0.049	0.106	61	6.9	2290	2646	2650	21	33	81	8	12	26	82	14	Yes	No	0.1	3432.3
JAMESON 1105	TP6	24	77	8.8	56.5	11.1	0.515	0.055	0.112	61	7.7	2650	604	604	29	39	76	10	6	9	58	23	Yes	No	0.0	15184.9
JOLON 1102	TP12	20	79	12.4	80.3	11.8	0.451	0.055	0.102	59	1.6	No	16	16	23	31	76	10	6	7	58	23	Yes	Yes	3.6	18.6
JOLON 1103	TP12	16	75	10.2	62.3	12.4	0.394	0.054	0.1	60	1.1	No	441	532	18	35	83	8	10	18	83	9	Yes	Yes	2.4	10.4
KESWICK 1101	TP1	20	80	10.8	50.6	11.3	0.667	0.052	0.088	62	1.6	548	1368	1368	21	32	83	4	13	21	83	16	Yes	No	1.2	420.7
LAKEVILLE 1102	TP19	24	83	9.6	92.9	8.8	0.534	0.05	0.116	64	5.0	No	1493	1493	30	40	82	7	25	32	83	17	Yes	No	0.4	4578.9
LOGAN CREEK 2102	TP3	24	85	11.6	155.1	8.4	0.335	0.048	0.092	52	3.1	1493	2637	2637	28	41	76	10	6	12	72	15	Yes	No	0.2	212.6
LONE TREE 2105	TP8	25	79	11.2	145.8	12.3	0.321	0.053	0.101	59	3.0	2637	2307	2307	40	60	72	14	30	40	65	14	Yes	No	0.2	3259.2
LOS GATOS 1107	TP18	20	72	20	58.3	13.5	0.391	0.056	0.118	64	12.1	2303	586	586	25	38	78	9	17	23	78	17	Yes	No	0.7	74.1
MADISON 1105	TP5	23	83	7.1	71.4	9	0.532	0.049	0.104	51	5.5	586	2188	2188	35	54	81	8	18	27	81	12	Yes	No	0.0	620.2
MADISON 2101	TP5	24	83	8.7	88.8	8.8	0.533	0.049	0.089	53	3.4	2188	228	228	20	32	80	8	18	29	82	18	Yes	No	0.1	7402.1
MAXWELL 1102	TP4	20	84	10.2	123.6	8.3	0.264	0.047	0.092	56	1.4	228	843	843	30	40	80	8	25	32	82	17	Yes	No	0.2	119.4
MAXWELL 1105	TP4	21	84	11.4	145.5	8.4	0.382	0.047	0.091	53	2.4	843	2105	2105	61	79	90	6	23	32	90	14	Yes	No	0.1	185.1
MIDDLETOWN 1101	TP7	26	81	20.4	65.2	8.8	0.643	0.052	0.097	62	13.7	No	4351	4351	43	53	80	9	14	20	81	12	Yes	No	1.4	518.8
MILPITAS 1109	TP17	25	76	9.1	90.7	12.4	0.44	0.052	0.123	64	2.8	4351	1404	1409	41	57	86	7	19	28	86	14	Yes	No	0.9	937.8
MONTICELLO 1101	TP5	25	83	29.2	65.3	9.1	0.643	0.048	0.102	58	5.6	1409	2911	2692	33	52	75	10	24	36	63	14	Yes	No	1.9	98.3
MORGAN HILL 2111	TP18	18	76	17.7	47.7	12	0.511	0.055	0.12	64	7.6	2692	4936	2912	21	33	81	8	12	26	82	14	Yes	No	0.4	4072.6
NAPA 1112	TP6	21	77	12.9	57.2	11.1	0.474	0.055	0.109	60	2.5	2673	2037	4936	39	56	75	10	26	35	76	14	Yes	No	0.1	20923.2
NORTH DUBLIN 2103	TP8	25	77	10.8	137.8	12.4	0.342	0.052	0.122	64	3.6	4936	229	1383	31	53	78	12	22	40	80	14	Yes	No	0.2	12926.2
ORO FINO 1102	TP14	26	75	13.8	21.6	11.6	0.269	0.057	0.128	64	5.8	1387	2524	256	11	26	65	19	5	9	49	29	Yes	No	2.1	9.0
PANOCHE 1103	TP12	20	76	12.6	86.9	14.2	0.218	0.05	0.097	56	0.6	338	2071	2493	17	32	78	12	12	25	80	14	Yes	No	0.1	636.0
PARADISE 1105	TP14	12	74	5.9	14	11.7	0.388	0.057	0.12	65	1.3	2507	2143	2071	25	39	86	7	10	17	86	12	Yes	No	0.2	92.9
PUEBLO 1104	TP7	25	76	9.1	52.9	10.8	0.512	0.055	0.114	60	5.3	2068	2295	2143	25	39	88	7	10	17	88	12	Yes	No	0.2	4753.4
PUEBLO 1105	TP7	24	79	9.8	52.8	10.1	0.606	0.054	0.116	62	7.7	1336	4710	2295	34	46	84	6	27	38	85	14	Yes	No	0.3	2453.9
PUEBLO 2102	TP19	20	80	14.9	43.6	9.6	0.588	0.051	0.113	63	6.1	2	917	4710	24	38	83	7	14	25	83	12	Yes	No	0.3	245.4

