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November 25, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Leslie Palmer
Director, Safety and Enforcement Division
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Mr. Palmer:

As required by Resolution ESRB-8 and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) respectfully submits this report for the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS. This report has been verified by a PG&E officer in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Susan C. Martinez'. Below the signature is a horizontal line.

Susan C. Martinez
Director of Liaison, Regulatory Operations and Engagement

Enclosures

cc: Anthony Noll, SED
ESRB_ComplianceFilings@cpuc.ca.gov
EnergyDivisionCentralFiles@cpuc.ca.gov

**Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC
November 5 – 8, 2024 De-energization**

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**PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC
November 5 – 8, 2024 De-energization**

Section 1 – Summary and Overview

Section 1.1 - Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility’s Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers have been restored.
(D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

High winds can cause tree branches and debris to contact energized electric lines, and potentially damage our equipment causing a wildfire. As a result, we may need to turn off power during severe weather to help prevent wildfires. This is called a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS). PG&E will not take any chances with customer safety. For the safety of our customers and communities, PSPS continues to be a necessary tool as a last resort. We know that turning off the power disrupts lives, and do not take this decision lightly.

On October 31, 2024, PG&E’s Meteorology Team identified potential fire weather in forecast models and notified the acting Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Commander. On November 3, we activated our EOC for a PSPS and began notifying Public Safety Partners. During November 3 – 4, we further refined the PSPS scope based on updated meteorological forecasts, notified Public Safety Partners and customers in the areas anticipated to be impacted, readied the grid, and prepared Community Resource Centers (CRCs) and other customer support.

Since this PSPS occurred on November 5, Election Day, PG&E took additional precautions to ensure no disruption of election integrity. For more than a month, PG&E had been coordinating with state and local officials to prepare for Election Day. There were more than 7,000 polling sites and 37 tabulation centers within PG&E’s service area. Prior to the time of de-energization, five polling locations were identified to be in scope for the PSPS. There were no tabulation centers within scope. PG&E delivered temporary generation to each of the five locations to ensure power remained on in support of our democratic process.

We also coordinated with Southern California Edison (SCE) as their customers served by a PG&E circuit was in scope for de-energization. These customers are referred to as “shared customers.” Throughout this EOC activation, we were in constant contact with SCE related to scope and notifications for these areas.

We closely monitored weather conditions across 25 Time Places (TPs),¹ as shown in Figure 1, and ultimately PG&E decided to move forward with de-energizing customers, due to unfavorable weather conditions.

On November 5 at 17:27 PST, PG&E began de-energizing its assets and customers to mitigate catastrophic wildfire risk across portions of the western Sacramento Valley, elevated Bay Area terrain and the Feather River Canyon in the Northern Sierra Foothills. Wind gusts up to nearly 90 mph were recorded during the period of concern.

¹ A Time-Place (TP) is a portion of the PG&E grid that is electrically and geographically coherent and is forecast to experience consistent timing for severe fire weather. Time-Places are identified for each PSPS and receive consistent treatment for notifications and de-energization. Once actual weather conditions occur, Weather “All-Clear” and service restoration times may vary due to actual weather conditions within a TP.

Once winds subsided on November 6 at 13:32 PST, the first Weather All-Clear was issued for a portion of the All-Clear zones. The last All-Clear was declared on November 7 at 09:35 PST. During this PSPS, we ultimately de-energized 21,357 customers² in 25 TPs across 17 counties.

During patrol inspections, we identified nine damages and two hazards caused by weather. Figures 2 – 12 show the fire spread simulation of what a wildfire might have looked like, and the potential damage or impact caused, if a PSPS had not been initiated. See Section 4 for more information regarding damages and hazards.

During this PSPS, PG&E mitigated and avoided the de-energization of approximately 192,894 customers in the final scope through the use of sectionalization, distribution switching, temporary microgrids, and backup power support. PG&E notified those customers who required de-energization and contacted more than 473 community representatives to ensure that communities could prepare before the PSPS.

PG&E opened 29 CRCs that were operated within the impacted counties, which hosted approximately 3,700 visitors from November 5 – November 8. Additionally, we partnered with local organizations to provide resources and support to our Access and Function Needs (AFN)³ customers. See Section 6.5 for more details.

Customers were re-energized safely and as quickly as possible. Within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear, 99% of customers' power had been restored. The average restoration time for this PSPS was 10.9 hours.


Figure 1: PSPS Timeline



² Customers refers to active service points (meters).

³ AFN is defined by the CPUC as individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking, older adults, children, people living in institutional settings or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including but not limited to those who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.


Figure 2: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Butte County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	3,480.34
Initial Attack Assessment	2 - Moderate
No. of Buildings	140
Total Population	95
No. of Places	7


Figure 3: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Lake County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	11,556.21
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	480
Total Population	565
No. of Places	8


Figure 4: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Napa County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	15,689.71
Initial Attack Assessment	3 - High
No. of Buildings	508
Total Population	220
No. of Places	25


Figure 5: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Santa Clara County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	638.19
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	72
Total Population	77
No. of Places	2


Figure 6: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Santa Cruz County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	7,437.43
Initial Attack Assessment	4 - Very High
No. of Buildings	160
Total Population	121
No. of Places	12


Figure 7: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Santa Cruz County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	2,476.89
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	105
Total Population	44
No. of Places	5


Figure 8: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Santa Cruz County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	923.51
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	136
Total Population	231
No. of Places	1


Figure 9: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Sonoma County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	4,629.64
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	3,828
Total Population	3,158
No. of Places	28


Figure 10: Fire Spread Simulation Damage to Equipment (Sonoma County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	1,734.42
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	599
Total Population	800
No. of Places	12


Figure 11: Fire Spread Simulation Hazard to Equipment (Contra Costa County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	752.96
Initial Attack Assessment	1 - Low
No. of Buildings	432
Total Population	634
No. of Places	16

Figure 12: Fire Spread Simulation Hazard to Equipment (Sonoma County)



Impact Analysis

Size (ac)	5,047.85
Initial Attack Assessment	3 - High
No. of Buildings	3,390
Total Population	3,458
No. of Places	29

Section 1.2 - A table including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed (D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Table 1 identifies the maximum number of customers notified and de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of Medical Baseline Program (MBL) Program customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; and number of Critical Facilities and Infrastructure (CFI) de-energized.

Table 1: Customers Notified and De-energized⁴

Total Customers			MBL Program Customers	Counties	Tribes	Circuits			Damage/Hazard Count	CFI De-energized
Notified	De-energized	Cancelled	De-energized	De-energized	De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Unique Distribution Circuits in Any Version of Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized		
22,541 ⁵	21,357 ⁶	1,169 ⁷	1,275	17	4	5	97	97	9 damages 2 hazards	648

⁴ The information, times, and figures referenced in this report are based on the best available information available at the time of this report's submission. The information, times, and figures herein are subject to revision based on further analysis and validation.

⁵ Of the 22,541 customers notified of planned PSPS impact, 71 customers received a notice that they may be de-energized, but did not receive a cancellation notice and are also not counted as a de-energized customer. This customer set is comprised of one false positive notification, as reported in Section 5.7, 61 customers mitigated from experiencing long-duration PSPS outages, and nine customers who were inactive or stopped having valid contact information by the time of cancellation notifications or de-energization.

⁶ Of the 21,357 customers de-energized, 56 customers did not receive any notifications before de-energization. This is comprised of two notification failures and 54 customers with no valid contact information at the time of these notifications. See Section 5.5 for more information.

⁷ This count shows the number of customers who were notified of cancellation and were not de-energized. This does not include five customers who were notified of cancellation but also de-energized. Those five customers are included in the count of de-energized customers and comprises of four false positive notifications as reported in Section 5.7 and one transmission customer who voluntarily de-energized before their transmission line was removed from planned scope.

Section 1.3 - A PDF map depicting the de-energized area(s) (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

During the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS, we de-energized 21,365 customers in 25 TPs. The final de-energization footprint is shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13: De-energization Footprint Map



Section 2 – Decision Making Process

Section 2.1 - A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

See Appendix A for a list of factors considered in the decision to de-energize each of the circuits in scope for the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS.

Section 2.2 - Decision criteria and detailed thresholds leading to de-energization including the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description (*D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.*)


Response:

This section provides an overview of the criteria and threshold evaluation process that were used in the decision to de-energize customers during the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS.

PSPS Preparation and Scoping Process

At a high-level, Figure 14 shows the process used to prepare for a PSPS. PG&E utilized and referenced the following protocols and tools during the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS to determine the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Appendix A includes anticipated parameters based on the latest forecast used to develop the planned de-energization scope versus actual weather parameters for each circuit.

Figure 14: PG&E's High-level PSPS Process Steps



PG&E considers executing a PSPS when strong gusty winds, critically low humidity levels, and low fuel moisture levels pose an unacceptable risk of causing fast-spreading, catastrophic wildfires. Assessments begin several days before the weather event is forecasted to take place.

We identify weather conditions that could create high fire potential by using a combination of high outage and ignition potential, high-resolution internal and external weather forecasting models and data from federal agencies that include the following:

- Ignition Probability Weather (IPW): Determines the potential of an outage due to weather conditions, and then for that outage to lead to an ignition.
- Fire Potential Index (FPI): Assists with fire model development and calibration.

- Technosylva: Provides fire spread modeling via data inputs.

Through partnerships with external experts, we developed our machine learning models using historic datasets and advanced forecast models that provide a better understanding of historical weather events and improve our weather forecasting. These models use the following:

- Precise location data points across our service territory to conduct hourly weather analyses using high-resolution, historical data.
- Over 100 trillion data points of historical weather and fuel.
- Hourly weather data such as temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, precipitation, pressure, and dead and live fuel moisture.
- Data storage and processing via the PG&E-Amazon Web Services Cloud.

Our thresholds and guidance for identifying critical fire risk and outage/ignition potential are determined by analyzing and rigorously testing our current PSPS protocols and criteria through decades of historical weather data in and around California.

External forecast information from the National Weather Service (NWS) (e.g., Red Flag Warnings) and other forecast agencies are examined carefully. Furthermore, we coordinate with these agencies during high-risk periods via daily conference calls to ultimately decide whether to de-energize portions of the grid for public safety.

Tools and Technology


PG&E partners with Technosylva, an external expert in the wildfire modeling field to test and deploy cloud-based wildfire spread model capabilities. This helps us better understand where we might need to turn off power.

Each day, PG&E delivers our wildfire conditions datasets to Technosylva, who then perform over 100 million fire spread simulations to provide fire spread scenarios that help to identify circuits that may be at risk during dry, windy weather. These are done every three hours, for the five days ahead.

Decision Criteria and Thresholds for Distribution PSPS Protocols

When determining whether to turn off power for safety, we start with the distribution system. These powerlines are closer to communities and are generally more susceptible to dry, windy weather threats. The values presented in Figure 15 were developed using 10 years of PG&E's high-resolution climate data to help understand wildfire risk and the potential customer impacts of PSPS. We evaluate within a small geographic area (700 square kilometers) and if any of the measures are forecasted to be met, we scope the circuit segments within that region for de-energization. There is no single criterion or threshold that will require turning off power to a distribution circuit. For event-specific thresholds, see Appendix A. Our process is outlined in Figure 15 below.

Figure 15: PSPS Protocols for Distribution



Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions

The first step to determine the scope of a PSPS is evaluating the Minimum Fire Potential Conditions (mFPC). This ensures that PSPS is only executed during wind events when atmospheric conditions and fuels are dry. A PSPS is evaluated if the mFPC noted in Step 1 of Figure 15 above are met.

These values were established from an examination of historical fire occurrence in the PG&E service area, PSPS sensitivity studies using historical data viewed through the lens of both customer impacts and wildfire risk mitigated, as well as information published by federal agencies regarding fire behavior and criteria used to issue warnings to the public.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk


If all minimum fire conditions are met, we conduct an in-depth review of fire risk using three separate measures. If the criteria for any of these measures are met, we may need to turn off power for safety. We evaluate all of the factors below together, rather than isolating any specific factor to assess fire risk against the potential harms of de-energization. For event-specific factors, see Appendix A.

- **Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFPD):** This model combines the probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the electric system with the probability that a fire will be catastrophic if it starts. It is the combination of the FPI and the IPW. The CFPD model accounts for changes over time based on actual performance data. Thus, the model will address positive and negative trends in grid performance and reliability year-over-year, incorporating grid improvements such as system hardening, and enhanced vegetation management based on their performance at mitigating outages over time.
 - **IPW Model:** A system comprised of two machine learning models. These models are used to evaluate the probability of outages across several outage classes (Outage Probability Weather (OPW) model) and the probability of that outage becoming an ignition (Ignition Given Outage Probability Weather Model (IOPW)). These models are combined for each location at each hour to ascertain the ignition probability. These machine learning models use 10 years of weather data to correlate approximately 500,000 outages occurring on PG&E's

distribution grid. The model analyzes the potential for several types of power outages in each weather event, as well as the potential for that outage to be the source of an ignition. IPW learns from and accounts for changes on the grid from year-to-year.

- **FPI Model:** This model outputs the probability that a fire will become large or catastrophic and is used as a daily and hourly tool to drive operational decisions to reduce the risk of utility caused fires. It was enhanced in 2024 with additional data and improved analytic capabilities.
- **Tree Considerations:** Our PSPS protocols utilize a machine learning model to integrate the potential for trees to strike the lines into our OPW Model and IPW Model. This helps our Meteorology Team more accurately analyze risk posed by trees and how that translates to increased ignition probability. See Figure 16 below explaining OPW modeling. Scenarios with a high risk of an IPW and a high FPI value will always warrant a PSPS. However, power may be turned off in other scenarios to avoid catastrophic wildfires.

Figure 16: Incorporating Tree Strike Potential into PSPS Modeling



- **Catastrophic Fire Behavior (CFB):** We also evaluate areas that are meeting mFPC (windy and dry conditions) but are not meeting our CFP guidance values by utilizing dynamic wildfire spread simulations from Technosylva. This allows us to consider potential ignition events that are rarer and more difficult to forecast such as animal and third-party contacts, or external debris impacting electrical lines. These locations are only considered once the mFPC are met, ensuring that conditions are sufficiently windy and dry.
 - **Fireline Intensity:** The U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station did a study of fire line intensity which is determined by the size and components of flames. It is measured as the rate of heat energy released (Btu) per unit length of the fire line (ft) per unit (s). It is also calculated by estimating the flame length, the distance measured from the average flame tip to the middle of the fire's base. Internal studies that evaluated historical fire simulation outputs to actual fire events, damages, and fatalities showed that outputs of flame length and rate of spread were best correlated to historical fire outcomes. Studies, as mentioned above, have shown that more intense fires with higher flame lengths and higher

rates of spread are more difficult to control. Thus, we evaluate fire simulation data that indicates where fast-spreading and intense fires could manifest and incorporate that into our PSPS decision making process.

- **Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations:** We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues may increase the risk of ignition. If an area is forecasted to experience minimum fire conditions and there are known issues with equipment or vegetation that have not yet been addressed, we may need to turn off power.

PSPS Protocols for Transmission

In addition to analyzing distribution circuits that may need to be de-energized for safety, we also review the transmission lines and structures in areas experiencing dry, windy weather conditions. Transmission lines are like the freeways of the electric system, carrying high voltage energy across long distances. Similar to our distribution protocols, there is no single factor or threshold that will require turning off power to a transmission line.

Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions

When determining whether to turn off power for safety on transmission lines, we review the same minimum fire potential conditions as with distribution circuits. If these conditions are met, we will review the criteria below to determine whether a transmission line must be turned off.


Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk

Once PG&E identifies the initial scope, we work with the California Independent Service Operator (CAISO) to ensure the initial scope is appropriate. This includes analyzing whether it will compromise the power supply to other jurisdictions, utilities or facilities connected to our system. This important step can last several hours, which is why the potential scope of a PSPS may change as we get closer to the forecasted weather event.

- **Catastrophic Fire Probability – Asset (CFP_T – Asset):** We use computer models to assess the likelihood of equipment failure during a given weather event, and the subsequent risk of catastrophic wildfires if a failure occurs. This model uses a combination of the Operability Assessment (OA) and FPI Models, both in time and space, at every transmission structure to form the Transmission CFPD model for asset failures. The OA Model combines historical wind speeds for each structure, historical outage activity, Bayesian updating, and the condition of assets based on inspection programs to help understand the wind-related failure probability of each structure. The OA Model can be driven with forecast wind speeds to output the probability of failure at the structure level.
- **Catastrophic Fire Probability – Vegetation (CFP_T – Veg):** The transmission-specific vegetation risk model is a calibrated probability of vegetation risk built internally using data collected and managed by PG&E vegetation management and external contractors such as NV5 and Formation Environmental. This model leverages aerial LiDAR data to map the location and attributes of trees near transmission lines. The transmission vegetation risk model is based on several factors such as overstrike, the amount of unobstructed fall paths to a wire, the slope between tree and conductor, and tree exposure. The transmission vegetation risk model is combined with the FPI Model in space and time to form CFPT – Veg.
- **CFB:** We may de-energize customers where the consequence of a potential wildfire ignition would be extreme, even if the probability of a power line or equipment failure is low.

- Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues are present that may increase the risk of ignition. Figure 17 provides a quantitative summary of our PSPS Protocols for Transmission.

Figure 17: PSPS – Protocols for Transmission



Step 3: Determining the Outage Area

Transmission lines meeting the criteria above pass to the next stage of review. We conduct a Power Flow Analysis on the in-scope transmission lines (if applicable) to analyze any potential downstream impacts of load shedding.

Reviewing Impact and Forecasted Weather

After determining the outage area both for Distribution and Transmission, PG&E reviews the forecasted customer impacts of each circuit against the forecasted wildfire risk of each circuit. If there's reasonable risk for ignition on the distribution circuits or transmission lines during the forecasted weather event, it is included in the PSPS scope. We then share this analysis internally during key decision-making points to inform PSPS decision making and further risk modeling.

Starting 12 hours before the forecasted PSPS de-energization time, we transition from evaluating forecast data to observing the weather in real-time. Based on real-time observations and analysis, we continually evaluate all the outage areas identified in the previous steps and use external tools and analysis to determine whether to initiate PSPS de-energization.

Decision-Making and Analysis to Validate if PSPS is Necessary

During high-risk periods, PG&E Meteorologists participate in daily interagency conference calls that commonly include multiple NWS local offices, the NWS western region headquarters, and representatives from the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC), also known as Predictive Services. This call is hosted by the Northern California and/or Southern California GACC offices.

During these calls, the external agencies present their expert assessment on the upcoming periods and locations of risk, wind speeds and fuel moisture levels, and any other relevant factors to consider.

During a PSPS, PG&E's Lead Meteorologist, called the Meteorologist-in-Charge (MIC), summarizes these forecasts and discussions for the PG&E Officer-in-Charge (OIC), who ultimately makes the decision to execute a PSPS.

The following sources and tools are considered before initiating a PSPS by the MIC:

- Fire Weather Watches and Red Flag Warning (NWS - Federal)
- Significant fire potential for wind (GACC - Federal)
- Storm Prediction Center (part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) - Federal)
- Daily interagency conference call with agencies during high-risk periods
- Field observer information
- Live weather data from weather stations
- Location of existing fires
- External weather model data

Based on the above analyses, we determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization, and further investigate mitigation options, such as advanced switching solutions, sectionalization, the use of islanding, alternative grid solutions, and temporary generation, to support customers who could lose upstream power sources but are in areas that may be safe to keep energized.

We monitor and forecast weather over a multi-day horizon, so we can anticipate when a PSPS may be needed and activate our EOC as far in advance as possible. Our internal weather model and external modeling are updated multiple times per day. PG&E's Meteorology Team constantly evaluates both internal and external weather models for changes in weather timing, strength, and potential locations impacted. We then incorporate these changes into a new weather scope generally once per day.

Weather shifts may force changes to PSPS scope and impacts at any point in time during PSPS planning and execution; this may allow us to avoid de-energization in some areas if fire-critical conditions lessen but can also cause some areas and customers to move into de-energization scope late in the process if forecasted fire-critical weather footprints change or increase. Possible changes in PSPS scope and impact are driven by the inherent uncertainty in weather forecast models.

Section 2.3 - A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

The quantitative factors that were used in the decision to de-energize customers for safety are provided in Appendix A. Below, we outline a detailed description of the qualitative factors that were provided by our Meteorology Team when determining to de-energize customers.

PG&E Meteorology Team Review

On Thursday, October 31, 2024, weather models indicated a significant offshore wind event developing about five days prior to November 5. Later that day, PG&E’s Meteorology Team, Emergency Planning and Response Team, and EOC Commander met to discuss the potential PSPS.

Based on the emerging risk of a PSPS, we entered EOC readiness posture at 16:15 PST on November 2 and activated the EOC at 06:00 PST on November 3.

The first PSPS scope was developed the evening of November 3, reflecting the risk of dry winds mostly along the western Sacramento Valley, elevated Bay Area terrain, the Feature River Canyon in the Sierra Foothills, and the Grapevine area in Kern County.

The weather forecast and PSPS models were closely monitored to adjust the scope leading up to the PSPS and the scope of the PSPS was adjusted on November 4 and November 5.

During the morning hours of November 4, federal forecast agencies began to highlight the upcoming weather conditions:

- NWS Monterey and Eureka issued a Red Flag Warning for the Bay Area, Central Coast, and parts of Lake County for November 5 at 11:00 PST – November 7 at 07:00 PST.
- NWS Oxnard issued a Red Flag Warning for Los Angeles and Ventura Counties for November 6 at 04:00 PST – November 17 at 18:00 PST.
- NWS Sacramento issued a Fire Weather Watch for the Delta and Carquinez Strait for November 6 at 10:00 PST – November 7 at 16:00 PST.
- North Ops Predictive Services included in their forecast High Risk due to wind for two Predictive Service Areas, which covered the Bay Area and adjacent terrain for November 6.
- South Ops Predictive Services included in their forecast High Risk due to wind for four Predictive Service Areas, which included the Tehachapis for November 6 – 7.

All federal agencies kept this posture throughout the period of concern.

High Resolution PSPS Models Guidance

The tools and models outlined in Section 2.2 are part of the decision criteria that PG&E’s Meteorologists consider for PSPS scope. Longer range weather forecast model data are used to determine the location and timing of a PSPS. Typically, these weather forecasts are less certain the farther the observed date. This is akin to the well-known hurricane “cone of uncertainty” in which the potential track of a hurricane is represented by an area that expands

farther out in time, which resembles an expanding cone. Thus, there is an inherent tradeoff between the further out the forecasts are for a PSPS and the uncertainty in the PSPS scope and waiting until forecasts become more certain. Forecast uncertainty leads to changes in PSPS scope as weather forecast models are updated and the scope is refined closer to the period of concern.

As the PSPS unfolds in real-time, PG&E's Meteorologists transition to real-time observations of weather stations, satellite data, pressure gradients, and live feeds from Alert Wildfire Camera. These observations help to evaluate if the weather is behaving as expected. In many instances, models trend stronger or weaker with each model iteration leading up to a PSPS.

External PSPS Decision Inputs

Meteorological analyses establish that high winds in California create significant fire threat and exacerbate fire spread. The NWS issues a Red Flag Warning to indicate critical fire weather conditions under which any fire that develops will likely spread rapidly; California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) states, "the types of weather patterns that cause a watch or warning include low relative humidity, strong winds, dry fuels, the possibility of dry lightning strikes, or any combination of the above." As noted previously, PG&E's PSPS outages consistently occur during periods and in areas where federal, state, and local authorities have identified as having extreme fire risk including the presence of strong winds.

We compare our fire risk forecasts against those of external agencies, for validation that there is shared recognition of high fire risk across the California meteorology community. Between November 5 – 7, our analysis of fire risk justifying a PSPS was validated by numerous sources and warnings:

- North Ops Predictive Services issued their 7-day Significant Fire Potential Outlook showing High Risk for multiple Predictive Service Areas, which covered the Bay Area and Sacramento Valley.
- South Ops Predictive Services issued their 7-day Significant Fire Potential Outlook showing High Risk for four Predictive Service Areas, one of which included the Tehachapi Mountains.
- Red Flag Warnings from the NWS were issued from four local offices including: Eureka, Monterey, Sacramento, and Oxnard (Figure 18).
- The NOAA's Storm Prediction Center's Fire Weather Outlooks indicating elevated fire-weather conditions portions of California (Figure 19).

Figure 18: NWS Red Flag Warning Coverage from the Eureka, Monterey, Sacramento, and Oxnard Weather Offices




Figure 19: NOAA – Storm Prediction Center (SPC) Forecasts of Elevated and Critical Fire Weather Conditions.

Fire Weather Outlooks

Updated: Tue Nov 5 08:15:06 UTC 2024 (9h 34m ago)

Storm Prediction Center Mesoscale Assistant/Fire Weather Forecaster Ariel Cohen describes the SPC fire weather forecast process for a meteorology class at the University of Oklahoma. You can view the YouTube video: <https://youtu.be/xy9AdUaUynU>.

Current Fire Weather Outlooks (Product Info)

Current Day 1 Fire Weather Outlook



Forecaster: WEINMAN
 Issued: 050808Z
 Valid: 051200Z - 061200Z
 Forecast Risk of Fire Weather: Elevated
 Note: Critical Fire Weather Criteria document in MS-Word or PDF.

Current Day 2 Fire Weather Outlook



Forecaster: WEINMAN
 Issued: 050813Z
 Valid: 061200Z - 071200Z
 Forecast Risk of Fire Weather: Extremely Critical Risk
 Note: Critical Fire Weather Criteria document in MS-Word or PDF.

Day 3-8 Fire Weather Outlooks (Product Info)

Day 3-8 Fire Weather Outlook



Forecaster: SQUITIERI
 Issued: 042140Z
 Valid: 06/1200Z-12/1200Z

We also review forecasted wind speeds in the potential PSPS-impacted counties to evaluate the need for a PSPS. Figure 20 shows the Utility FPI Ratings for Fire Index Areas (FIAs) in PG&E’s service area for November 5 – 8, 2024. We determine the scope for PSPS outages within those FIAs with fire risk rating R5-Plus from PG&E’s FPI model. In Figure 21, the PSPS scope can be compared with other agencies to vet the fire weather risk.

Figure 20: PG&E Utility FPI Ratings for November 5 – 8, 2024





Figure 21: Comparison of Federal Agency Severe Fire Weather Warning Footprints to Final PSPS Scope



Section 2.4 - An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing. The utility must identify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization (D.19-05- 042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

For the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS, PG&E used the PSPS Risk Model using the latest scope prior to the first potential de-energization. As discussed in detail below, based on the scoping of this PSPS, our Risk Model supported initiating a PSPS based on the forecasted impact information that indicated that each of the 97 distribution circuits and six transmission lines in the latest scope surpassed the analysis threshold of one to support a PSPS. Note the PSPS Risk Model calculations are based on forecasted conditions.