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast										Agency			Observed										PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		ws_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_8hr	rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr	rh_2m	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_100hr	lfm_chamise_new	cfpd	NOAA	RFW	GACC_High Risk	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	open_pspstags	Tx_impacts_yes_no	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
PUEBLO 2103	TP19	23	83	26.2	81	9.2	0.648	0.049	0.107	63	11.9	No	2206	917	41	57	76	7	24	33	77	18	Yes	No	1.0	317.5
PUTAH CREEK 1102	TP5	22	83	7.8	76.3	9.1	0.523	0.048	0.092	51	14.1	917	1317	2206	23	40	76	9	13	26	77	18	Yes	No	0.7	5048.5
PUTAH CREEK 1103	TP5	21	83	6.8	56.6	9.2	0.507	0.048	0.094	55	9.6	2206	2532	1317	25	38	76	9	17	26	77	18	Yes	No	0.2	45784.7
PUTAH CREEK 1105	TP5	24	83	8.1	89.3	9	0.452	0.048	0.099	51	11.2	1317	1632	2532	28	41	77	12	17	26	77	11	Yes	No	0.1	2214.1
RAWSON 1103	TP1	21	84	6.6	61.2	9.7	0.409	0.053	0.099	52	3.4	2532	2722	1632	29	43	82	7	16	22	84	14	Yes	No	0.0	4971.3
RED BLUFF 1101	TP2	20	84	8.2	79.4	9.8	0.448	0.052	0.094	52	1.6	1632	1939	2722	29	43	82	7	16	22	84	14	Yes	No	0.3	7670.2
RED BLUFF 1103	TP2	20	83	7.6	75	9.8	0.537	0.052	0.092	52	3.0	2722	2099	1939	29	43	79	9	16	20	79	7	Yes	No	0.7	1856.7
RED BLUFF 1105	TP1	21	84	13.5	64.4	9.8	0.351	0.055	0.111	53	3.1	1939	3417	2103	32	46	85	6	15	25	85	16	Yes	No	0.8	574.1
REDBUD 1101	TP7	18	79	13.6	56.8	9.1	0.638	0.052	0.1	57	2.3	No	3864	3417	25	40	85	6	15	25	85	16	Yes	No	2.7	188.6
REDBUD 1102	TP7	15	78	11.6	48.6	9.6	0.614	0.055	0.106	59	1.5	No	2016	3864	34	46	82	3	27	38	85	11	Yes	No	0.4	636.2
RINCON 1101	TP19	19	83	5.8	25.3	8.9	0.481	0.051	0.118	65	4.1	No	6165	2016	34	46	82	3	27	38	83	14	Yes	No	0.2	846.8
RINCON 1103	TP19	18	78	5.1	22.9	9.9	0.412	0.052	0.117	65	3.5	No	1355	6362	33	52	77	12	24	36	63	14	Yes	No	0.1	9534.3
ROB ROY 2104	TP18	20	70	12.9	23.5	14.6	0.355	0.061	0.123	64	16.4	96	967	1355	25	39	89	6	10	17	89	12	Yes	No	0.2	200.2
SILVERADO 2102	TP7	21	84	18.7	69.5	8.6	0.672	0.049	0.112	61	6.6	110	3790	967	34	46	84	6	27	38	85	14	Yes	No	1.0	142.0
SILVERADO 2103	TP19	24	82	10.8	37.4	8.9	0.565	0.05	0.109	64	2.9	No	2313	3790	30	43	89	6	11	19	89	13	Yes	No	0.1	444.9
SILVERADO 2104	TP7	23	84	33.3	55.5	8.5	0.641	0.049	0.098	58	13.5	223	No	2313	34	46	84	3	27	38	85	14	Yes	No	6.6	34.4
SILVERADO 2105	TP19	18	82	5.2	24.5	9.1	0.577	0.049	0.11	64	2.8	No	3574	111	32	43	76	12	9	11	65	14	Yes	No	0.1	666.3
SISQUOC 1103	TP13	16	76	11	50.1	14.4	0.408	0.058	0.11	62	1.6	No	2272	3574	24	38	80	7	14	25	80	14	Yes	No	0.3	119.8
SONOMA 1102	TP19	24	83	13.6	37	9.1	0.603	0.049	0.108	63	7.1	No	2238	2272	24	38	82	7	14	25	82	12	Yes	No	0.3	678.0
SONOMA 1103	TP19	24	84	13.2	37.2	8.8	0.623	0.049	0.108	63	11.0	No	3196	2238	24	38	82	7	14	25	82	12	Yes	No	0.4	1916.9
SONOMA 1105	TP19	22	82	8.3	55.6	9.2	0.588	0.049	0.115	64	10.6	No	734	3196	24	38	80	7	14	25	80	14	Yes	No	0.2	8389.9
SONOMA 1106	TP19	18	84	6.5	40.9	8.6	0.58	0.048	0.115	64	6.8	No	1419	705	23	39	83	10	9	18	83	11	Yes	No	0.0	2646.9
STILLWATER 1101	TP1	21	80	10.6	35.6	11.3	0.627	0.056	0.097	63	7.0	734	736	1325	23	39	78	10	11	21	78	11	Yes	No	2.2	130.6
STILLWATER 1102	TP1	22	81	9.2	48.5	10.7	0.635	0.054	0.1	59	4.4	1419	2849	736	43	53	76	11	14	20	77	12	Yes	No	2.5	314.2
SUNOL 1101	TP17	22	78	9.2	93.8	12.2	0.412	0.053	0.123	65	2.5	736	2598	2849	39	56	75	10	26	35	76	12	Yes	No	0.5	1114.6
TASSAJARA 2104	TP8	23	77	10.5	127	12.4	0.465	0.052	0.122	64	4.3	2849	2204	2598	38	56	76	10	26	35	74	13	Yes	No	0.2	19467.2
TASSAJARA 2112	TP8	28	77	15.1	84.5	11.9	0.537	0.053	0.12	61	11.6	2598	2666	2666	31	47	76	10	23	31	72	15	Yes	No	0.4	2844.7
TIDEWATER 2106	TP8	23	77	9.5	89.7	12.1	0.344	0.053	0.109	59	3.3	2204	1851	1851	29	43	82	7	16	24	84	14	Yes	No	0.1	10836.7
TYLER 1105	TP2	22	83	9.3	106	9.8	0.554	0.05	0.091	52	2.3	2666	974	974	41	57	79	7	24	33	77	18	Yes	No	2.5	305.1
VACA DIXON 1101	TP6	25	83	8	62.3	9.3	0.456	0.048	0.096	57	7.0	1851	2355	2355	38	56	79	7	24	32	77	18	Yes	No	1.4	2524.6
VACA DIXON 1105	TP6	23	83	6.9	59.2	9.3	0.285	0.048	0.097	58	6.5	974	2115	2116	25	41	79	7	13	18	75	19	Yes	No	0.1	55898.6
VACAVILLE 1103	TP6	21	82	9	99.7	9.1	0.391	0.046	0.092	58	13.1	2355	2476	2477	41	57	79	6	21	29	76	17	Yes	No	0.1	2536.2
VACAVILLE 1104	TP6	24	82	11	152.6	9.4	0.424	0.048	0.097	58	9.9	2116	2153	2153	41	57	79	7	24	33	79	14	Yes	No	0.4	2273.0
VACAVILLE 1108	TP6	25	82	9.3	99.7	9.1	0.458	0.046	0.092	51	13.1	2477	2113	2113	28	41	79	6	16	18	75	17	Yes	No	1.7	261.0
VACAVILLE 1109	TP6	24	82	9.9	134.7	9.1	0.423	0.047	0.097	58	13.3	2153	1661	1661	38	56	79	7	24	32	75	19	Yes	No	0.6	1470.2

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast										Agency			Observed										PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		ws_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_8hr	rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr	rh_2m	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_100hr	lfm_chamise_new	cfpd	NOAA	RFW	GACC_High_Risk	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	open_dpsps_tags	Tx_impacts_yes_no	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
VACAVILLE 1111	TP6	21	82	7	45	9.1	0.427	0.047	0.094	58	14.2	2113	4144	4144	35	49	77	8	15	26	63	22	Yes	No	0.3	5261.7
VASCO 1102	TP9	19	77	11	91.1	13.1	0.347	0.051	0.118	58	1.1	1661	1336	177	30	46	76	11	13	20	76	15	Yes	No	0.6	1893.6
VINEYARD 2108	TP17	20	75	10.3	46.5	13	0.327	0.055	0.123	64	1.9	4144	1090	1090	28	41	76	12	17	26	76	12	Yes	No	0.0	1394.8
VOLTA 1101	TP1	19	81	6.3	35.2	10.6	0.346	0.055	0.118	56	3.1	470	2246	2246	26	49	75	11	17	22	61	21	Yes	No	0.0	752.5
WESTLEY 1103	TP9	26	78	11.5	154.3	13.6	0.327	0.049	0.094	55	3.1	1090	707	707	23	36	80	11	18	26	81	19	Yes	No	0.2	321.4
WILLIAMS 1102	TP4	23	84	8.8	91.9	8.2	0.254	0.047	0.09	56	1.2	2246	328	122	25	34	77	13	14	20	78	20	Yes	No	0.1	431.2

**Table A-1.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the October 17 – 20, 2024 PSPS Event**

Forecast / Agency/ Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Forecast	<b>ws_mph</b>	Sustained wind speeds	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	<b>temp_2m_f</b>	Temperature	degrees F	max	Temperature in Fahrenheit at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	<b>flame_length_ft_8hr</b>	Flame length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	<b>rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr</b>	Rate of spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	<b>rh_2m</b>	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	<b>prob_cat</b>	Fire Potential Index (FPI)	probability outputs	max	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output - Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFPD model.
Forecast	<b>dfm_10hr</b>	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 10 hrs	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	<b>dfm_100hr</b>	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 100 hrs	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	<b>lfm_chamise_new</b>	Live Fuel Moisture Content-shrub	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of Chamise (shrub) plant species (% of species that is comprised of water).
Forecast	<b>cfpd</b>	Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFPD)	Scaled Probability	max	The product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob_Cat) and IPW - probability of ignition (prob_ignition). This product is called the (CFPD) Catastrophic Fire Probability distribution.  Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.
Agency	<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	N/A	Yes/No During Event	NOAA (SPC) Fire Weather Outlook forecast.
Agency	<b>RFW</b>	Red Flag Warning	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	<b>GACC_HighRisk</b>	GACC High Risk	N/A	Yes/No During Event	High Risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Observed	<b>Observed ws_mph</b>	Observed Sustained Wind Speed during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed wg_mph</b>	Observed Peak Wind Gust during Event	mph	max	The maximum wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed temp_f</b>	Observed Temperature during Event	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed RH_%</b>	Observed Relative Humidity During Event	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed ws_mph_AC</b>	Observed Sustained Wind	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
		Speed at All Clear			all-clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed wg_mph_AC</b>	Observed Peak Wind Gust at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed temp_f_AC</b>	Observed Temperature at All Clear	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed RH_%_AC</b>	Observed Relative Humidity at All Clear	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	<b>open_psp_s_tags</b>	Open PSPS Qualified Tags	N/A	Yes/No During Event	PSPS-Qualified Tags include P1 (tree represents an immediate risk) and P2 (tree is damaged or diseased and could fall into nearby power lines) tree tags and Electric Corrective tags (Priority A - emergency, B - urgent, and E/F - risk-based).
Observed	<b>Tx_impacts_yes_no</b>	Impacted by Transmission	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream transmission lines, regardless of whether those distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct distribution PSPS.
Observed	<b>PSPS Potential Risk Consequence</b>	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to de-energization.
Observed	<b>PSPS Potential Benefit</b>	PSPS Potential Benefit	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire.