PG&E’s PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, which is further detailed below, addresses the CPUC’s requirements presented in the 2019 PSPS OIL.⁸ This decision requires California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to quantify the risk/benefits associated with initiating or not initiating a PSPS for our customers.

PG&E incorporated the aforementioned risk-benefit analysis into our PSPS execution process to help inform our PSPS decision-making process. Our risk-benefit tool aligns with California IOUs Multi-Attribute Value Function (MAVF) framework, as defined through the Safety Modeling Assessment Proceeding (SMAP), which specifies how various consequences are factored into a risk calculation. Utilizing this framework, we incorporate PSPS forecast information into our PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, which is further described under the “Risk Assessment” section below.

The output of the tool is a ratio that compares the calculated PSPS potential benefit from initiating de-energization (i.e., mitigation of catastrophic wildfire consequence) to the risks associated with PSPS (i.e., impact to customers resulting from a PSPS outage). Key inputs in the risk-benefit analysis include results from Technosylva wildfire simulations specific to the distribution circuit and transmission lines in scope for a potential de-energization, the number of customers forecasted to be de-energized, and the forecasted number of customer minutes across each identified circuit in scope for a potential de-energization.

After the potential de-energization scope is determined, including the identification of potentially impacted circuits for the potential PSPS in question, this scope and the Technosylva wildfire simulation outputs are used as inputs into the Risk-Benefit tool, which quantifies the potential public safety risk and wildfire risk resulting from the forecasted impacts of the pending PSPS. Note that the Wildfire Risk Score is based on an 8-hour simulation from Technosylva and while useful, in some cases this can significantly understates the risk. Thus, the MIC may still recommend to de-energize circuits where the Risk-Benefit tool shows higher PSPS risk than Wildfire risk.

⁸ D. 21-06-014.

Risk Assessment

As referenced above, PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool utilizes California IOU agreed approach utilizing the MAVF framework that captures the safety, reliability, and financial impact of identified potential risk events, as outlined in our Enterprise Risk Register.⁹ The tool's calculations use a non-linear scaling of consequences reflecting our focus on low-frequency/high-consequence risk events without neglecting high-probability/low-consequence risk events. Developed by the PPS Risk-Benefit Tool, MAVF scores are used to compare the potential de-energization risk from a forecasted PPS to the potential risk of catastrophic wildfires from keeping the circuits energized, specific to the potentially impacted circuits being considered for PPS de-energization.

The following inputs are used in calculations to build MAVF risk scores for PPS outages and wildfires, which are ultimately weighed against one another:

- Technosylva Wildfire Simulation Data: Fire simulation forecasts on the consequence of a potential wildfire's impact on customers, wildlife, and infrastructures on each circuit for every three hours. These values are based on Technosylva's proprietary and sophisticated wildfire modeling, using real-time weather models, state-of-the-art fuel, and 8-hour fire spread modeling.
- Forecasted Circuits: The final list of the distribution circuits and transmission lines identified to be in-scope for a potential PPS.
- Customer Minutes: Forecasted outage duration the customers will face by the potential PPS.
- Customers Impacted: Forecasted number of customers anticipated to be impacted by the potential PPS.
- Customer Category and Critical Customer Adjustment Factor: The type of customer (e.g. MBL Program, etc.) is incorporated into the analysis through the use of a "critical customer adjustment factor," which is applied to the customer outage duration to reflect a higher risk score for customers who are at a greater adverse risk of a potential de-energization event.

Once the above data are made available and incorporated into the tool, the modeling considerations described below are used to estimate the consequence of the: 1) potential wildfire risk and 2) PPS risk at the per-circuit level. Throughout the tool, a variety of modeling considerations are made to facilitate calculations which are included in Table 2 and summarized in Figure 22.

⁹ Full details of the MAVF methodology are provided through the RAMP Report, pp. 3-3 to 3-15 and General Rate Case (GRC) workpapers in response to Energy Division GRC-2023-PhI_DR_ED_001_Q01Supp01.

Table 2: 2024 PSPS Risk-Benefit Consequence Modelling Considerations

Consequence Type	Wildfire Consequence Considerations	PSPS Consequence Considerations
Safety	Calculated based on maximum population impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a fatality ratio based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data.	Calculated from an estimate of Equivalent Fatalities (EF) per Million Customer Minutes Interrupted (MMCI). The EF/MMCI ratio is estimated from previous PG&E PSPS outages and other large external outages. ¹⁰
Reliability	N/A	Calculated directly from the potential number of customers impacted and outage duration based on customer minutes interrupted.
Financial	Calculated based on maximum building impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a cost per structure burned previously evaluated in 2020 the Risk Assessment and Modeling Phase (RAMP) Report. ¹¹	Calculated based on two financial estimates, 1) distribution of a lump sum cost of execution across all relevant circuits and 2) an estimated proxy cost per customer in scope per PSPS. ¹²

Potential Wildfire Risk

Wildfire consequence impacts are calculated based on the outputs of the Technosylva simulations. Variables include 1) population impacted by wildfire and 2) structure impacted by wildfire used to calculate natural unit values for two consequence components:

- Wildfire Safety Consequence: Equivalent Fatalities (EF)
- Wildfire Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of Wildfire (in dollars)

Potential PSPS Risk

PSPS consequence impacts are based on the following values: duration of de-energization by circuit, and number of customers impacted by de-energization on each circuit. These input values are used to calculate natural unit values for three consequence components:

- PSPS Safety Consequence: EF as an output of Customer Minutes interrupted
- PSPS Electric Reliability Consequence: Customer Minutes Interrupted × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor
- PSPS Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of PSPS (in dollars) × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor

Once the consequence values (safety, reliability, financial) are estimated they are converted into MAVF risk scores. Once the Risk-Benefit tool calculates the impacts between the PSPS and a

¹⁰ Previous PG&E PSPS include <2019-2021 events, and other large external outage events include the 2003 Northeast Blackout in New York City, 2011 Southwest Blackout in San Diego, 2012 Derecho Windstorms, 2012 Superstorm Sandy, 2017 Hurricane Irma, 2021 Blackout event.>

¹¹ See A.20-06-012.

¹² The assumptions used in these calculations, including the proxy cost per customer per PSPS, are subject to be updated and are not intended to prejudge or create precedent with regard to the development of more precise values of resiliency or cost of PSPS metrics being considered in other ongoing proceedings at the California Public Utilities Commission, such as the Risk-Based Decision-Making Rulemaking [R.20.07.013] and the Microgrid and Resiliency Strategies.

wildfire, it is summarized in Figure 23 by indicating if the adverse impact from a PSPS outweighs the risk of a wildfire.

Figure 22: Visual Representation of PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool




Figure 23: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence

PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	71.8	} <i>Aggregated to event-level</i>
PSPS Potential Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)	139,104	
Potential Benefit : Potential Risk	1,937	
Recommended Approach	Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk	
Risk Ratio Per Circuit (>1, PSPS Benefit Outweighs Risk)	Dx Circuits: 97 (of 97) ¹ Tx Circuits: 6 (of 6)	
<small>As defined in PLAN_D-05_REV1</small>		

¹ Includes two circuits that each occur in two TPs, and hence these circuits are counted twice for circuit count in PSPS Situation Report.

$$\frac{\text{PSPS Potential Benefit (wildfire risk)}}{\text{PSPS Potential Risk}} > 1$$

Indicates potential PSPS benefit outweighs risk

$$\frac{\text{PSPS Potential Benefit (wildfire risk)}}{\text{PSPS Potential Risk}} < 1$$

Indicates potential risk may outweigh potential benefit

Key Factors

- PSPS Consequence**
 - Safety consequence factors in planned and unplanned widespread outage events across the US.
 - Reliability consequence based on customer minutes interrupted
 - Financial consequence based on execution and fixed customer cost per event
 - Assumes maximum duration for each customer per circuit
- PSPS Benefit (Wildfire Mitigation)**
 - Safety consequence based on population impacted from fire spread simulation
 - Reliability consequence not considered
 - Financial consequence based on buildings impacted from fire spread simulation
 - Assumes an ignition on each circuit based on the maximum consequence modeled by TechnoSylva

Section 2.5 - Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative. (D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)

Response:

After reviewing the meteorological information that indicated potential for catastrophic wildfire and the impacts on customers through de-energization, we considered whether alternatives to de-energizing, such as additional vegetation management and disabling automatic reclosers, could adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire thus lowering the need for de-energization. We determined these measures alone did not reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire in areas within the PSPS scope sufficiently to protect public safety.

Leading up to the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS, PG&E readied de-energization mitigations, reviewed alternatives to de-energization and took the following steps:

- Our Operations team reviewed asset and vegetation tags that included incremental customers into PSPS scope and worked to correct these tags.
- Conducted hazard tree mitigation efforts on circuits potentially in PSPS scope in the days leading up to the PSPS. Tree-trimming near a utility line can keep limbs and trunks from nearby trees from falling into a line, but it does not mitigate against broken limbs from distant trees outside the vegetation management perimeter that could blow into a line or break utility equipment.
- Pre-patrols of potentially impacted transmission facilities were also ongoing in the days leading up to the time of anticipated de-energization. While pre-patrols can help identify and correct asset tags on impacted transmission lines, even transmission lines in fully healthy condition may still pose a wildfire risk. Thus, pre-patrol of potentially impacted transmission facilities was not considered a sufficient alternative to PSPS.
- Enabled Enhanced Powerline Safety Setting (EPSS) and disabled automatic reclosing in Tier 2/Tier 3 High Fire Threat District (HFTD) areas. This reduces the ignition risk from attempts to re-energize circuits via automatic reclosing.
- Prepared to reduce the public safety impacts of de-energization by employing granular scoping processes to significantly reduce the public safety impacts of de-energization by de-energizing smaller segments of the grid within the close confines of the fire-critical weather footprint, rather than de-energizing larger amounts of customers in more populated areas.
- Reviewed opportunities for islanding, sectionalization, temporary generation, backup-generation, and alternate grid solutions to reduce and mitigate the number of customers de-energized.
- Prepared to reduce the public safety impacts of de-energization by providing local CRCs closest in proximity to support customers in those impacted communities.
- Supported vulnerable customers through California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC) and Community Based Organizations (CBO) resource partners that offered various services to customers impacted by this PSPS. Further information is detailed in Section 6.5
- Notified impacted customers via extensive use of Advanced Notifications and outreach tools of the expected de-energization.
- Increased our restoration efforts including helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to conduct line safety patrols after the Weather All-Clear, readied and prepared equipment for patrols and needed repairs to restore service to lines that were deemed operationally safe to power.

Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

Section 3.1 - The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable (*Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

The PSPS occurred over the timeframe of November 5 – 8, 2024 in 25 TPs located in 17 counties.

Section 3.2 - A zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS event polygons of de-energized areas. The file should include items that are required in Section 3.3. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

A zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS polygons of final de-energized areas combined with the PSPS data can be found in attachment, “*PGE_PSPS_Polygons_of_De-energized_Areas_11052024.gdb.zip.*”

Section 3.3 - A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

- **County**
- **De-energization date/time**
- **Restoration date/time**
- **“All Clear” declaration date/time**
- **General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non- High Fire Threat District**
- **Total customers de-energized**
- **Residential customers de-energized**
- **Commercial/Industrial Customers de-energized**
- **Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized**
- **AFN other than MBL customers de-energized**
- **Other Customers**
- **Distribution or transmission classification**

Response:

A total of 21,357 customers were de-energized during the PSPS. Of the customers de-energized, 17,896¹³ were residential, 2,496 were commercial/industrial, 1,275 were MBL Program customers, 3,295 were AFN other than MBL Program, and 962 were customers in the “Other”¹⁴ category. Additionally, three PG&E defined transmission-level¹⁵ customers were de-energized. Appendix B lists de-energized circuits and the relevant information relating to each circuit. Delayed restoration time due to reclassification and/or damages are further noted for each circuit.

¹³ MBL Program and AFN customers are included within the count of residential customers affected.

¹⁴ ‘Other’ includes customers that do not fall under the residential or commercial/industrial categories such as governmental agencies, traffic lights, agricultural facilities, and prisons.

¹⁵ PG&E defines transmission level customers as customers being served by 60 kV assets or higher.

Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

Section 4.1 – Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility’s overhead facilities in the areas where power is shut off. (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

During the period of concern, weather stations near the PSPS areas recorded wind gusts as high as 88 mph. These are shown in Table 22 and Figure 44 in Section 12.

During patrols of the de-energized circuits prior to restoring power, PG&E found nine incidents of wind-related damages and two incidents of wind-related hazards. Damages are conditions that occurred during the PSPS, likely wind-related, necessitating repair or replacement of PG&E’s asset, such as a wire down or a fallen pole. Hazards are conditions that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed, such as a tree limb found suspended in electrical wires. The damage and hazard locations are illustrated in Figures 24-34 and mapped in Figure 27.

Figure 24: Vegetation-Damage in Butte County – Tree fell on primary line, broke pole top and crossarm



Figure 25: Vegetation-Damage in Napa County – Tree fell on primary line



Figure 26: Vegetation-Hazard in Contra Costa County – Tree branch fell on primary line



Figure 27: Vegetation-Damage in Santa Clara County – Tree on line



Figure 28: Vegetation-Damage in Santa Cruz County – Broken pole top



Figure 29: Vegetation-Damage in Santa Cruz County – Primary wire broken




Figure 30: Vegetation-Damage in Lake County – Tree branch fell on service wire



Figure 31: Vegetation-Damage in Santa Cruz County – Tree branch fell on wire



Figure 32: Vegetation-Damage in Sonoma County – Tree branch fell on wire



Figure 33: Vegetation-Hazard in Sonoma County – Tree fell on service wire



Figure 34: Vegetation-Hazard in Sonoma County – Tree fell on service wire



Section 4.2 - A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

A table of damages and hazards within the de-energized areas can be found in Appendix C.

Section 4.3 - A zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS event damage and hazard points. The file should include items that are required in Section 4.2. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:


A zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS damage and hazard points can be found in attachment, “PGE_PSPS_Damage_Hazard_Points_11052024.gdb.zip.”

Section 4.4 - A PDF map identifying the location of each damage or hazard. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

See Figure 35 for a map identifying the location of the damages and hazards.

Figure 35: Map of Damage and Hazard Incidents During the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS



Section 5 – Notifications

Section 5.1 - A description of the notice to public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3. D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Throughout the PSPS, PG&E made significant efforts to notify Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, CBOs (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers in accordance with the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.¹⁶

PG&E followed the Notification Plan included in our [PG&E's 2024 Pre-Season Report, Appendix C: Notification Plan](#), pp. 70-79. In addition, PG&E completed the following:

- Worked closely with telecommunications service providers throughout the PSPS to effectively coordinate, share information and manage the weather event. PG&E also provided telecommunications service providers with a dedicated PG&E contact in the EOC known as the Critical Infrastructure Lead (CIL), who shared up-to-date PSPS information and answered specific, individual questions. These partners were able to reach the CIL 24/7 during a PSPS by e-mail or phone. In addition, PG&E proactively reached out to 11 telecommunications service providers¹⁷ via email or phone as weather changes or new information regarding the PSPS became available.
- In accordance with the Phase 3 PSPS Guidelines,¹⁸ provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that served known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons. All notifications to paratransit agencies included a link to the PSPS emergency website updates page, pge.com/pspsupdates and a section called “Additional Resources” with a link to a map showing areas potentially affected by the shutoff. This site also directs users to other webpages, such as the CRC page, which includes CRC information such as CRC locations, hours, and services available (see Section 9). The PSPS emergency website updates page also includes two prominent buttons at the top of the page, allowing customers to look up an address to determine impact, and a map showing areas potentially affected by the shutoff.
- Directs customers to pge.com/pspsupdates via each PSPS notification, which includes a link to CRC information. This website prominently highlights the dedicated CRC page, which includes CRC locations, hours of operation, services available at each site, information regarding how to find local CRCs via the PSPS outage map and where to access electricity during the hours CRCs are closed.
- PG&E considers multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community as part of our All Customers (including MBL Program customers and Self-

¹⁶ D.19-05-042.

¹⁷ American Tower, AT&T Corporation, Century Link, Comcast Corporation, Crown Castle International, Ducor Telephone Co., Frontier Communications Corp, Mediacom California LLC, SBA Towers, T-Mobile-Sprint, Verizon Wireless.

¹⁸ D.21-06-034.

Identified Vulnerable (SIV)¹⁹ Program customers) recipient group. For information on PG&E’s outreach and community engagement with master-metered owners, property managers and building account holders, refer to [PG&E’s AFN Quarterly Progress Report](#) of activities between July 1, 2024, and September 30, 2024.

- During this PSPS, SCE identified six shared customers with PG&E on Tejon 1102 that were in scope for potential de-energization. SCE and PG&E collaborated closely to ensure situational awareness of PG&E’s PSPS so that SCE could successfully execute PSPS notifications to these customers.

Table 3 provides a description of the notifications PG&E sent to Tribal/Local Governments Public Safety Partners, and all customers in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.²⁰

Table 3: Notification Descriptions

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
<p>PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners and CBOs,²¹ transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities</p>	<p>On November 3, 2024, PG&E’s Meteorology Team noted a potential PSPS and updated the weather forecast on pge.com/weather to “elevated” in certain parts of the service area. At this time, local PG&E representatives called each County Office of Emergency Services (OES) in PG&E’s electrical service area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E is monitoring an increased potential of PSPS outages.</p> <p>Following PG&E’s activation of its EOC, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PG&E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E’s EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for potential PSPS. • PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners²² via call, text, and e-mail; these notifications included the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time. ○ When weather is anticipated to pass. ○ Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR). ○ Links to the PSPS Portal where event-specific maps and information are available.

¹⁹ SIV Program is inclusive of customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL Program and “certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected.” In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” in an effort to identify customers “above and beyond those in the medical baseline population” to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account indefinitely.

²⁰ D.19-05-042.

²¹ Phase 3 D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A9, Section G. MBL and AFN Communities, No. 4, Each electric investor-owned utility must provide proactive notification and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during a PSPS.

²² Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected CCAs, publicly owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, and CAL FIRE.

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local PG&E representatives called potentially impacted County OES and select Tribes to inform them that PG&E is monitoring an increased potential of PSPS.
<p>WATCH NOTIFICATION: 24-48 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, All Customers (including MBL Program customers, SIV customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities</p>	<p>During this time, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PG&E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES. PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers, municipal utilities, and all customers via call, text message and e-mail; these notifications included the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Estimated window of the de-energization time. When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass. ETOR. For Public Safety Partners only: Links to the PSPS Portal. For Customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS Updates webpage with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, language support, and the Portable Battery Program. For transmission-level customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation. PG&E sent notifications to MBL Program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV Program customers every hour until the customer confirmed receipt of the notification. PG&E also sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope; this was to inform them that power would not be shut off. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to get PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
<p>WARNING NOTIFICATION: 1-4 hours in advance of anticipated de-</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, All Customers (including MBL Program customers, SIV</p>	<p>During this time, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PG&E submitted a PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E has made the decision to de-energize. PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers, and customers;

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
energization, if possible	customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	<p>these notifications included the same key PSPS timing information and resource links as the “Watch Notification.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PG&E sent notifications to MBL Program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV Program customers every hour until the customer confirmed receipt of the notification. • PG&E also sent Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope; this was to inform them that power would be shut off. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-energization is initiated	Public Safety Partners, CBOs, All Customers (including MBL Program customers, SIV customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities	<p>When shut off was initiated, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PG&E submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC to notify them that de-energization has been initiated. • Agency Representatives of PG&E conducted a live call and/or sent an e-mail, as appropriate, to County OES representatives that were within the potential PSPS scope area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that customers within their jurisdiction were beginning to be de-energized. • PG&E Grid Control Center (GCC) conducted live agent calls to impacted transmission-level customers. • PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners municipal utilities, transmission-level customers and customers via call, text messages, and e-mail, which included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Impacted addresses (for customers only). ○ De-energization time. ○ When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass. ○ For Customers Only: Links to the PSPS Updates webpage with CRC information, and resources for AFN customers, including but not limited to information on the MBL Program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the Portable Battery Program. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-</p>

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
<p>WEATHER “ALL-CLEAR”/ETOR UPDATE NOTIFICATION: Immediately before re-energization begins</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, All Customers (including MBL Program customers, SIV customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities</p>	<p>language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p> <p>After the weather event had passed and the area was deemed safe to begin patrols and restoration, PG&E completed the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E is initiating re-energization patrols. • Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers²³, municipal utilities and customers via call, text message and e-mail; these notifications included the ETOR. • Sent “PSPS update” notifications to customers if their ETOR changed; two ways that an ETOR may change include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ New field or meteorology conditions. ○ Damage was found during patrols and repair is needed. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to get PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
<p>RESTORATION NOTIFICATION: When re-energization is complete</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, All Customers (including MBL Program customers, SIV customers), transmission-level customers, and municipal utilities</p>	<p>GCC conducted live agent calls to notify impacted transmission-level customers of restoration. Once customers, including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers, were restored, they received notifications via call, text and e-mail. This was done using an automated process that issued customer notifications every 15 minutes upon restoration of service. Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive PSPS information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications.</p> <p>Once all customers were restored, PG&E submitted the final PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES, sent an e-mail to the CPUC confirming restoration of PSPS outages and reclassification of customers if applicable, and sent a notification to Public Safety Partners via call, text, and e-mail. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>

²³ Transmission lines serving impacted Transmission-level Customers and Municipal Utilities may cut across multiple FIAs and will only be notified when all those FIAs that the line cuts across have been given the All-Clear.

In addition to providing notifications to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, CBOs (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers, PG&E alerted the public in advance of de-energization, via media and PG&E's website.

Media Engagement

From the time PG&E publicly announced the potential PSPS event until power was restored, PG&E engaged with customers and the public through the media as described below. Proactively issued ten local news releases or written information directly to news outlets about the PSPS. This included:

- Five updates to integrated multicultural news outlets.
- Five updates to local or national news outlets.
- Responded to 63 media inquiries, either from media outlets that contacted PG&E's 24-hour media line, or direct calls/emails to field media representatives. This included:
 - Eight integrated multicultural news outlets.
 - 55 local or national news outlets.
- Participated in 29 media interviews (i.e., live, recorded or unrecorded phone interviews) to provide situational updates and preparedness messages for the PSPS. This included:
 - Four integrated multicultural news outlets.
 - 25 other local or national news outlets.
- As of November 13, 2024, PG&E identified 324 unique print, online, and broadcast stories. This included:
 - 12 integrated multicultural news outlets.
 - 312 local or national news outlets.

PG&E Website

During this PSPS, PG&E placed an Informational Alert on the [pge.com](https://www.pge.com) home page that drove traffic to PG&E's PSPS site and implemented tools to drive traffic to and maintain stability of the PSPS emergency website/PSPS updates page pgealerts.alerts.pge.com/psps-updates. Visits to the emergency website peaked on November 6, 2024, with 109,686 visits and 230,841 page views. The emergency website saw a total of 370,836 visits and 789,642 page views from the time the PSPS began to the time all customers had power restored.

We remain committed to the continuous improvement of our websites to better meet the diverse needs of its customers. As we launch new features and functionality to [pge.com](https://www.pge.com) and to pgealerts.alerts.pge.com, we test to help ensure compliance with updated WCAG 2.1AA standards. We also seek to improve customer experience with user testing for key components. Where possible, we remediate accessibility issues that customers or stakeholders have brought to our attention.

The following content was available on PG&E's PSPS updates pages or on links from those pages:

- Straightforward, simplified PSPS information available in 16 languages, with clear updates about the planned scope of the event, including location (e.g., list of impacted Tribes, cities, and counties), duration of the PSPS, including estimated times of de-energization and re-energization at the individual address level, and overall, for the event.

- PDFs of potentially impacted areas, shapefiles and KMZ files for Public Safety Partners to use with their own mapping applications, and city/county lists with shutoff and restoration summaries.
- CRC details were made available as soon as sites were confirmed, including locations listed by county, resources available at each center, type of CRC (e.g., indoor or outdoor), health and safety policies, and operating hours. CRC locations were also indicated on the PSPS impact map.
- Links to additional resources including Electric Vehicle (EV) charging location map, videos in ASL (American Sign Language), locations of ILCs, resources for customers with accessibility, financial, language, and aging needs, backup power safety tips, MBL Program information and more.
- Webpage, available in 15 non-English languages, that describes our language support services for customers during a PSPS at pge.com/pspslanguagehelp.
- Survey to provide input about the website and PSPS communications.
- Address look-up tool that a customer and the public could use to identify specific potential PSPS impacts.
- Address-level alerts, available in 15 non-English languages, that allow non-PG&E-account holders to receive notifications via a phone call or SMS text for any address where they do not receive a bill (e.g., workplace, child’s school, renters, mobile home parks, etc.). This is also a valuable communication tool for renters and tenants of master metered accounts, such as mobile home parks. See pgealerts.alerts.pge.com/outage-tools/get-psps-alerts/ and Figure 36 below.

Figure 36: PG&E PSPS Address Alert Sign-Up Webpage

Section 5.2 – Notification timeline including prior to de-energization, initiation, restoration, and cancellation, if applicable. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)

Response:

Table 4 describes notifications and the time the notification was sent, in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines,²⁴ to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, and all customers prior to de-energization, initiation, and restoration.

During this PSPS, there were 37 cases of Public Safety Partners receiving duplicate notifications either imminently before de-energization or before re-energization. These duplicate notifications

²⁴ D.19-05-042.

were caused by an oversight when creating notifications for jurisdictions in multiple TPs. These were solely duplicated notifications and as such these entities are not included in Table 8 in Section 5.5.

Table 4: Customer Notification Timeline Summary

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Pre-De-energization (Prior)	72-48 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/3/2024 12:34	Priority		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/3/2024 12:48:00 PM	Priority		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/3/2024 11:20	Priority		SCE
		Public Safety Partners**	11/3/2024 12:27	Priority		SCE
	48-24 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/3/2024 17:15	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/3/2024 20:40	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/4/2024 13:01	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/3/2024 20:40	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/4/2024 12:00	Watch		SCE
		All Customers***	11/4/2024 12:40	Watch		SCE
		All Customers***	11/4/2024 12:57	Watch		PG&E
	24-12 hours ²⁶	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/4/2024 12:39	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 8:35	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 8:35	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 13:41	Watch		SCE
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 13:55	Watch		SCE
	4-1 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/5/2024 16:26	Warning		PG&E

²⁵ D.19-05-042, Appendix A, Timing of Notification.