**Table A-2.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut off Power for Each Transmission Circuit De-energized During the October 17 – 20, 2024 PSPS Event**

\* Please see Table A-2.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

\*\* Note: PSPS decision making on Transmission does not occur at a per-circuit level, and instead occurs at the granularity of each transmission structure. These outputs are used in a GIS system and dashboard to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Transmission Asset Health Specialists review to scope the event. This includes a review of lines that have little to no impact to customers and electric grid reliability. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting model. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

Circuit Name	Forecast					Agency			Forecast						Observed							PSPS Risk vs. Benefit					
	ws_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_8hr	rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr	rh_2m	NOAA	RFW	GACC_High_Risk	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_100hr	lfm_chamise_new	OA	CFPt	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	High Fire Risk Area (Y/N)	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit (Y/N)	Tx_impacts_yes_no	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
LOWER LAKE-HOMESTAKE	24	79	12.9	58.1	9	No	No	No	0.645	0.054	0.101	57	0.278	108.1	33	49	83	6	17	36	83	13	Yes	Yes	No	0.0	20664.3
ELK CREEK TAP	24	84	11.6	154.5	8.6	No	No	No	0.458	0.048	0.089	52	0.009	2.0	26	37	87	5	14	23	87	16	Yes	Yes	Yes	0.0	1715.9
JOLON TAP	19	79	11.3	76	12.2	No	No	No	0.454	0.055	0.114	60	No	0.1	17	29	76	10	5	9	45	41	Yes	Yes	No	N/A <sup>1</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The PSPS Potential Risk Consequence and PSPS Potential Benefit was not calculated for JOLON TAP circuit due to no customer impact.

<sup>2</sup> The PSPS Potential Risk Consequence and PSPS Potential Benefit was not calculated for JOLON TAP circuit due to no customer impact.

**Table A-2.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut off Power for Each Transmission Circuit De-energized During the October 17 – 20, 2024 PSPS Event**

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Forecast	<b>ws_mph</b>	Sustained wind speeds	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	<b>temp_2m_f</b>	Temperature	degrees F	max	Temperature in Fahrenheit at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	<b>flame_length_ft_8hr</b>	Flame length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 2 hours of fire spread simulation from Technoslyva.
Forecast	<b>rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr</b>	Rate of spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 2 hours of fire spread simulation from Technoslyva.
Forecast	<b>rh_2m</b>	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level.
Agency	<b>NOAA</b>	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	N/A	Yes/No during event	NOAA (SPC) Fire Weather Outlook forecast.
Agency	<b>RFW</b>	Red Flag Warning	N/A	Yes/No during event	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	<b>GACC_HighRisk</b>	GACC High Risk	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Forecast	<b>prob_cat</b>	Fire Potential Index (FPI)	probability outputs	max	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output - Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFP <sub>D</sub> model.
Forecast	<b>dfm_10hr</b>	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 10 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	<b>dfm_100hr</b>	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 100 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	<b>lfm_chamise_new</b>	Live Fuel Moisture Content-shrub	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of Chamise (shrub) plant species (% of species that is comprised of water).
Forecast	<b>OA</b>	Transmission Operability Assessment (OA)	Probability	max	Ignition Probability Weather (IPW) Model Output - Probability of Ignition based on the probability of outages by cause. Ignition component of the CFPD model.  Ignition Probability Weather Model - A model that provides estimates of the probability of an ignition given an outage on an hourly basis
Forecast	<b>CFPt</b>	Catastrophic Fire Potential (CFPT)	Scaled Probability	max	The product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob_Cat) and IPW - probability of ignition (prob_ignition). This product is called the (CFP <sub>D</sub> ) Catastrophic Fire Probability distribution model. Scaled by 1000 to covert to an integer value.
Observed	<b>Observed ws_mph</b>	Observed Sustained Wind Speed during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to All-Clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed wg_mph</b>	Observed Wind gust during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to All-Clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed temp_f</b>	Observed Temperature during event	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to All-Clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed RH_%</b>	Observed Relative Humidity During Event	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to All-Clear time.

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Observed	<b>Observed ws_mph_AC</b>	Observed Sustained Wind Speed at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed wg_mph_AC</b>	Observed Sustained Wind gust at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed temp_f_AC</b>	Observed Temperature at All Clear-	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	<b>Observed RH_%_AC</b>	Observed Relative Humidity at All Clear	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit at the All-Clear time.
Observed	<b>High Fire Risk Area</b>	High Fire Risk Area	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Labeled 'Yes' when Circuit goes through High Fire Risk Area.
Observed	<b>High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit</b>	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit	N/A	Yes/No During Event	High risk vegetation present on the circuit. PG&E does not utilize this factor in the decision to shutoff power.
Observed	<b>transmission_impacts_yes_no</b>	Impacted by Transmission	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream transmission lines, regardless of whether those distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct distribution PSPS.
Observed	<b>PSPS Potential Risk Consequence</b>	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to de-energization.
Observed	<b>PSPS Potential Benefit</b>	PSPS Potential Benefit	MAVF Score	Yes/No During Event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire.



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX B

SECTION 3 – DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

## **Appendix B: DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS**

**Table B-1. Circuits De-Energized During the October 17 – 20, 2024 PSPS Event**

Circuits labeled as “non-HFTD” are located outside of the CPUC High Fire-Threat District (HFTD). These circuits or portions of circuits are impacted for one of two reasons: (1) indirect impacts from transmission lines being de-energized or (2) the non-HFTD portion of the circuit are conductive to the HFTD at some point in the path to service.

Circuits with an asterisk (\*) were sectionalized during the event to further reduce customer impact. The de-energization date and time represents the time the first customer was de-energized on the circuit and the restoration time represents the date and time of the last customer restored on a circuit by circuit

Circuits with (\*\*\*) indicate that restoration time was delayed due to reclassification and/or damages.

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time	All-Clear Date and Time	Restoration Date and Time	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	ARBUCKLE 1101	10/17/2024 16:39	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 12:12	COLUSA	Outside HFTD	17	4	3	0	1	10
Distribution	BIG BEND 1101	10/18/2024 19:50	10/19/2024 14:23	10/19/2024 18:45	BUTTE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	286	259	25	27	96	2
Distribution	BRENTWOOD 2105	10/17/2024 20:33	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 14:23	CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	71	34	30	1	5	7
Distribution	BUCKS CREEK 1103	10/18/2024 19:55	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 16:53	PLUMAS	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	304	270	33	11	22	1
Distribution	CALISTOGA 1101	10/17/2024 18:13	10/19/2024 15:20	10/19/2024 17:42	NAPA, SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	163	122	31	5	14	10
Distribution	CALISTOGA 1102	10/17/2024 18:20	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 9:56	NAPA	Tier 3	11	7	1	0	0	3
Distribution	CALPINE 1144	10/17/2024 20:04	10/19/2024 14:23	10/20/2024 11:20	SONOMA, LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	20	2	18	0	0	0
Distribution	CALPINE 1146	10/17/2024 20:04	10/19/2024 14:23	10/20/2024 11:20	LAKE	Tier 3	1	0	1	0	0	0
Distribution	CANTUA 1103	10/18/2024 2:37	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 11:31	FRESNO	Outside HFTD	2	0	2	0	0	0
Distribution	CASTRO VALLEY 1108	10/17/2024 19:59	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 10:39	ALAMEDA	Tier 3	78	61	14	2	5	3
Distribution	CAYETANO 2109	10/17/2024 20:39	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 14:36	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Tier 3, Tier 2	135	97	28	11	8	10
Distribution	CLAYTON 2212	10/17/2024 20:56	10/19/2024 13:07	10/19/2024 15:15	CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	530	447	78	40	61	5
Distribution	CLAYTON 2213	10/17/2024 20:44	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 8:18	CONTRA COSTA	Tier 2	4	0	4	0	0	0
Distribution	CLOVERDALE 1102	10/17/2024 18:19	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 15:04	SONOMA, MENDOCINO	Tier 3, Tier 2	100	63	16	6	4	21
Distribution	COALINGA NO 2 1105	10/18/2024 2:44	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 9:57	SAN BENITO, MONTEREY, FRESNO	Outside HFTD	92	62	20	3	23	10
Distribution	CORNING 1101	10/17/2024 13:15	10/18/2024 14:55	10/18/2024 18:14	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	796	735	58	87	394	3
Distribution	CORNING 1102	10/17/2024 14:10	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 15:43	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	253	202	44	16	67	7