²⁶ While not a CPUC requirement, PG&E provides an additional 24-12-hour notification to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners and Customers.

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/5/2024 18:15	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/5/2024 19:13	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/5/2024 20:13	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/5/2024 21:03	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/6/2024 1:34	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 17:02	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 18:05	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 19:32	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 19:47	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 21:28	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 2:02	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 17:01	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 18:04	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 19:30	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 19:46	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 21:28	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 2:00	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 1:37	Warning		SCE
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 1:43	Warning		SCE
Initiation (During)	When De-energization	Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 18:46	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
	is initiated (Power Off)	Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 19:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 19:31	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 20:07	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 20:19	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 20:31	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 20:45	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 21:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 21:30	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 22:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 22:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 22:30	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 22:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 23:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 23:31	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 23:45	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 0:15	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 0:30	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 0:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 1:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 1:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 5:45	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 6:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 7:16	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 7:30	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 7:45	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 8:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 8:16	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 8:30	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 8:46	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 9:01	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 13:00	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 21:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 18:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 19:01	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 19:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 20:07	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 20:19	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 20:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 20:45	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 21:00	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 21:30	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 22:00	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 22:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 22:30	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 22:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 23:01	Power Off		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 23:31	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 23:45	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 0:15	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 0:30	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 0:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 1:01	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 1:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 5:45	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 6:01	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 7:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 7:30	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 7:45	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 8:01	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 8:16	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 8:30	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 8:46	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 9:01	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 13:00	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 21:46	Power Off		PG&E
				All Customers***	11/6/2024 6:12	Power Off
	Immediately before re-energization	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/6/2024 16:17	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear	First All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/7/2024 8:20	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear	Last All-Clear Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 14:18	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 14:32	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 15:18	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 15:33	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 16:33	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 17:03	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 17:33	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 18:02	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 18:34	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 18:49	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 19:05	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 19:33	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 19:48	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 20:03	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 21:33	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 21:48	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 22:03	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 22:12	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 6:04	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 6:17	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 6:49	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 7:18	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 7:39	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 7:55	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 8:18	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 8:48	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 9:06	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 9:44	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 9:56	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 10:22	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 10:36	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 11:48	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 14:18	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 14:32	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 15:18	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 15:33	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 16:33	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 17:03	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 17:33	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 18:02	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 18:34	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 18:49	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 19:05	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 19:33	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 19:48	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 20:03	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 21:33	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 21:48	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 22:03	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 22:12	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 6:04	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 6:17	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 6:49	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 7:18	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 7:39	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 7:55	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 8:18	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 8:48	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 9:06	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 9:44	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 9:56	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 10:22	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 10:36	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:48	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:40	Inspecting/ Weather All-Clear		SCE
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 8:02	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 8:34	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 16:16	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 16:49	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 17:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 17:36	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 18:14	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 18:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 18:36	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 19:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 20:19	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 20:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 23:01	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 23:11	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 4:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 6:53	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 7:14	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 7:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 8:05	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 8:21	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 8:27	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 9:03	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 9:54	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 10:23	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 10:37	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 10:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 11:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 11:21	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 11:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 12:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 12:34	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 13:01	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 13:31	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 14:40	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 14:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 15:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 15:50	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 16:05	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 16:36	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 17:17	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 19:14	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 19:15	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 19:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 8:02	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 8:34	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 16:16	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 16:49	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 17:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 17:36	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 18:14	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 18:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 18:36	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 19:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 20:19	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 20:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 23:01	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 23:11	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 4:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 6:53	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 7:14	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 7:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 8:05	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 8:21	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 8:27	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 9:03	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 9:54	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 10:23	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 10:37	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 10:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:04	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:21	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 12:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 12:34	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 13:01	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 13:31	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 14:40	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 14:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 15:35	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 15:50	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 16:05	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 16:36	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 17:17	ETOR Update		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 19:14	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 19:15	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 19:20	ETOR Update		PG&E
Restoration (After)	After re-energization was completed	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	11/8/2024 12:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 20:17	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 21:32	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 23:17	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 1:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 14:47	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 15:32	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 15:46	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 16:32	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 17:01	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 17:32	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 18:04	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 18:16	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 18:32	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 18:47	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 19:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 19:17	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 19:47	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 20:47	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 21:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 22:16	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/6/2024 23:31	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 1:16	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 3:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 3:16	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 3:32	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 7:47	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 8:01	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 8:23	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 8:32	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 8:46	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 9:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 9:16	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 9:42	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 10:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 10:17	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 10:29	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 10:30	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 10:47	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 11:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 11:17	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 11:32	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 11:47	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 12:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 12:17	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 12:32	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 12:46	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 13:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 13:17	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 13:33	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 14:28	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 14:31	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 14:47	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 15:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 15:17	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 15:21	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 15:32	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 15:47	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 16:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 16:36	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 16:40	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 17:13	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 17:31	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 17:47	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 17:59	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 18:02	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 18:17	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 18:32	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 18:46	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 19:16	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/7/2024 19:47	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/8/2024 9:19	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	11/8/2024 12:01	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 20:17	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 21:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/5/2024 23:17	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 1:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 14:47	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 15:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 15:46	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 16:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 17:01	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 17:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 18:04	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 18:16	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 18:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 18:47	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 19:02	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 19:17	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 19:47	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 20:47	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 21:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 22:16	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/6/2024 23:31	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 1:16	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 3:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 3:16	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 3:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 7:47	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 8:01	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 8:23	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 8:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 8:46	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 9:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 9:16	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 9:42	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 10:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 10:17	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 10:29	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 10:30	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 10:47	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:17	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:47	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 12:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 12:17	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 12:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 12:46	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 13:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 13:17	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 13:33	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 14:28	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 14:31	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 14:47	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 15:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 15:17	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 15:21	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 15:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 15:47	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 16:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 16:36	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 16:40	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 17:13	Restore		PG&E

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ²⁵	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PST)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 17:31	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 17:47	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 17:59	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 18:02	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 18:17	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 18:32	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 18:46	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 19:16	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 19:47	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/8/2024 9:19	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/8/2024 12:01	Restore		PG&E
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:44	Restore		SCE
		All Customers***	11/7/2024 11:39	Restore		SCE
		Cancellation	Within 2-hours of decision to cancel	Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 8:10	Cancel
Public Safety Partners**	11/5/2024 15:45			Cancel		PG&E
All Customers***	11/5/2024 8:10			Cancel		PG&E
All Customers***	11/5/2024 15:45			Cancel		PG&E
Ad Hoc Notification	N/A	All Customers***	11/6/2024 9:00	Ad Hoc	Only customers who received the incorrect restoration notification received this ad hoc notification.	PG&E

*A subset of Public Safety Partners, including Tribes, cities, counties, and community choice aggregators.

**A subset of Public Safety Partners, including water, wastewater, and communication service providers.

***All Customers, including MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers.

Section 5.3 - For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following template to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

“Notification attempts made” and “Successful positive notification” must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers that need positive notifications, the utilities must explain the reason. In addition, the utilities must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Table 5 below includes metrics associated with PG&E notifications provided to customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted. PG&E interprets the number of customers that need positive or affirmative notification as customers the company seeks confirmation from, namely MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers.

Table 5: Notifications to Customers where Positive or Affirmative Notification was Attempted²⁷

Designation	Total Number of customers ²⁸	Notification Attempts Made ²⁹	Timing of Attempts ³⁰ (PST)	Who made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification ³¹
MBL ³²	1,340	1,340 Watch Notifications	11/3/2024 20:43	PG&E	1,249 Watch Notifications
		1,283 Warning Notifications	11/4/2024 9:33		1,035 Warning Notifications
		2,623 Overall Notifications	11/3/2024 20:43		2,284 Overall Notifications

²⁷ Counts of Notification Attempts Made will not reflect the actual total of customers notified as both MBL and SIV Program customers can appear in both subset groups.

²⁸ Total number of customers notified where notification was attempted. Count includes customers that may have been removed from scope or received Cancellation Notifications prior to de-energization, but still received Watch and/or Warning notifications.

²⁹ Count of Warning Notifications includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

³⁰ Initial start time notification was sent.

³¹ PG&E considers successful positive notifications as those in which the notification was successfully delivered to the customer (i.e., no bounce back) and the customer acknowledges receipt of the notification.

³² Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for Medical Baseline quantities. The Medical Baseline category for the purposes of Table 5 does not include MBL Program customers who are master meter tenants.

Designation	Total Number of customers ²⁸	Notification Attempts Made ²⁹	Timing of Attempts ³⁰ (PST)	Who made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification ³¹
MBL behind a master meter ³³	14	14 Watch Notifications	11/3/2024 20:44	PG&E	13 Watch Notifications
		14 Warning Notifications	11/5/2024 12:10		8 Warning Notifications
		28 Overall Notifications	11/3/2024 20:44		21 Overall Notifications
SIV	663	663 Watch Notifications	11/3/2024 20:40	PG&E	583 Watch Notifications
		636 Warning Notifications	11/4/2024 9:22		498 Warning Notifications
		1,299 Overall Notifications	11/3/2024 20:40		1,081 Overall Notifications

For this PSPS, MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers received automated calls, texts, and emails at the same intervals as the general customer notifications. PG&E provided unique PSPS Watch and PSPS Warning Notifications to MBL Program customers³⁴ and SIV Program customers.

These customer groups also received additional calls and texts at hourly intervals until the customer confirmed receipt of the automated notifications by either answering the phone, responding to the text, or opening the email. If confirmation was not received, a PG&E representative visited the customer’s home to check on the customer (referred to as the “doorbell ring” process) while hourly notification retries continued. If the customer did not provide confirmation to PG&E following the check-in, the PG&E representative left a door hanger providing additional PSPS notification and information at the home to indicate PG&E had visited. In each case, the additional door hanger notification was considered successful.³⁵

At times, PG&E also made Live Agent phone calls in parallel to the automated notifications and doorbell rings, as an additional attempt to reach the customer prior to and/or after de-energization.

PG&E shared the lists of the MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers who had not confirmed receipt of their notifications with the appropriate county and Tribal emergency managers twice daily via the PSPS Portal. PG&E proactively notified agencies that the data was

³³ PG&E has additional processes in place to ensure MBL customers are notified. Master meter tenants are contacted directly to be considered a positive notification. Contacting the property or building manager does not count as a positive notification.

³⁴ Including MBL Program customers who are master-metered tenants (e.g., renters or tenants in mobile home park).

³⁵ For MBL Program customers and SIV Program customers, the in-person door ring visit where a door hanger is left, but no contact made with the customer is considered “successful contact,” but not confirmed as “received.” If the representative makes contact with the customer, then it is considered “received.”

available on the PSPS Portal and encouraged them to inform these customers of the resources available to them. PG&E is unable to track and report on notifications made by Public Safety Partners, as notification systems and/or platforms used by Public Safety Partners are out of PG&E’s purview; PG&E encourages Public Safety Partners to include PSPS messages on all of their platforms. PG&E describes its engagement with Public Safety Partners in Section 6.

Table 6 and Table 7 include metrics associated with the notifications to de-energized MBL Program customers.

Table 6: Outcomes of Notifications to De-energized MBL Program Customers

Count	Type of Notifications to De-energized MBL Customers³⁶	Description
1,275	Total De-energized MBL Program Customers	The number of customers de-energized who participate in PG&E’s MBL Program.
1,275	Total Notifications Attempted/Sent	The total sum of automated notifications attempted via call, text, and e-mail, in-person doorbell ring visit attempts and/or Live Agent phone calls.
<i>0</i>	<i>Total Notifications Not Attempted/Sent</i>	<i>Total MBL Program customers de-energized that PG&E did not attempt to notify.</i>
1,275	Total Notifications Delivered	The total sum of automated notifications sent via call, text, and e-mail.
<i>0</i>	<i>Total Notifications Not Delivered</i>	<i>Total MBL Program customers de-energized whose notification was not delivered.</i>
960	Total Notifications Initially Acknowledged	The total sum of automated notifications sent via call, text, and email where notification was acknowledged.
582	Total In-Person Visits/Doorbell Rings and Live Agent Phone Calls	Total attempted doorbell ring for impacted MBL Program customers where PG&E made contact with the customer (either in person or via phone call in advance of visit) or left a door hanger. ³⁷ This includes call attempts made by Live Agent representatives to MBL Program customers that had not yet confirmed receipt of their automated notification or answered the door during PG&E’s in-person visit. Refer to Table 7 for the detailed breakdown of this category.
1,261	Total Notifications Received	Customers who acknowledged their notification by taking one of the following actions: answered an automated or Live Agent phone call, responded to a text message, opened an e-mail, or greeted an in-person doorbell ring (excludes voicemails left, text message delivered only and not confirmed, door hanger left).

³⁶ Based on SPID.

³⁷ Customers may have confirmed receipt of their notifications in multiple channels (e.g., automated notification and/or doorbell ring); therefore, the counts of total attempted and successful notifications are not mutually exclusive.

Count	Type of Notifications to De-energized MBL Customers ³⁶	Description
0	Total Notifications Not Received	Total MBL Program customers who did not confirm receipt/acknowledge their automated notifications, Live Agent phone calls or in-person doorbell ring. Customers who did not answer a doorbell ring were left a door hanger.

Table 7: Count and Type of Additional Notifications to De-energized MBL Program Customers

Count	Type of Additional Notifications to Impacted MBL Customers ³⁸	Description
450	Total In-Person Visits/ Doorbell Rings	Doorbell ring attempts to impacted MBL Program customers where PG&E made contact with the customer (either in person or via phone call in advance of visit) or left a door hanger. ³⁹
132	Live Agent Phone Calls	Calls made by Live Agent representatives to MBL Program customers that had not yet confirmed receipt of their automated notification or answered the door during PG&E’s in-person visit.

Section 5.4 - A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Please reference attachment “PGE_PSPS_Notifications_20241105.pdf” for a copy of the notification templates, the timing of the notifications and methods of notifications that PG&E and SCE sent during the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS. Additional information on the timing of notifications sent during this PSPS can be found in Section 5.2.

PG&E provides Tribal, city, county, CCAs, Public Safety Partners, transmission-level customers, and municipal utility notifications in English only. All other customer notifications are delivered in-language if a customer’s language preference is on file. If there is no language preference on file, the notification is delivered in English, with information on how to get PSPS information in translated languages. For more information on notifications provided to customers in customer-set language preferences, see Table 12.

Section 5.5 - If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. (D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)

³⁸ Based on SPID.

³⁹ Customers may have confirmed receipt of their notifications in multiple channels (e.g., automated notification and/or doorbell ring); therefore, the counts of total attempted and successful notifications are not mutually exclusive.

Response:

PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notifications whenever possible in accordance with the PSPS Phase 1, Phase 3 and 2019 PSPS OII guidelines, weather and other factors permitting.

Table 8 shows the count of notification failures for all customers in scope at the time of the required notification, based on the forecasted or planned de-energization times.⁴⁰ Customers who enter scope later in the event for reasons outside of PG&E’s control (such as rapidly changing weather) after the required notification window, are not considered notification failures for that window as they are notified within the next notification sequence of when these new customers came into scope.

During this PSPS, 60 customers were unable to receive notifications as no valid contact information was provided by the customer to PG&E at the time of notification. Therefore, these customers are not included in Table 8 below. Following the PSPS, PG&E will send these customers postcards and encourage them to update their contact information for future notifications.

Table 8: Notification Failure Causes

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
Public Safety Partners excluding CFI⁴¹	Entities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification	0	No Failures.
	Entities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	0	No failures.
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No entities were cancelled during this PSPS.
CFI⁴²	Facilities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification	0	No failures.
	Facilities who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notification	9	See Table 8B
	Facilities who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	0	No failures.

⁴⁰ OIC Decisions. See Section 2 for more information on OIC B and D scoping based on forecasted weather and planned de-energization times.

⁴¹ Only includes Tribes, cities, counties, and CCAs.

⁴² Includes Public Safety Partners who are CFI customers.

Notifications Sent to	Notification Failure Description	Number of Entities or Customer Account	Explanation of Failure
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	27	See Table 8C and 8D
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	58	See Table 8C and 8E
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization is complete	6	See Table 8C
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No failures.
All other affected customers	Customers who did not receive 24–48-hour advance notifications	2	See Table 8A
	Customers who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notifications	215	See Table 8A and 8B
	Customers who did not receive any notifications before de-energization	2	See Table 8A
	Customers who were not notified at de-energization initiation	887	See Table 8C and 8D
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization	1,880	See Table 8C and 8E
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization is complete	130	See Table 8C and 8F
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	3	These customers received a delayed cancellation notice due to a data issue. This delayed cancellation was sent prior to their planned de-energization time.

Table 8A: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive Any Notifications Before De-Energization

Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
2	<p>Our data system for pre-outage PSPS notifications had not yet registered that these customers were in service. Therefore, these customers were not identified as impacted by PSPS and did not receive any notifications prior to de-energization.</p> <p>However, these customers did receive notifications at de-energization initiation and when re-energization was complete.</p>

Table 8B: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Did Not Receive 1–4-hour Imminent Notifications

Count of CFI	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
1	0	<p>This transmission-level customer received their notification six minutes before the required window due to being included in the same notification file as customers with an earlier planned de-energization time.</p>
1	0	<p>This transmission-level customer received their notification 34 minutes after the required window due to delays in the notification process.</p> <p>However, this customer was previously notified 14 hours prior to planned de-energization.</p>
0	1	<p>This customer received a delayed Imminent Notification which was sent 15 minutes after the required notification window.</p> <p>The root cause of this delay is under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.</p>
0	1	<p>This customer received a delayed Imminent Notification which was sent 4 hours after the planned de-energization time. However, due to rapidly changing weather conditions and adjusted de-energization time, this notification was still sent approximately 3 hours prior to the customer’s actual de-energization time.</p> <p>The root cause of this delay is under investigation with our notification vendor. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.</p>
0	4	<p>These customers did not receive Imminent Notifications. Our data system for pre-outage PSPS notifications updated mid-event to reflect a change in the transformers serving these customers due to Undergrounding project.</p>

Count of CFI	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
		Due to the timing of this change, these customers were not identified as impacted by PSPS in the scope used for Imminent Notifications. However, these customers received all other required notifications.
7	207	<p>PG&E de-energized customers within TP 18 significantly earlier than anticipated in response to rapidly changing weather conditions. Therefore, there was insufficient time to provide 1 – 4-hour Imminent Notifications to these customers due to rapidly changing weather conditions. This resulted in customers receiving their 1 – 4 Hour Imminent Notifications after their outage began.</p> <p>These customers received all other required notifications prior to their de-energization and were successfully notified at de-energization initiation.</p>

Table 8C: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Were Not Notified at De-energization Initiation, Immediately Before Re-energization, and When Re-energization was Complete

Count of CFI	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
5	82	For these customers, our internal outage management system used for in-outage and post-outage notifications was not aligned with actual field conditions. Therefore, these customers did not receive notifications after their outage began.
1	29	<p>These customers were impacted by a non-PSPS outage shortly before the start of the planned PSPS outage. We are still investigating why this resulted in these notification failures for the PSPS outage.</p> <p>We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report</p>
0	3	The root cause of these failures have not been identified and are still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 8D: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Were Not Notified at De-energization Initiation

Count of CFI	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
3	171	These customers received a delayed Notification at De-energization Initiation. This notification is triggered by a manual categorization performed in our internal outage platform. For these customers, this manual step was delayed.

Count of CFI	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
		As a result, these customers received this notification between 4.5 and 9.5 hours after de-energization initiation.
18	602	The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 8E: Explanation of Failures for CFI and All Other Affected Customers Who Were Not Notified Immediately Before Re-energization

Count of CFI	Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
6	132	These customers did not receive this notification until after restoration. The root cause of this delay is still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.
5	41	These customers were not notified immediately before re-energization due to a manual categorization error in our internal outage platform.
41	1,593	The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 8F: Explanation of Failures for All Other Affected Customers Who Were Not Notified When Re-energization was Complete

Count of All Other Affected Customers	Explanation
16	The root cause of these failures has not been identified and is still under investigation. We will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Section 5.6 - Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. (D.21-06-014, page 286.)

Response:

We have reviewed the notifications for this PSPS and have identified or are in the process of identifying corrective actions as discussed in Table 8. We plan to mitigate any identified misalignment in field conditions for the 2025 wildfire season. Additional planned corrective actions will be included in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Section 5.7 - Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)

Response:

For this PSPS, we identified one case of false positive communications involving one customer who experienced extended outage before the PSPS de-energization due to an ongoing Undergrounding project throughout the duration of the PSPS. Our data systems were not aligned

with actual field conditions related to this extended outage. Therefore, this customer received notification that they were planned to be de-energized despite not being impacted by a PSPS outage. We are still identifying corrective actions to prevent future false positive communications for this customer.

Additionally, we identified eight cases of false negative communications including:

- Four customers received a cancellation notification and were subsequently de-energized. This occurred because our data system for pre-outage PSPS notifications updated mid-event to reflect a pre-event change in the transformers serving these customers. As a result, these customers were removed from scope and subsequently received a cancellation notification despite still being de-energized. These customers are the same four described in Table 8B. We are still investigating this issue and will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.
- Four customers incorrectly received a restoration notification prior to actual outage restoration without any additional notifications to correct the error. This was the result of categorization errors that occurred during the patrol and restoration process. One of these customers did receive a restoration notification after the end of the outage, at the expected time. We are still investigating this issue and will report our findings in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement

Section 6.1 - List the organization names of public safety partners including, but not limited to, local governments, tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management , and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted prior to de-energization, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Please see Appendix D for a list of Public Safety Partners including Tribal representatives, local governments, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities notified with the date and time of the initial notification, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3.

As stated in our [2023 Safety Outage Decision Making Guide](#), we use a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope. In Appendix D, we begin by identifying HFTD area assigned to Public Safety Partners. Any area outside of HFTD is re-classified as HFRA. PG&E’s circuits can run miles long and span across multiple jurisdictions. Some Public Safety Partners outside of HFRA and HFTD were also in the potentially impacted scope in order to de-energize areas within HFRA and HFTD for safety.

Section 6.2 - List the names of all entities invited to the utility’s Emergency Operations Center for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility’s emergency operation center. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

Response:

PG&E invited the CPUC via email to virtually embed in the EOC for the duration of the activation on November 3, 2024, at 06:33 PST.

PG&E also offers communication service providers a dedicated PG&E contact in the EOC, known as the CIL, who shares PSPS updates and answers specific questions. These providers can reach the CIL 24/7 during a PSPS by e-mail or phone at PG&E’s Business Customer Service Center.

As part of our PSPS Pre-Season outreach,⁴³ PG&E provides water infrastructure and communication service providers in PG&E’s electrical service area with information on how to request representation at PG&E EOC’s. Alternatively, some partners may also request PG&E representation at their jurisdiction’s activated Operations Emergency Center (OEC).⁴⁴

⁴³ See 2024 PSPS Pre-Season Report, pp 70-71.

⁴⁴ D.19-05-042.

Section 6.3 - A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

Response:

In preparation for a potential PSPS, PG&E sent automated notifications with links to the PSPS Portal, which provides PDF maps and GIS data to Public Safety Partners at the times outlined in Table 4. In addition, when PDF maps and GIS data were updated on the PSPS Portal due to scope changes, Portal users were notified via e-mail at the times outlined below in Table 9.

After the EOC was activated, PDF maps and GIS data on the PSPS Portal were determined accurate and updated in a timely manner following changes to geographic scope or customer impacts.

Table 9: PSPS Portal Time & Date for Map Sharing

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PST)
11/03/2024	10:47
11/03/2024	16:34
11/04/2024	12:10
11/05/2024	07:52
11/05/2024	15:24

Section 6.4 - A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. (D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)

Response:

Below is a description of the engagement with state CPUC, Cal OES, CAL FIRE and local (i.e., Tribes, cities, counties) Public Safety Partners:

- Submitted the PSPS Notification Form to Cal OES twice a day (07:00 PST and 15:00 PST), if there was a significant change to scope and at least once for each of the five PSPS stages: Activating PSPS Protocols/Potential to De-energize (Stage 1), Decision to De-energize (Stage 2), De-energization Initiated (Stage 3), Initiating Re-energization Patrols (Stage 4) and All PSPS Lines Re-energized (Stage 5). See Table 10 below.

Table 10: PSPS Notifications Submitted to Cal OES

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PST)
11/03/2024	06:46
11/03/2024	14:24
11/04/2024	07:17
11/04/2024	14:59
11/05/2024	06:49
11/05/2024	11:47
11/05/2024	14:47
11/05/2024	19:37
11/05/2024	21:42

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PST)
11/05/2024	23:25
11/06/2024	01:33
11/06/2024	07:06
11/06/2024	08:16
11/06/2024	14:47
11/06/2024	19:58
11/06/2024	22:28
11/07/2024	06:49
11/07/2024	08:57
11/07/2024	15:05
11/08/2024	07:01
11/08/2024	10:03

- Sent e-mails to the CPUC at least once for each of the five PSPS stages listed above. See Table 11 below.

Table 11: PSPS Notifications Submitted to CPUC

Date	Time PDF and GIS Maps Shared (PST)
11/03/2024	06:34
11/04/2024	11:40
11/05/2024	19:16
11/05/2024	19:37
11/05/2024	20:54
11/05/2024	22:39
11/05/2024	23:34
11/06/2024	00:40
11/06/2024	05:26
11/06/2024	07:22
11/08/2024	11:56

- Hosted daily State Executive Briefings with invitees including Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, Governor’s Office, and other state and federal agencies to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions. A deck with key PSPS information was provided to participants.
- Hosted a daily Systemwide Cooperators Call, where all Public Safety Partners in the service area were invited to join for situational awareness.⁴⁵
- Hosted Tribal Cooperators Calls with potentially impacted Tribes to provide the latest PSPS information and answer questions.
- Hosted Operational Areas Cooperators Communication Calls to provide situational awareness updates and answer questions.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ An issue with the invitation system used for the Systemwide Cooperators Call excluded some invites from being sent to the full distribution list on the first day of EOC activation. This issue was caught and resolved the morning of the second day of EOC activation and all invitees were resent the invitation to the Call.

⁴⁶ May vary in cadence & type based on County OES.