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time	All-Clear Date and Time	Restoration Date and Time	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	CORTINA 1101	10/17/2024 16:28	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 12:28	COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	17	6	10	0	1	1
Distribution	CRESTA 1101	10/18/2024 19:53	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 14:21	BUTTE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	6	1	3	0	0	2
Distribution	DUNBAR 1101	10/17/2024 19:51	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 15:01	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	206	163	28	3	15	15
Distribution	DUNBAR 1103	10/17/2024 20:18	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 13:10	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	117	96	16	5	7	5
Distribution	DUNNIGAN 1103	10/17/2024 16:35	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 11:53	YOLO, COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	13	9	3	0	3	1
Distribution	ELK CREEK 1101	10/17/2024 12:58	10/19/2024 14:23	10/20/2024 9:23	COLUSA, GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	814	673	116	48	185	25
Distribution	FRENCH GULCH 1101	10/17/2024 12:59	10/18/2024 7:26	10/18/2024 10:11	SHASTA	Tier 2	234	208	26	21	88	0
Distribution	FRENCH GULCH 1102	10/17/2024 12:57	10/18/2024 7:26	10/18/2024 10:24	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	37	10	26	1	1	1
Distribution	GEYSERVILLE 1102	10/17/2024 18:20	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 14:14	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	165	86	42	2	5	37
Distribution	GIRVAN 1101	10/17/2024 13:04	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 12:53	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	456	408	42	29	75	6
Distribution	GLENN 1101	10/17/2024 13:05	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 16:02	GLENN, TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	100	55	33	4	12	12
Distribution	HICKS 2101	10/18/2024 0:10	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 11:10	SANTA CLARA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	197	178	18	9	25	1
Distribution	HIGHLANDS 1102	10/17/2024 18:23	10/19/2024 14:23	10/19/2024 16:08	LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	28	23	5	2	11	0
Distribution	HIGHLANDS 1103	10/17/2024 18:11	10/19/2024 14:23	10/19/2024 16:40	LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	49	34	11	5	9	4
Distribution	JAMESON 1102	10/17/2024 17:45	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 9:52	SOLANO	Tier 2	32	29	3	1	4	0
Distribution	JAMESON 1105	10/17/2024 17:13	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 10:23	SOLANO	Tier 2	5	2	3	0	0	0
Distribution	JOLON 1102	10/18/2024 2:46	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 13:06	MONTEREY	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	570	418	92	21	90	60
Distribution	JOLON 1103	10/18/2024 2:31	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 11:36	MONTEREY	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	18	0	18	0	0	0
Distribution	KESWICK 1101	10/17/2024 13:03	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 11:25	SHASTA	Tier 3, Tier 2	320	250	69	14	79	1
Distribution	LAKEVILLE 1102	10/17/2024 19:48	10/18/2024 7:26	10/18/2024 9:46	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	22	10	7	1	1	5
Distribution	LOGAN CREEK 2102	10/17/2024 13:08	10/19/2024 14:23	10/19/2024 17:59	GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	77	33	28	0	0	16
Distribution	LONE TREE 2105	10/17/2024 20:31	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 12:50	CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	70	56	10	1	13	4
Distribution	LOS GATOS 1107	10/18/2024 0:08	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 14:53	SANTA CLARA, SANTA CRUZ	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	179	142	36	10	17	1
Distribution	MADISON 1105	10/17/2024 17:29	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 13:15	YOLO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	6	3	2	1	0	1
Distribution	MADISON 2101	10/17/2024 17:33	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 14:09	YOLO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	19	3	13	0	0	3

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time	All-Clear Date and Time	Restoration Date and Time	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	MAXWELL 1102	10/17/2024 16:32	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 12:33	COLUSA	Outside HFTD	11	5	2	0	0	4
Distribution	MAXWELL 1105	10/17/2024 16:22	10/19/2024 14:23	10/19/2024 15:53	COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	54	27	18	0	2	9
Distribution	MIDDLETOWN 1101	10/17/2024 18:17	10/19/2024 14:23	10/19/2024 18:47	NAPA, SONOMA, LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	378	333	40	14	96	5
Distribution	MILPITAS 1109	10/17/2024 19:47	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 17:39	SANTA CLARA, ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	183	144	34	12	24	5
Distribution	MONTICELLO 1101	10/17/2024 17:13	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 16:08	NAPA, SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	487	395	58	23	58	34
Distribution	MORGAN HILL 2111	10/18/2024 0:18	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 13:33	SANTA CLARA	Tier 3, Tier 2	167	147	18	15	13	2
Distribution	NAPA 1112	10/17/2024 17:29	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 9:27	NAPA	Tier 2	5	4	0	3	0	1
Distribution	NORTH DUBLIN 2103	10/17/2024 20:41	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 14:30	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	63	54	7	4	8	2
Distribution	ORO FINO 1102	10/18/2024 19:52	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 17:22	BUTTE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	809	754	51	51	182	4
Distribution	PANOCHÉ 1103	10/18/2024 2:55	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 9:13	SAN BENITO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	23	7	16	0	0	0
Distribution	PARADISE 1105	10/18/2024 20:02	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 13:01	BUTTE	Tier 3	50	48	2	9	9	0
Distribution	PUEBLO 1104	10/17/2024 18:18	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 13:19	NAPA	Tier 2	37	25	6	3	7	6
Distribution	PUEBLO 1105	10/17/2024 18:21	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 14:23	NAPA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	96	63	18	0	10	15
Distribution	PUEBLO 2102	10/17/2024 19:39	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 13:12	NAPA, SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	80	64	14	3	9	2
Distribution	PUEBLO 2103	10/17/2024 19:42	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 16:23	NAPA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	263	189	38	6	16	36
Distribution	PUTAH CREEK 1102	10/17/2024 17:14	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 16:25	YOLO, SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	258	186	46	16	18	26
Distribution	PUTAH CREEK 1103	10/17/2024 17:17	10/19/2024 13:07	10/19/2024 15:28	YOLO, SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	52	47	1	4	6	4
Distribution	PUTAH CREEK 1105	10/17/2024 17:36	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 12:28	YOLO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	36	19	7	4	0	10
Distribution	RAWSON 1103	10/17/2024 13:15	10/18/2024 14:55	10/18/2024 17:03	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	9	4	4	0	0	1
Distribution	RED BLUFF 1101	10/17/2024 13:51	10/18/2024 14:55	10/18/2024 17:44	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	67	67	0	7	22	0
Distribution	RED BLUFF 1103	10/17/2024 13:53	10/18/2024 14:55	10/18/2024 18:14	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	160	152	7	14	28	1
Distribution	RED BLUFF 1105	10/17/2024 13:07	10/18/2024 14:55	10/18/2024 17:00	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	233	219	8	24	48	6
Distribution	REDBUD 1101	10/17/2024 18:25	10/19/2024 14:23	10/19/2024 18:09	LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	541	497	31	53	195	13
Distribution	REDBUD 1102	10/17/2024 18:18	10/19/2024 13:07	10/19/2024 14:30	LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	48	37	2	5	16	9
Distribution	RINCON 1101	10/17/2024 19:58	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 11:15	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	47	35	11	4	8	1

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time	All-Clear Date and Time	Restoration Date and Time	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	RINCON 1103	10/17/2024 20:03	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 12:03	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	12	10	2	0	0	0
Distribution	ROB ROY 2104	10/18/2024 0:17	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 12:24	SANTA CRUZ	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	88	77	10	4	13	1
Distribution	SILVERADO 2102	10/17/2024 18:15	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 17:30	NAPA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	325	184	70	4	15	71
Distribution	SILVERADO 2103	10/17/2024 20:34	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 11:16	NAPA, SONOMA	Tier 3	14	9	3	0	0	2
Distribution	SILVERADO 2104	10/17/2024 18:30	10/19/2024 12:00	10/20/2024 13:18	NAPA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 1, Tier 2	1589	1337	137	86	234	115
Distribution	SILVERADO 2105	10/17/2024 19:42	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 14:04	NAPA, SONOMA	Tier 3	22	12	4	0	0	6
Distribution	SISQUOC 1103	10/18/2024 8:25	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 11:00	SANTA BARBARA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	155	120	24	4	15	11
Distribution	SONOMA 1102	10/17/2024 19:46	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 11:20	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	108	94	7	1	12	7
Distribution	SONOMA 1103	10/17/2024 19:52	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 11:31	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	131	115	5	5	9	11
Distribution	SONOMA 1105	10/17/2024 20:30	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 12:42	NAPA, SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	74	65	5	1	4	4
Distribution	SONOMA 1106	10/17/2024 19:49	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 11:02	SONOMA	Tier 3	8	3	5	0	0	0
Distribution	STILLWATER 1101	10/17/2024 13:19	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 13:36	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	606	537	63	59	197	6
Distribution	STILLWATER 1102	10/17/2024 13:27	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 12:34	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	724	702	22	70	216	0
Distribution	SUNOL 1101	10/17/2024 20:04	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 17:43	ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 1, Tier 3, Tier 2	74	51	20	4	3	3
Distribution	TASSAJARA 2104	10/17/2024 20:39	10/19/2024 12:00	10/19/2024 14:00	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	59	48	9	2	5	2
Distribution	TASSAJARA 2112	10/17/2024 21:02	10/19/2024 13:07	10/19/2024 14:53	CONTRA COSTA	Tier 3	27	15	12	1	1	0
Distribution	TIDEWATER 2106	10/17/2024 20:35	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 8:32	CONTRA COSTA	Tier 2	25	15	9	0	1	1
Distribution	TYLER 1105	10/17/2024 13:03	10/18/2024 14:55	10/18/2024 17:48	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	495	425	41	50	123	29
Distribution	VACA DIXON 1101	10/17/2024 17:21	10/19/2024 13:07	10/19/2024 17:23	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	505	473	31	49	64	1
Distribution	VACA DIXON 1105	10/17/2024 17:32	10/19/2024 13:07	10/19/2024 15:20	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	27	24	0	3	8	3
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1103	10/17/2024 17:40	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 8:54	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	37	35	2	4	3	0
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1104	10/17/2024 17:22	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 12:00	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	150	115	28	11	23	7
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1108	10/17/2024 17:22	10/19/2024 13:07	10/19/2024 18:42	NAPA, SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	813	724	67	69	59	22
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1109	10/17/2024 17:26	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 10:27	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	161	149	11	24	36	1
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1111	10/17/2024 17:24	10/19/2024 13:07	10/19/2024 15:37	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	88	83	5	8	10	0
Distribution	VASCO 1102	10/17/2024 21:20	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 15:40	ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	217	153	50	16	21	14