- Conducted ongoing coordination with Tribal and local County OES contacts through dedicated Agency Representatives. This includes but is not limited to providing the latest PSPS information, coordinating CRC locations, and resolving local issues in real-time.
- Provided links to the PSPS Portal that included planning and event-specific maps, situation reports, critical facility lists and MBL Program customer lists at each notification and when scope changed. Note that the Situation Report was provided twice a day and at scope changes prior to de-energization and hourly once restoration began.
- Sent automated and live call notifications to agency partners before, during and after de-energization.
- Offered local and state agencies to be embedded in PG&E’s EOC, as well as offered PG&E Agency Representatives to be embedded virtually in local EOCs.
- A dedicated State Operations Center Agency Representative provided ongoing support to Cal OES to ensure all questions were addressed.

PG&E considers the advanced outreach and notification to local and state Public Safety Partners during this EOC activation successful but with minor improvements needed. This is based on the number and various types of outreach conducted (see list above), the feedback received from Public Safety Partners through the post-PSPS survey and the success rate of automated agency notifications. Of the responses given, PG&E received the following positive comments from in-scope Public Safety Partners regarding PSPS outreach: “Our PG&E Public Safety Specialist was responsive and provided support in our EOC as well as after-hours coordination and follow-up” and “PG&E has done a great job of minimizing the impacts of outages by narrowing in on their areas truly necessary to be affected and no longer blanket covering an area.”

Leading up to potential de-energization, we sent 100% of our automated notifications to Tribal and local governments within the required timeframes. Figure 37 below shows the post-PSPS survey results when Public Safety Partners were asked to “evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the outage.” Note that we received nine responses to the survey. PG&E will continue to refine the agency notification process to ensure accurate and timely information sharing.

Figure 37: Evaluation of Public Safety Partner Engagement
 How would you evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the 11/5 PSPS?



Section 6.5 - Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information)

Response:

To ensure PG&E provides adequate support to AFN communities, we engage with local communities through paratransit agencies, media partnerships and CBOs to share coordination efforts, notifications plans, CRC information, PSPS-specific information and more. See below for details on this engagement.

Engagement with Paratransit Agencies

In accordance with the Phase 3 Guidelines,⁴⁷ PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a CRC during the PSPS. PG&E provided proactive notifications⁴⁸ to 221 paratransit agencies for the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS. All notifications included a link to the PSPS emergency website updates page, pge.com/pspsupdates and a section called “Additional Resources” with a link to a map showing areas potentially affected by a shutoff. For more information on Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliant CRC locations, see Section 9.

Community Engagement

We engaged with over 500 “information-based” CBOs during the PSPS, sharing courtesy notification updates, fact sheets, and other relevant information that they could share with their constituents to expand our reach of communications, including infographic videos with relevant PSPS updates in 16 languages and ASL that the organizations could use to educate their consumers.

CBO resource partners were invited to the daily cooperator calls for Public Safety Partners, which was hosted by members from PG&E’s EOC who provided a situational update about the latest scope of the PSPS and an overview of the services available to customers. We hosted additional daily coordination calls with the CBO resource partners supporting the PSPS to provide an open forum to answer questions, offer suggestions regarding how they can best support their consumers and facilitate more localized coordination among the partners.

Programs/Support for AFN Customers

PG&E provided a variety of resources to AFN customers before and during this PSPS. These resources include:

- Ad-Hoc AFN Backup Generation Solutions: During the November 5 – 8 PSPS, PG&E granted temporary generation exceptions to eight AFN customers experiencing critical circumstances. This included transportation limitations and medical device requirements that CBO resources were unable to resolve during this PSPS. After exploring all viable options to support these customers, PG&E delivered backup generation for these individual customers who rely on power for their health and safety. These specific situations do not meet our typical temporary generation process and procedures standards. However, given the unique circumstances, we went beyond our usual practices to ensure safety for our customers with Access and Functional Needs. Four of these

⁴⁷ D.21-06-034.

⁴⁸ For this PSPS, paratransit agencies received the Watch, Warning, Cancellation, and Restoration Notification. A list of zip codes was provided four times.

customers were also recently impacted by the October 17 – 20 PSPS, however, due to this PSPS activation occurring shortly after, PG&E was not able to finalize permanent mitigation solutions prior to de-energization. We are coordinating with these customers to introduce programs aimed at offering more permanent mitigation solutions for future PSPS impacts.

- **Disability Disaster Access and Resource Program (DDAR):**⁴⁹ We continued our collaboration with the CFILC to implement the DDAR Program for this PSPS. Through DDAR, we have supported AFN customers with the delivery of backup portable batteries (since July 2020) to qualify customers who need power during a PSPS. Through DDAR, PG&E provided the following resources for the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS.
 - 11 local (ILCs) provided aid to 830 customers who rely on power for medical or independent living needs. The direct assistance resources provided during this activation were 26 food vouchers, two generator fuel vouchers and 64 hotel accommodations. PG&E is evaluating intervenor comments regarding how the ILCs aided customers reliant on power and will update the 2025 AFN Plan accordingly.
 - 1,562 batteries were previously distributed in affected counties and two batteries were delivered during the activation to potentially impacted customers. PG&E is evaluating intervenor comments regarding engagement with customers and battery delivery requests through DDAR and will update the 2025 AFN Plan accordingly.
- **Portable Battery Program (PBP):**⁵⁰ Our PBP provides free portable battery systems for customers who live in Tiers 2 and 3 HFTDs and are enrolled in the MBL Program. For this PSPS, 475 customers in scope were supported by batteries received through the PBP (delivered in 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, and year to date 2024). Since July 2020, a total of approximately 25,707 battery units have been delivered through the PBP across the entire PG&E service area.
- **Food Bank Partnerships:** We continued to fund local food banks to provide food replacement to families during the PSPS and three days following service restoration. For this PSPS, we partnered with ten local food banks that serve 15 of the 17 impacted counties to provide boxes of food replacement for families. For this PSPS, local food bank partnerships included:
 - Alameda County Food Bank
 - Clear Lake Gleamers Food Bank
 - Community Action Agency of Butte County
 - Community Action of Napa Valley Food Bank
 - Food Bank of Contra Costa & Solano
 - Redwood Empire Food Bank
 - Second Harvest Food Bank of Santa Cruz
 - Second Harvest Food Bank of Silicon Valley
 - Second Harvest Food Bank San Joaquin & Stanislaus
 - Yolo Food Bank
- **Meals on Wheels Partnerships:** We continued our partnership with Meals on Wheels to provide additional support and services to customers in need during PSPS outages. For this PSPS, we partnered with 18 Meals on Wheels Organizations that would be able to

⁴⁹ For more information on the types of aid ILCs provided and how the delivery of aid was coordinated among DDAR, ILCs and the customers, refer to [PG&E's 2024 AFN Plan](#).

⁵⁰ For more information about the PBP Program, refer to [PG&E's 2024 AFN Plan](#).

provide services to customers in scope for the de-energization in 12 counties. Meals on Wheels Organization partnerships included:

- Chico Meals On Wheels
 - Clearlake Senior Center
 - Coastal Seniors
 - Community Action Agency of Napa Valley
 - Community Bridges
 - Council on Aging, Sonoma County
 - J-Sei
 - Lakeport Senior Center
 - Liveoak Senior Center
 - Meals on Wheels Diablo Region
 - Meals on Wheels Solano County
 - Middletown Senior Center
 - Passages
 - Petaluma People Services
 - Service Opportunity for Seniors
 - Spectrum Community Services
 - Tehama County Community Action Agency
 - West Contra Costa Meals on Wheels
- 211 Referral Services: PG&E has a long-standing relationship with 211 through our charitable grant program. As of August 13, 2021, PG&E has a partnership with the California network of 211s to connect customers with resources before, during, and after PSPS outages. For this PSPS, PG&E worked with 211 to assist 816 customers with resources.⁵¹ The direct assistance resources provided during this activation were food vouchers for 91 customers, accessible transportation for one customer and hotel accommodations for ten customers.
 - Accessible Transportation Partnerships: We are partnered with Accessible Transportation organizations to provide customers with transportation to and from PG&E’s CRCs. For this PSPS, we successfully partnered with one organization in preparation for the possibility of any transportation needs.⁵²

Communications to Customers with Limited English Proficiency

PG&E provided translated customer support through its customer notifications, website, call center, social media and engagement with CBOs, and multicultural media partnerships. Customers with their language preference set, received in-language (translated) notifications. For customers with no language preference set, notifications were provided in English with information on how to receive PSPS information in 15 non-English languages. See language preferences for this PSPS in Table 12 below.

Table 12: Customer Notifications Based on Language Preference

Language	Total Notifications ⁵³	Percent
English	738,019	99.15%
Spanish	6,135	0.82%
Chinese (Cantonese & Mandarin)	164	0.02%
Portuguese	24	0.003%
Vietnamese	22	0.003%
Korean	20	0.003%
Total	744,384	100%

⁵¹ Additional information on 211s is not available within the PSPS Post-Event Report timeline. More information will be available in the [2024 AFN Plan](#).

⁵² PG&E partnered with Vivalon during this PSPS.

⁵³ Total notifications do not include doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

Customers with limited English proficiency have access to translation phone numbers on our PSPS website, highlighting that translation services are available in over 200 languages. Table 13 includes call center-related metrics associated with this PSPS.

Table 13: Call Center Support Services⁵⁴

Total Calls Handled	PSPS Calls Handled	Average Response Time for PSPS-related Calls (seconds)	Number of Calls Handled by Call Center Translation Services	Number of Languages Supported by Call Center Translation Services
95,174	1,191	5	1,607	250+

PG&E continued support and engagement with multi-cultural media organizations and in-language CBOs to maximize the reach of in-language communications to the public. Prior to the PSPS, we reached out to 32 multicultural media organizations to provide outreach in translated languages throughout the 17 impacted counties. These organizations covered the translated languages above and languages spoken by communities that occupy significant roles in California’s agricultural economy (e.g., Nahuatl). Additionally, we shared information and updates on PSPS with these media outlets, including news releases and social media infographics in English, translated languages and ASL, for their use and distribution. We also shared our new PSPS Language Resources page (www.pge.com/pspslanguagehelp available in 16 languages) with organizations to share with their constituents. Highlights from our coordination with multicultural media organizations and CBOs during this PSPS include coverage from El Popular⁵⁵ and KTSF 26 (Napa).⁵⁶ See Figure 38 and Figure 39 below.

Figure 38: El Popular Update in Spanish



⁵⁴ Metrics are provided from November 2, 2024, through November 8, 2024.

⁵⁵ [El Popular Update in Spanish.](#)

⁵⁶ [PSPS Update of KTSF-TV in Chinese.](#)

Figure 39: PSPS Update of KTSF – TV in Chinese



Section 6.6 - Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)

Response:

The information requested is included in Sections 6.6a – 6.6f. For questions related to backup power, customers can email TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com.

Section 6.6a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:

Table 14 lists the generators available for CFI customers before and during the PSPS.

Table 14: Generators Available for CFI Customers

Generator Type	Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.) ⁵⁷	Description
Diesel Generator	1	.032	37.6	1 unit on reserve in Sacramento.

⁵⁷ Estimated based on a 75% load. Barring mechanical failure and refueling the temporary generators have the ability to operate continuously throughout a typical PSPS.

Generator Type	Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.) ⁵⁷	Description
Diesel Generator	2	.065	31.0	2 units in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	2	.100	25.3	2 units in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	1	.125	25.0	1 unit in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	4	.200	22.9	4 units in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	2	.570	24.1	2 units in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	7	1.50	10.0	7 units in Martinez.
Diesel Generator	5	1.0	35.0	5 units total including 3 pre-staged in ICU Hospital and 2 units in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	8	1.140	24.0	8 units in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	8	2.0	27.7	8 units in Sacramento.

6.6b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:

Table 14 lists the power capacity and maximum duration of operation of the generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

6.6c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer’s site immediately before and during the PSPS.

Response:

During and immediately before the PSPS, 19 backup generators were activated to energize CFI customers that did not have an existing mitigation plan in place.

6.6d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer’s site.

Response:

As a general policy, PG&E does not offer backup generation to individual facilities. However, PG&E’s policy allows for granting exceptions for critical facilities when a prolonged outage could have a significant adverse impact to public health or safety.

Deployment of temporary generation is contingent upon the following circumstances: the expected duration to perform permanent repairs is significantly longer than the expected duration to install backup generation, the expected customer outage is 50,000 or more customer minutes,

and the outage affects a distribution circuit serving multiple customers without a functional back-tie.⁵⁸

PG&E has pre-arranged commitments with critical facility and infrastructure customers to provide temporary generation in case of a PSPS and evaluated requests received during the PSPS according to the prioritization described in Section 6.6e.

6.6e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.

Response:

PG&E prioritizes the deployment of available generation by first meeting existing commitments to individual facilities in the following order.

- Intensive care unit (ICU) hospitals, pre-identified by PG&E in partnership with the California Hospital Association (CHA) and Hospital Council of Northern and Central California (HC).
- Pandemic Response sites classified as medical stations and shelters. Additional facilities prepared to support public safety such as but not limited to First/emergency responders at the Tribal, local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected community choice aggregators, publicly-owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services and CAL FIRE.⁵⁹

Deployment of available generation is then followed by customers with special needs in the following order:

- Life support, MBL, and temperature sensitive
- Large customers, economic damage customers, and danger to health and safety customers

Deployment of available generation is then followed by other customers based on maximizing relief based on the number of customers times expected duration.

6.6f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.