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time	All-Clear Date and Time	Restoration Date and Time	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	VINEYARD 2108	10/17/2024 19:48	10/19/2024 5:28	10/19/2024 7:44	ALAMEDA	Tier 3	6	2	2	0	0	2
Distribution	VOLTA 1101	10/17/2024 13:01	10/19/2024 8:53	10/19/2024 10:54	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	7	0	6	0	0	1
Distribution	WESTLEY 1103	10/17/2024 21:17	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 11:55	STANISLAUS	Outside HFTD	26	3	21	0	0	2
Distribution	WILLIAMS 1102	10/17/2024 16:38	10/19/2024 10:09	10/19/2024 12:47	COLUSA	Outside HFTD	15	7	5	0	2	3
Transmission	Elk Creek Tap	10/17/24 13:22	10/19/24 14:23	10/19/24 16:04	Transmission Line	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	1 <sup>3</sup>	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	Lower Lake-Homestake*	10/17/24 18:09	10/19/24 14:23	10/19/24 16:26	Transmission Line	Tier 1 & Tier 2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	Jolon Tap	10/18/24 03:19	10/19/24 05:28	10/19/24 09:59	Transmission Line	Tier 1 & Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>							<b>17,367</b>	<b>14,370</b>	<b>2,181</b>	<b>1,136</b>	<b>3,190</b>	<b>814</b>

<sup>3</sup> Foreign Line de-energized with Elk Creek Tap per TOTL WC T24-016269.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX C

SECTION 4 – DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

## **Appendix C: DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES**

*Table C-1. Damages & Hazards Found Within the De-Energized Areas*

<b>Circuit Name</b>	<b>County</b>	<b>Structure Identifier</b>	<b>Tier 2/3 or Non-HFTD</b>	<b>Damage/Hazard</b>	<b>Type of Damage/Hazard</b>	<b>Description of Damage</b>
Silverado 2104	Napa	102253166	Non-HFTD	Damage	Vegetation	Broken conductor
Rob Roy 2104	Santa Cruz	101682184	Tier 3	Damage	Wind Related	Broken tie wire
Rob Roy 2104	Santa Cruz	103998482	Tier 3	Hazard	Vegetation	Tree branch on line



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
APPENDIX D  
SECTION 6 – PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

## Appendix D: PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

*Table D-1. Public Safety Partners Contacted*

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Alameda County	Board President	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Board Vice President	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	County Administrator	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	County Clerk Recorder	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Division Chief	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Alameda County	Division Chief of Operations/ Emergency Management	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	EMS Disaster and WMD Coordinator	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Fire Chief	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Alameda County	General	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Main Line	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Alameda County	OES Capt	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Alameda County	OES EOC Lead	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	President of the Board	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Safety & Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Alameda County	Senior Emergency Services Coordinator	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Sheriff	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Superintendent of Water Distribution	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Supervisor	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Technician	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County	Train Ops	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Alameda County	Watch Commander	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Alameda County	Water Operations Manager	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alameda County CCA	General	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Alameda County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 3	10/17/2024 04:12 PDT
Alameda County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Alameda County Communication Facility	Global Valley Networks	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Alameda County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	City Clerk	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	City Leadership	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	City Manager	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	Council Member	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	Deputy Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	Deputy Chief of Police	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	Emergency Services Manager	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	Fire Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	General	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	Mayor	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	OES Duty officer	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	Police Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	Police Watch Commander	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	Public Works Director	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Fremont	Vice Mayor	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Hayward	City Clerk	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Hayward	City Manager	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Hayward	Council Member	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT

<sup>4</sup> Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Alameda County Hayward	Fire Chief	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Hayward	Mayor	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Hayward	Mayor Pro Tem	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Hayward	Police Chief	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Hayward	Utilities Operations & Maintenance Manager	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Other Facility	City and County of San Francisco	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Alameda County Other Facility	County of Alameda	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Alameda County Other Facility	Gexpro	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Assistant City Manager	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Assistant to the City Manager	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	City Clerk	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	City Manager	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	City Traffic Engineer	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Council Member	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Director of Engineering	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Director of Information Technology	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Director of Library and Recreation	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Director of Operations and Water Utilities	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Fire Chief	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Mayor	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Non-Emergency	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Police Chief	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Public Information officer	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Training and Emergency Services Manager	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alameda County Pleasanton	Vice Mayor	Tier 3	10/17/2024 16:45 PDT
Alpine County	Chair	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alpine County	County Administrative officer	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Alpine County	County Clerk	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alpine County	Dispatch	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Alpine County	General	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Alpine County	Health officer	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alpine County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alpine County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alpine County	Under Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alpine County	Vice Chair	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Alpine County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 1	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Alpine County Communication Facility	New Cingular Wireless LLC	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Alpine County Emergency Services Facility	County of Alpine	Tier 1	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Alpine County Other Facility	Skyline Bear Valley Resorts Inc	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Alpine County Water and Waste Water Facility	Bear Valley Water District	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Alpine County Water and Waste Water Facility	Lake Alpine Water Co	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Amador County	Board member District 1	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County	County Administrative officer	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County	County Clerk/Recorder	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County	Director	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County	Division Chief	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County	Fire Chief	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County	Health officer	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT

<sup>4</sup> Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Amador County	Lieutenant, Dispatch/OES	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County	OES Coordinator / Sergeant	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County	Police Chief	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County	Program Manager for Emergency Preparedness	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Amador County	Supervisor	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County	Supervisor District 3	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Amador County Communication Facility	Volcano Telephone	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Amador County Other Facility	Pacific Gas & Electric Company	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Butte County	Admin Analyst II	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Butte County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	Chief Administrative officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	County Clerk-Recorder	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	Deputy Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Butte County	Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	Division Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	General Services Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	Interim OEM Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	Lieutenant	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	Public Health Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	Sergeant	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County	Vice Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County Chico	Captain	Tier 2	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Butte County Chico	City Clerk	Tier 2	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Butte County Chico	City Manager	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Butte County Chico	Council Member	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Butte County Chico	Deputy Chief	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Butte County Chico	Fire Chief	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Butte County Chico	Mayor	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Butte County Chico	Police Chief	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Butte County Chico	Vice Mayor	Tier 2	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Butte County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Butte County Emergency Services Facility	County of Butte	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Butte County Oroville	Assistant City Clerk	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County Oroville	Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County Oroville	City Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County Oroville	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County Oroville	Deputy Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County Oroville	Division Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County Oroville	Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County Oroville	Police Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County Oroville	Vice Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Butte County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Calaveras County	Board Chair	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Calaveras County	Board Vice Chair	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Calaveras County	County Clerk/Recorder	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Calaveras County	Emergency Services Coordinator	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Calaveras County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT

<sup>4</sup> Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Calaveras County	Health officer	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Calaveras County	Interim County Administrative officer	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Calaveras County	Interim Emergency Services Coordinator	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Calaveras County	Interim Emergency Services Director	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Calaveras County	Local Cal Fire	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Calaveras County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Calaveras County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Calaveras County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Calaveras County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Calaveras County Communication Facility	Media One Inc	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Calaveras County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Calaveras County Other Facility	Us Department of Agriculture	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Colusa County	Board Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	County Clerk/Recorder	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	County Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	Deputy Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	Director	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	Division Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	Emergency Service Technician	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	General	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	MHOAC	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Colusa County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County	Vice Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	Citizens Telecommunications of California Inc.	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	Gte Mobile Net of California Lp	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	County of Colusa	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	Indian Valley - Bear Valley Fire Protection Distri	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	Indian Valley Fire Protection District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Colusa County Energy Sector Facility	City of Santa Clara	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT

<sup>4</sup> Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Colusa County Energy Sector Facility	Western Area Power Administration	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Colusa County Tribal	Chairperson	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Colusa County Water And Waste Water Facility	California Department Of Forestry	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Colusa County Water and Waste Water Facility	County Of Colusa	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	Chair of the Board	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	Chief of Staff	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	County Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Contra Costa County	County Clerk Recorder	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	Deputy Fire Chief, Mutual Aid Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Contra Costa County	Duty officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Contra Costa County	Duty officer - 24/7 Staff call line	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	Emergency Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	OES Warning System	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Antioch	City Clerk	Tier 2	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Contra Costa County Antioch	City Manager	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Contra Costa County Antioch	Council Member	Tier 2	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Contra Costa County Antioch	Emergency	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Contra Costa County Antioch	Mayor	Tier 2	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Contra Costa County Antioch	Mayor Pro Tem	Tier 2	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Contra Costa County Antioch	Police Chief	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Contra Costa County CCA	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Clayton	City Clerk	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Clayton	City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Clayton	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Clayton	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Clayton	Interim City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Clayton	Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Clayton	Non-Emergency	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Contra Costa County Clayton	Police Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Contra Costa County Clayton	Vice Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	AT&T Pacific Bell	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	County of Contra Costa	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	SBA Towers	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Sprint Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	US Coast Guard	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Verizon	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Contra Costa County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County Emergency Services Facility	County of Contra Costa	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County Emergency Services Facility	San Ramon Valley Fire District	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County Government - Jail Facility	County of Contra Costa	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County Other Facility	Contra Costa Water District	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Chief of Police	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	City Clerk	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	City Manager	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Council Member	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Emergency	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Fire Chief	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Mayor	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Non-Emergency	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Vice Mayor	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Battalion Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Board Chair / District III Supervisor	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Board First Vice Chair	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Board Second Vice Chair	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Chief Administrative officer	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Commander	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	County Clerk-Recorder	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Fire Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Interim Fire Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Local Cal Fire	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Medical Health Operational Area Coordinator	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	MHOAC	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	OES Deputy	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	OES Sergeant	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	OES/Sheriff	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Sheriff	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Supervisor	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Supervisor District 4	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County	Wildfire Preparedness/ Resilience officer	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
El Dorado County CCA	General	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
El Dorado County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
El Dorado County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
El Dorado County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 1	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
El Dorado County Communication Facility	Crown Castle International	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
El Dorado County Communication Facility	Newpath Networks LLC	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
El Dorado County Communication Facility	Sprint Nextel Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
El Dorado County Communication Facility	T-Mobile	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
El Dorado County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
El Dorado County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
El Dorado County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless Services LLC	Tier 1	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
El Dorado County Emergency Services Facility	El Dorado County Fire Dept	Tier 1	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
El Dorado County Other Facility	Sprint Nextel Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
El Dorado County Water and Waste Water Facility	El Dorado Irrigation District	Tier 1	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Fresno County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	Chair of the Board	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	City Clerk	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Fresno County	County Clerk	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Fresno County	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	County Administrative officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	Emergency	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Fresno County	Emergency Management Specialist	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	Facility Services	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	Lieutenant	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	MHOAC	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	Mayor Pro Tem	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	OES Director of Emergency Services	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	Staff Analyst	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	HFRA	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Fresno County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	HFRA	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Fresno County Communication Facility	Crown Castle International	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Fresno County Communication Facility	Pinnacle Towers Inc	HFRA	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Fresno County Communication Facility	Ponderosa Telephone Co	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Fresno County Communication Facility	T-Mobile USA Inc	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Fresno County Communication Facility	USA Media Group	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Fresno County Emergency Services Facility	Bald Mountain Fire Protection District	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Fresno County Other Facility	Dean, Allan	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Fresno County Tribal	Chairperson	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County Tribal	Environmental Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County Tribal	Housing Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County Tribal	MWC GM	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County Tribal	Member at Large	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County Tribal	Secretary	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County Tribal	Treasurer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Fresno County Tribal	Vice Chairperson	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County	CAO	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County	County Administrative officer	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County	Deputy Director OES	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County	Director of Public Works Agency	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County	General	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Glenn County Emergency Services Facility	County of Glenn	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Glenn County Emergency Services Facility	Elk Creek Fire District	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Glenn County Energy Sector Facility	City of Santa Clara	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Glenn County Orland	City Clerk	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County Orland	City Manager	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County Orland	Fire Chief	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County Orland	General	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Glenn County Orland	Public Works Director	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County Other Facility	US Army Corps of Engineers	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Glenn County Tribal	Interim Tribal Secretary	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Glenn County Water and Waste Water Facility	Elk Creek Community Service	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Glenn County Water and Waste Water Facility	US Army Corps of Engineers	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Lake County	Battalion Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Lake County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	Chair of the Board	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Lake County	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	County Administrative officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	County Supervisor, District 4	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	Dispatch	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	District 3 County Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	District 5 Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	District Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	Emergency Services Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	Health Services Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	Lieutenant	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Lake County Clearlake	City Manager	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Clearlake	Council Member	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Clearlake	Councilman	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Clearlake	Lieutenant - Operations	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Clearlake	Non-Emergency	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/17/2024 14:20 PDT
Lake County Clearlake	Police Chief	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Clearlake	Vice Mayor	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Lake County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Lake County Communication Facility	Mediacom California LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Lake County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Lake County Communication Facility	Williams Communication LLC	Tier 2	10/17/2024 04:12 PDT
Lake County Emergency Services Facility	Northshore Fire Protection District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Chairman	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Lake County Tribal	Cultural Resources	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/19/2024 12:31 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Environmental Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/19/2024 12:31 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Representative	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Secretary	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Treasurer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Vice Chairman	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/17/2024 14:19 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Vice Chairperson	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/19/2024 12:31 PDT
Madera County	CAO	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	Cal FIRE Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	Command Center	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Madera County	Command Staff E-Mail	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	County Administrative officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	County Clerk	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Madera County	Dispatch	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	Emergency Command Center	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Madera County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	Lieutenant	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	MHOAC	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	OES Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	OES Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	Sergeant	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County	Unit Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County Communication Facility	County of Madera	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Madera County Communication Facility	Northland Cable Television Inc	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Madera County Communication Facility	Ponderosa Telephone Co	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Madera County Communication Facility	Sierra Telephone Company Inc	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Madera County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Madera County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Madera County Emergency Services Facility	County of Madera	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Madera County Other Facility	Dept of Forestry	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Madera County Tribal	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County Tribal	Emergency Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County Tribal	Emergency Operations Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County Tribal	Treasurer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Madera County Tribal	Tribal Chairperson	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County Tribal	Tribal Secretary	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Madera County Tribal	Vice Chairperson	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Madera County Water and Waste Water Facility	County of Madera	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Mariposa County	Battalion Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	Cal FIRE Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	Command Center	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Mariposa County	Councilmember	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	County Administrative officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	County Clerk	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	County Health officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	County Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Mariposa County	Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	Division Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	Emergency Command Center	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	Emergency Dispatch	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	Emergency Services	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Mariposa County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	GIS Specialist	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	MHOAC	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	OES Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	Public Information officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	Sergeant Special Operations	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Mariposa County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County	Unit Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mariposa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Mariposa County Communication Facility	Sierra Telephone Company Inc	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Mariposa County Emergency Services Facility	USDI-NPS-Yosemite	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Mendocino County	Acting Emergency Services Coordinator	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County	Board Chair	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Mendocino County	County Clerk/Assessor/Recorder	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Mendocino County	County Supervisor	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County	County supervisor	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County	Fire Chief	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County	Interim County Executive officer	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County	Lieutenant	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County	Local Cal Fire	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County	MHOAC	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County	OES Coordinator	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Mendocino County	Sheriff	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County	Supervisor	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Mendocino County CCA	General	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	Battalion Chief	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	Board Vice Chair	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	Cal FIRE Chief	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	County Clerk	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Merced County	County Executirve officer	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	District 4 Supervisor	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Merced County	Duty Chief	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	Fire Chief	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	General	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	OES Coordinator	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Merced County	OES Director	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	Sheriff	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	Supervisor	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	Supervisor District 1	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County	Unit Chief	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County Gustine	City Manager	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Merced County Gustine	Emergency	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	Board Chair	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	Board Member	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	County Supervisor - District 2	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	Duty officer	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Monterey County	Emergency Services Manager	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	Emergency Services Planner	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	Fire Chief	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	General	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	Medical Health Operational Area Coordinator	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	MHOAC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	OES Director	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	On Call contact	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	Sheriff	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Monterey County	Sr. Emergency Services Coordination	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	Supervisor	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County	UNIT CHIEF	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County CCA	General	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Monterey County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT

<sup>4</sup> Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Monterey County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Monterey County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Monterey County Communication Facility	Dept of The Army	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Monterey County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Monterey County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Monterey County Other Facility	Department of The Army	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 19:43 PDT
Monterey County Other Facility	Dept of The Army	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Monterey County Water and Waste Water Facility	Dept of The Army	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Napa County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County	County Clerk/Recorder	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County	Emergency Services officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Napa County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County	GIS	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Napa County	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County	Interim County Executive officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County	Medical Health Operational Area Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County	MHOAC	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Napa County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Napa County	Under-Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County CCA	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	Comcast	Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Napa County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Napa County Emergency Services Facility	County of Napa	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Napa County Emergency Services Facility	Napa County Department of Public Works	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/16/2024 08:08 PDT
Napa County Saint Helena	City Manager	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County Saint Helena	Fire Chief	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Napa County Water and Waste Water Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Nevada County	Assistant Director	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	Board Chair	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Nevada County	Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	County Executive officer	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	Director	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	Division Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	Fire Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	General	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	Health officer	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	Local Cal Fire	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	Sheriff	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County	Supervisor	Tier 1, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Nevada County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Nevada County Communication Facility	AT&T Wireless Service LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Nevada County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Nevada County Communication Facility	Qwest Communications International Inc	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Nevada County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Nevada County Communication Facility	USA Media Group	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Nevada County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	10/15/2024 19:43 PDT
Nevada County Communication Facility	Verizon Services Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Nevada County Energy Sector Facility	Sierra Pacific Power Co	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Placer County	Assistant Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Assistant Director	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Board Chair	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Building Maintenance Superintendent	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	CEO	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	CIO	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Captain - PCSO	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	County Clerk/Recorder	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	County Executirve officer	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Deputy Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Deputy Director	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Deputy Director of Communications and Public Affairs	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Director	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Duty officer	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Placer County	Emergency Command Center	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Emergency Services Coordinator	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Facilities, Emergency	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	General	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Health officer	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	IT Manager	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Placer County	IT Supervisor	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Lieutenant - PCSO	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Local Cal Fire	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Main Telecom Number	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Placer County Supervisor, District Two	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Public Health officer	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Placer County	Roads Manager	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Sergeant - PCSO	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Sheriff Dispatch	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County	Supervisor	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Placer County CCA	General	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Placer County Communication Facility	AAT Communications Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Placer County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Placer County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Placer County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Placer County Communication Facility	USA Media Group	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Placer County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Placer County Emergency Services Facility	Truckee Fire Protection Dist	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 19:43 PDT
Placer County Other Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Plumas County	CAO	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Plumas County	County Administrative officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Plumas County	County Clerk-Recorder-Registrar	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Plumas County	Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Plumas County	Director of Nursing	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Plumas County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Plumas County	Program Division Chief- Emergency Preparedness office	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Plumas County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Plumas County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Plumas County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Plumas County Communication Facility	Sprint Corporation	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Plumas County Energy Sector Facility	City of Santa Clara	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
San Benito County	County Administrative officer	HFRA, Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
San Benito County	Emergency Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
San Benito County	Emergency Services Specialist	HFRA, Tier 2	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
San Benito County	Non-Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
San Benito County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
San Benito County	Staff Analyst	HFRA, Tier 2	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
San Benito County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
San Benito County CCA	General	HFRA, Tier 2	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
San Benito County Communication Facility	Pinnacles Tel Co	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	Duty Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	Duty officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	Emergency Services Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	OES Duty officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
San Luis Obispo County	Watch Commander	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
San Luis Obispo County CCA	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
San Luis Obispo County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
San Luis Obispo County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
San Luis Obispo County Emergency Services Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Santa Barbara County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Santa Barbara County	OEM Duty officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Santa Barbara County	OES Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Santa Barbara County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Santa Barbara County CCA	General	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Santa Barbara County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Santa Barbara County Communication Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Santa Barbara County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Santa Barbara County Communication Facility	SBA Towers Vi, LLC	Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:08 PDT
Santa Clara County	Assistant Chief / Assistant Director / MHOAC	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County	Board President	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County	Board Vice Chair	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County	Chief Operating officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County	County Executive officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County	County Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County	Deputy CEO	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County	Deputy Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County	Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County	Director of Emergency Management	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County	Duty officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County	Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County	Emergency Preparedness Manager	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County	General	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County	Main Line	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County	Non-Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County	Policy Director - office of Supervisor Simitian	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County	Public Health officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Santa Clara County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County	Train Ops	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County	Watch Commander	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County CCA	General	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:46 PDT
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:46 PDT
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Comcast of California	Tier 2	10/16/2024 09:46 PDT
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Crown Castle International	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:46 PDT
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:46 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	City Clerk	Tier 2	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	City Manager	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Council Member	Tier 2	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Deputy City Manager	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Emergency	Tier 2	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Fire Chief	Tier 2	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Mayor	Tier 2	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Non-Emergency	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:00 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Police Chief	Tier 2	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Public Works Director	Tier 2	10/16/2024 07:59 PDT
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Vice Mayor	Tier 2	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:46 PDT
Santa Clara County Other Facility	D B Leeson & B S Leeson	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:46 PDT
Santa Clara County Other Facility	US National Weather Service	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:46 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Acting Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Assistant City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Assistant Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	City Clerk	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Chief of Staff	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Communications officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Council Member	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Deputy City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Deputy Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Director Clean Energy	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Director PRNS	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Director, office of Emergency Management	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Mayor	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 17:55 PDT
Santa Clara County San Jose	Senior Advisor	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	ADEC	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	Assistant CAO	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	Board Chair	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	Communications Director	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	County Administrative officer	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	Emergency Coordinator	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	Fire Chief	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	MHOAC	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	Main office	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	Non-Emergency	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	OES Duty officer	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	Sheriff	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County	Supervisor	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Santa Cruz County	Undersheriff	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Santa Cruz County CCA	General	Tier 3	10/16/2024 09:57 PDT
Shasta County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Shasta County	General	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Shasta County	Interim Tribal Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Shasta County	Lieutenant	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Shasta County	office of Emergency Services Coordinator	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Shasta County	Operations Manager	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Shasta County	Regional Disaster Medical Health Coordinator and Specialist	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Shasta County	Sergeant	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Shasta County	Sheriff-Coroner	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Shasta County	Staff Chief, Northern Operations	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Shasta County	Tribal Chairman	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Cingular Wireless Services, Inc	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Happy Valley Telephone Co	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	US Department of Agriculture	Tier 2	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	County of Shasta	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	French Gulch Volunteer Fire	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Shasta County Major Transportation Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Shasta County Water and Waste Water Facility	US Bureau Of Reclamation	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Sierra County	Chair	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sierra County	Chair, Supervisor District 4	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sierra County	Coordinator	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sierra County	County Clerk/Recorder	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sierra County	Dispatch Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Sierra County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sierra County	Sheriff-Coroner / OES Director	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sierra County	Superintendent	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sierra County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sierra County	Vice Chair	HFRA, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sierra County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Sierra County Communication Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 3	10/15/2024 19:43 PDT
Sierra County Communication Facility	US Department of Agriculture	Tier 3	10/15/2024 19:43 PDT
Sierra County Emergency Services Facility	Downieville Fire District	Tier 3	10/15/2024 19:43 PDT
Sierra County Emergency Services Facility	Sierra City Fire Protection District	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Sierra County Energy Sector Facility	Henwood Associate Inc	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Sierra County Government - Jail Facility	County of Sierra	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Sierra County Other Facility	Crown Castle Usa Inc	Tier 3	10/15/2024 19:43 PDT
Sierra County Other Facility	Sierra City Fire Dept Auxiliary	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT

<sup>4</sup> Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.



Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
SIERRA County Water and Waste Water Facility	Downieville Public Utilities District	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
SIERRA County Water and Waste Water Facility	Haskell Creek Tract Association	Tier 1	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Solano County	Board Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County	County Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County	County Clerk	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County	Dispatch	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Solano County	Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County	MHOAC - EMS Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County CCA	General	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	American Tower Corp	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	AT&T Wireless Service LLC	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	Comcast Cable Communications Management LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	Crown Castle International	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	TCI	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Solano County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Solano County Emergency Services Facility	Vacaville Fire Protection District	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Solano County Fairfield	City Clerk	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Fairfield	City Manager	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Fairfield	Council Member	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Fairfield	Councilmember	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Fairfield	Emergency	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Solano County Fairfield	Fire Chief	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Fairfield	General	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Solano County Fairfield	Mayor	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Fairfield	Police Chief	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Fairfield	Vice Mayor	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Vacaville	Assistant City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Vacaville	Chief of Police	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Vacaville	City Clerk	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Vacaville	City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Solano County Vacaville	Council Member	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Vacaville	Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Solano County Vacaville	General	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Solano County Vacaville	Mayor	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Solano County Vacaville	Utilities Operations and Maintenance Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Solano County Vacaville	Vice Mayor	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	1st District Sonoma County Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Sonoma County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	Board Chair Pro Tem	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	Community Alert & Warning Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Sonoma County	Deputy Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	Division Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	EMS	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	EMS Dispatch	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	Fire Captain	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	MHOAC	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT

<sup>4</sup> Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Sonoma County	Main office	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Sonoma County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	Sheriff Dispatch	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	Sheriff's Liaison	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Sonoma County	Staff Duty officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County CCA	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Sonoma County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Sonoma County Communication Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 2	10/17/2024 04:12 PDT
Sonoma County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Sonoma County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Sonoma County Communication Facility	T Mobile West A Delaware Corp	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Sonoma County Communication Facility	T-Mobile USA	Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Sonoma County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Sonoma County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 3	10/16/2024 08:07 PDT
Sonoma County Emergency Services Facility	Sonoma Valley Fire District	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Chief of Police	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	City Council Member	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Council Member	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Deputy Emergency Manager	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Division Chief Fire Marshal	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Mayor	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Police Chief	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Vice Mayor	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County	Board Chair	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County	Chief Executive officer	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County	County Clerk Recorder	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County	EMS Duty officer	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County	Emergency Manager	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County	Fire Chief	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County	Health officer	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County	MHOAC	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County	Public Health Duty officer	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Stanislaus County	Sheriff	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County	Supervisor	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Stanislaus County Communication Facility	Federal Bureau of Investigation	HFRA	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County	Chief Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tehama County	Communications Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tehama County	County Clerk / Recorder	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tehama County	Lieutenant and OES manager	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Tehama County	OES Director	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tehama County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	Charter Communications Holding Company LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	Ducor Telephone Co	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	Ducor Telephone Corp	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	T Mobile West A Delaware Corp	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Tehama County Corning	City Clerk	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tehama County Corning	City Manager	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tehama County Corning	Police Chief	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT

<sup>4</sup> Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Tehama County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Emergency Services Facility	County of Tehama	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Government - Jail Facility	California Department of Corrections	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Other Facility	Burns, Sherri	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tehama County Red Bluff	Chief of Police	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tehama County Red Bluff	City Manager	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	County Administrator	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	County Clerk	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	Emergency Command Center	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	General	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Tuolumne County	Local Cal Fire	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Tuolumne County	MHOAC	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	OES	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	Office of Emergency Services Assistant Director	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	Public Health Director	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	Sheriff	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	Supervisor	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Tuolumne County	Supervisor, District 4	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	Tuolumne County Board of Supervisors - District 1	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Tuolumne County	Unit Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Tuolumne County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tuolumne County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Tuolumne County Communication Facility	Comcast Cable Communications Management, LLC	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Tuolumne County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tuolumne County Communication Facility	New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Tuolumne County Communication Facility	Sierra Nevada Communications	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:04 PDT
Tuolumne County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tuolumne County Communication Facility	Tuolumne Cablevision	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tuolumne County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Tier 3	10/15/2024 19:43 PDT
Tuolumne County Emergency Services Facility	County of Tuolumne	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tuolumne County Water and Waste Water Facility	Leland Meadows Water	Tier 3	10/15/2024 19:43 PDT
Tuolumne County Water and Waste Water Facility	Slide Inn Water Co LLC	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Tuolumne County Water and Waste Water Facility	Tuolumne Utilities District	Tier 3	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Yolo County	Board Chair	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Yolo County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Yolo County	County Administrator	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Yolo County	County Clerk-Recorder	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Yolo County	County OES Supervisor	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Yolo County	Deputy County Administrator	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Yolo County	Dispatch	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Yolo County	EMS Administrator	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Yolo County	Fire Chief	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier <sup>4</sup>	Date/Time Contacted (PDT)
Yolo County	Non-Emergency	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:23 PDT
Yolo County	Sheriff	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Yolo County	Supervisor	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:21 PDT
Yolo County CCA	General	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:22 PDT
Yolo County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT
Yolo County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	10/15/2024 07:13 PDT
Yolo County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	10/15/2024 07:05 PDT

<sup>4</sup> Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.


PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX E

SECTION 8 – ALL CLEAR ZONE MAP

## Appendix E: ALL CLEAR ZONE MAP

Figure E-1. All Clear Zone Map



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX F

SECTION 9 – COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER LOCATIONS

## Appendix F: LIST OF PG&E COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTERS

**Table F-1. Community Resource Centers Provided by PG&E**

The table below provided details of the 29 CRCs that PG&E mobilized during the October 17 – 20, 2024 PSPS event, including specific locations, dates and times opened and closed, total attendance for each location, and amenities provided.

#	County	Site Name	Address	Operating Hours (PDT)				Total Visitors	Indoor / Outdoor	Amenities Provided
				Day 1 10-17	Day 2 10-18	Day 3 10-19	Day 4 10-20			
1	Butte	Forest Ranch Baptist Church	4967 Schott Road	No	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 1830	No	21	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
2	Butte	Magalia Pines Baptist Church	14098 Skyway Rd	No	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 15:30	No	5	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
3	Butte	Concow Elementary School	11679 Nelson Bar Rd	No	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 20:00	No	9	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
4	Colusa	Stonyford Community Hall	229 Market St	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 2200	08:00–10:30	223	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
5	Contra Costa	Clayton Community Church	6055 Main Street	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 19:00	No	73	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
6	Contra Costa	Balfour-Guthrie Park	1701 Balfour Rd	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	0800 – 19:00	No	80	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
7	Fresno	Auberry Library	33049 Auberry Rd	No	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 11:00	No	11	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
8	Glenn	Elk Creek Junior Senior High School	3430 Co Rd 309	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	0800 – 22:00	08:00 – 09:00	225	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
9	Lake	Live Oaks Senior Center	12502 Foothill Blvd	1200 – 2200	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 19:00	No	540	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
10	Lake	Hidden Valley Lake Association	19305 Donkey Hill Rd	1200 – 2200	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 19:00	No	722	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
11	Madera	North Fork Elementary School	33087 Rd 228	No	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 11:30	No	10	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
12	Madera	Oakhurst Community Hall	39800 Fresno Flats Rd	No	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 11:30	No	29	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
13	Monterey	San Antonio Union School	67550 Lockwood Jolon Road	No	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 14:30	No	199	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
14	Monterey	Salinas Valley Fairgrounds	625 Division St.	No	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 14:30	No	32	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
15	Napa	Pacific Union College	200 Angwin Ave	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 14:00	186	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
16	Napa	Calistoga Community Center	1307 Washington Street	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 14:00	56	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
17	Santa Barbara	Santa Maria Elks Lodge	1309 N Bradley Rd	No	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 12:30	No	17	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.



#	County	Site Name	Address	Operating Hours (PDT)				Total Visitors	Indoor / Outdoor	Amenities Provided
				Day 1 10-17	Day 2 10-18	Day 3 10-19	Day 4 10-20			
18	Santa Clara	Mayfair Community Center	2039 Kammerer Ave	No	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 18:00	No	141	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
19	Santa Clara	Morgan Hill Library	660 W Main Ave	No	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 15:00	No	38	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
20	Santa Clara	Faith Lutheran Church	16548 Ferris Ave	No	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 17:00	No	12	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
21	Santa Cruz	Unitarian Universalist Fellowship	6401 Freedom Blvd	No	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 16:00	No	21	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
22	Shasta	Risen King Community Church	6100 Oasis Rd	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 14:30	No	62	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
23	Shasta	Happy Valley Community Center	5400 Happy Valley Rd	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 14:30	No	56	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
24	Solano	Solano Community College	2001 N Village Pkwy	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 21:30	No	59	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Cooling, Seating, and Ice.
25	Solano	Green Valley Golf Course	35 Country Club Road	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 21:30	No	194	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
26	Sonoma	First Congregational Church of Sonoma	252 W Spain St	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 16:30	No	96	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
27	Sonoma	Healdsburg Community Church	1100 University Street	12:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 11:00	155	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
28	Tehama	Rancho Tehama Association	17605 Park Terrace Road	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 17:30	No	756	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.
29	Tehama	Flournoy Elementary School	15850 Paskenta Rd	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 17:30	No	158	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charging, Snacks, Seating.

**VERIFICATION**

I, undersigned, say:

I am an officer of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and am authorized to make this verification for that reason.

I have read the foregoing “PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff Report to the CPUC” for the October 17 – 20, 2024, PSPS and I am informed and believe the matters stated therein to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Oakland, California this 1<sup>st</sup> day of November 2024.



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MARK QUINLAN  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT  
WILDFIRE, EMERGENCY & OPERATIONS