Response:

During this PSPS, PG&E utilized its rental fleet of temporary generators to mitigate the impacts of PSPS on its customers. This fleet was used to support 19 stand-alone facilities serving public safety and two indoor CRCs. CFI customers that received backup generation are listed in Table 15.

⁵⁸ 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about 8 hours.

⁵⁹ 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about 8 hours.

Table 15: Critical Facility and Infrastructure Customers Energized with Backup Generation

County	Site Type	Generation Deployed	Duration of Operation	Reason Deployed
Solano	Polling Location – Moose Lodge	100 MW	0 hours	High risk to public safety.
Solano	Polling Location – Girl Scout House (Napa Solano Girl Scout Council)	150 MW	0 hours	High risk to public safety.
Santa Clara	Polling Location – Lakeside Elementary School	125 MW	0 hours	High risk to public safety.
Tehama	Polling Location – Rancho Tehama Association	56 MW	0 hours	High risk to public safety.
Lake	Ad-Hoc – Morgan Valley Rd., Lower Lake (Residence)	36 MW	21:23 hours	High risk to public safety.
Contra Costa	Ad-Hoc – BI-BETT Diablo Valley Ranch	100 MW	27:34 hours	High risk to public safety.
Contra Costa	Ad-Hoc – Briones Valley Rd., Brentwood (Residence)	32 MW	26:40 hours	High risk to public safety.
Lake	Polling Location – Calpine Geothermal Visitor Center	200 MW	71:19 hours	High risk to public safety.
Tehama	Ad-Hoc – Cal Fire Paskenta Station	70 MW	23:27 hours	High risk to essential emergency response and support facilities.
Colusa	Ad-Hoc – Deer Path, Stonyford (Residence)	25 MW	21:08 hours	High risk to public safety.
Solano	School – Suisun Valley Elementary School	200 MW	19:31 hours	High risk to public safety.
Tehama	Ad-Hoc – Maggie Way, Paskenta (Residence)	32 MW	74:02 hours	High risk to public safety.
Tehama	School – Flournoy Elementary School	200 MW	~36:25 hours	High risk to public safety.
Solano	Ad-Hoc – Aurora Way, Vacaville (Residence)	100 MW	45:05 hours	High risk to public safety.
Alameda	Ad-Hoc – Chabot Space and Science Center	570 MW	47:00 hours	High risk to public safety.

County	Site Type	Generation Deployed	Duration of Operation	Reason Deployed
Butte	Ad-Hoc – Meadow Springs Rd., Yankee Hill (Residence)	56 MW	~44:46 hours	High risk to public safety.
Solano	Ad-Hoc – Hemlock St., Vacaville (Residence)	40 MW	25:30 hours	High risk to public safety.
Butte	Ad-Hoc – Hoffman Rd., Oroville (Residence)	36 MW	~21:30 hours	High risk to public safety
Napa	Ad-Hoc – Cal Fire-Fire Station 38	32 MW	70:50 hours	High risk to essential emergency response and support facilities.

Section 7 – Complaints & Claims

Section 7.1 - The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06-014, page 304.)

Response:

Table 16 provides the number and nature of complaints received from customers and Public Safety Partners, submitted to both the CPUC and PG&E, for the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS.⁶⁰ Any complaints received after November 8, 2024 for this PSPS will be included in the 2024 PSPS Post-Season Report.

Table 16: Number and Nature of Complaints due to the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to get information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, Representational State Transfer (REST)/Digital Asset Manager (DAM) sites (as applicable).	42
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS, including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	127
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern.	37
General PPSD Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PPSD and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PPSD-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	232
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding CRCs, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PPSD.	14

⁶⁰ PG&E Post-Event Reports are based on the CPUC template. Additional information regarding complaints and claims will be provided in the PPSD Post-Season Report.

Claims

As of November 15, 2024, PG&E received 23 claims for the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS.

Table 17: Count and Type of Claims Received

Description of Claims	Number of Claims
Business Interruption/Economic Loss	2
Food Loss Only	20
Property Damage	1

Section 8 – Power Restoration

Section 8.1 - A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power (*Resolution ESRB-8 page 5*)

Response:

During the PSPS, the PG&E EOC Command and meteorology teams monitor real-time and forecasted weather conditions based on weather models, weather station data, and field observations while patrol crews and helicopters are pre-positioned in anticipation of the Weather All-Clear to begin patrols. Weather All-Clears are called based on pre-defined, geographic areas and mapping of each weather station in each zone to that area. This is known as the All-Clear Zone methodology, which based on past PSPS outages, was an improvement compared to issuing Weather All-Clear by FIAs.

All-Clear Zones align with known meteorological phenomena, such as mountain tops and wind gaps which may experience longer periods of extreme weather. This allows for further granularity in calling Weather All-Clears, thereby helping areas less prone to wind gusts or adverse conditions to be cleared and restored more quickly. PG&E monitors the conditions in each of these All-Clear Zones and as they fall below our minimum fire potential conditions the PG&E meteorologists will recommend areas for restoration.

As Weather All-Clears are issued, restoration crews patrol electrical facilities to identify and repair or clear any damage or hazard before re-energizing. Using the Incident Command System (ICS) as a base response framework, each circuit is assigned a taskforce consisting of supervisors, crews, trouble men, and inspectors. This structure allows PG&E to patrol and perform step restoration in alignment with the centralized control centers.

During restoration, PG&E issued ten Weather All-Clears and deployed approximately 283 personnel and 50 helicopters to patrol the lines in advance of restoration. Patrols were conducted on approximately 2,013 miles of distribution circuits and 37 miles of transmission lines that had been de-energized. Power was restored to customers as patrol completion verified the safe condition of each line.

Section 8.2 - The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable (*D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

PG&E issued Weather All-Clears for All-Clear Zones at the times noted in Table 18.

Table 18: Weather All-Clear Times

All-Clear Zones	Weather All-Clear Date and Time (PST)
518B, 520B, 520C, 540A, 540B, 553	11/6/2024 13:32
177D, 530E, 535	11/6/2024 15:12
175C, 175E, 180C, 180H, 245B, 246B, 530A, 530F, 530G, 530J	11/6/2024 16:39
530B, 530C	11/6/2024 18:07

All-Clear Zones	Weather All-Clear Date and Time (PST)
177F, 177G, 180D, 245A, 246A, 246H, 246I, 530D	11/6/2024 19:13
170B, 177A, 177B	11/6/2024 20:07
175A, 175B, 180J	11/7/2024 0:06
154D, 175D, 175F, 177C, 180I	11/7/2024 5:06
175H, 177E, 248A, 280C, 280G, 285A, 445, 448B, 651A, 651B	11/7/2024 6:43
175G, 280H	11/7/2024 9:35

Section 8.3 - For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.)

Response:

PG&E was unable to restore one circuit within 24 hours of the Weather All-Clear, which impacted approximately 145 customers. These customers were restored between one hour and thirty-six minutes to slightly over 22 hours past the 24-hour mark.

Table 19: Circuit PG&E was Unable to Restore within 24 Hours of the Weather All-Clear

Circuit Name	Reason the Utility was Unable to Restore the Circuit Within 24 Hours
Los Gatos 1107	A portion of Los Gatos 1107 was not restored within 24 hours due to repairs required after a tree branch fell onto the conductor. The damage was located in the middle of a ravine, therefore, crews had to cut a path to the tree in order to repair it. Restoration of the entire circuit was completed on November 8, 2024 at 11:42 PST.

Section 9 – Community Resource Centers

Section 9.1 - The address of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

During the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS, PG&E opened 29 CRCs. The sites were visited by 3,683 people. A full list of CRC locations, assistance available, operating days and hours, and attendance is reported in Appendix F.

CRCs are typically open from 08:00 to 22:00 PST during the time the power is shut off until customers are restored. Visitors were provided with PSPS information by dedicated staff, ADA-compliant restrooms, physically distanced tables and chairs, power strips to meet basic charging needs for personal medical devices and other electronics, snacks, bottled water, Wi-Fi, and cellular service access. For visitors who did not wish to remain on site, “Grab and Go” bags with a PSPS information card, water, non-perishable snacks, a mobile battery charger, and a blanket were available. Bags of ice and privacy screens were also available at indoor locations.

During all PSPS events, PG&E coordinates with county Offices of Emergency Management to determine the best locations for CRCs. For this PSPS, Mendocino, Plumas, Stanislaus, and Yolo Counties CRCs were not set up, with county agreement, due to low customer impact. Yolo opted for “Grab and Go” bags for their county in lieu of a CRC. Mendocino, Plumas, and Stanislaus did not request additional support.

During this PSPS, onsite visitors requested and received:⁶¹

- 4,529 snacks
- 4,353 bottled waters
- 4,090 device chargers
- 35 bags of ice
- 2,999 blankets
- 39 visitors were provided with food bank information

One visitor requested and was provided information regarding hotel vouchers.⁷³

3,465 visitors did not remain on site and were provided “Grab and Go bags,” while 218 visitors stayed on site. “Grab and Go” bags were delivered to Sonoma and Yolo counties at their request.

Additional information about our CRC operations, including coordination with Tribal and local governments, CRC types and resources, and more is available in the CRC Plan located in Appendix A of [PG&E’s 2024 Pre-Season Report](#), pp. 47-61.

⁶¹ PG&E does not provide hotel vouchers at CRC locations. For more information on vouchers, see Section 6.5.

Section 9.2 - Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Due to the timing of power restoration on November 7 and November 8, the hours of operation at CRCs listed in Appendix F deviated from the standard operating hours from 08:00 to 22:00 PST. See Appendix F for operating times.


During this PSPS, one CRC in Santa Clara County was briefly closed after our data system indicated full restoration. However, this CRC was reopened later that day when another data platform showed approximately 4% of the impacted customers in that community were not fully restored.

Section 9.3 - A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

See Figure 40 for a map of CRC locations. Based on the CRC survey conducted for this PSPS, most respondents traveled up to roughly five miles to the nearest CRC location. Additional CRC location information can be found at [PG&E Emergency Site – View Outage Map](#). Customers can find specific information using the ‘Address Search’ or ‘City/County Search’ functions.

Figure 40: Location of CRCs Readied During November 5, 2024 PSPS



Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact

Section 10.1 - Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids, permanent backup generation, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event (D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Mitigations to Reduce Impact

PG&E employed multiple measures to avoid de-energizing approximately 192,894 customers. Figure 41 depicts the impact each mitigation measure had on the total number of customers. Customer locations where mitigation efforts were utilized are mapped in Figure 42.

Figure 41: Reduction in Number of Impacted Customers Driven by Mitigation Efforts





Figure 42: Map of Locations Where Mitigation Was Utilized During the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS



Community Microgrids

A community microgrid is a group of customers and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries with the ability to disconnect from and reconnect to the grid. These microgrids are typically designed to serve the portions of communities that include community resources, like hospitals, police and fire stations, and gas stations and markets. PG&E continues to own and operate the distribution system within the microgrid. More information about PG&E's microgrid solutions or how to begin developing a community microgrid can be found at www.pge.com/cmep.

Community microgrids were not utilized during the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS.

Transmission Line Segmentation

Transmission lines are segmented using switches enabled with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), when possible, if only a portion of a line is required to be de-energized due to PSPS. Leaving segments of transmission lines energized allows PG&E to still reduce fire risk where needed and provide service to stations fed off the non-impacted segments during the PSPS.

During this PSPS, transmission segmentation enabled one substation and one substation bus to remain energized by only de-energizing transmission lines segments rather than the whole transmission line.

Distribution Switching

Depending on fire risk patterns, distribution switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through the fire risk area. Depending on PSPS scope, we may be able to use back-tie switching to bypass the distribution circuits that pass through the de-energization area to keep customers energized from a different set of lines.

During this PSPS, distribution switching was used to mitigate approximately 825 customers.

Sectionalization

PG&E has installed new sectionalization devices near the borders of the CPUC-designated HFTD Tier 2 and Tier 3 to reduce the number of customers affected by PSPS outages.

PG&E used sectionalization devices on 91 circuits which reduced the customer impact by approximately 192,001 customers for this PSPS.

Islanding

In some cases, PG&E can leverage islanding capabilities to keep some customers islanded apart from the rest of PG&E's transmission system and energized by generation located within the island.

Transmission islanding was not utilized during the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS.

Temporary Substation Generation

The objective of temporary substation microgrids is to enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during a PSPS at distribution substations resulting from transmission line outages. An interconnection is made at the substation, energizing entire

circuits where downstream assets are not at weather risk and generator capacity is sufficient. If there are downstream assets at risk, this mitigation is combined with distribution sectionalization to energize only safe areas. For reporting purposes, customers mitigated in the latter case will be documented in this category and not in sectionalization to avoid duplication. On average, customers served by temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes for the power source switchover from transmission to temporary generation and go-back from temporary generation to transmission.

Temporary substation generation was not utilized during the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS.

Temporary Microgrids

The objective of temporary microgrids is to enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during PSPS outages where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation. While temporary microgrids do not often support large numbers of customers, the community resources served by temporary microgrids include fire stations, local water and waste companies, markets, post offices, and medical facilities. On average, when utilized, customers served by temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 30 minutes for the switchover from grid to microgrid and go-back from microgrid to the grid. Thirteen temporary microgrid sites are currently ready for operation in PG&E’s service area. One temporary distribution microgrid was in scope for this PSPS.

PG&E safely provided power to portions of one de-energized community where we pre-installed equipment to safely island and energize temporary microgrids. Table 20 lists the temporary microgrids operated during this PSPS.

Table 20: Temporary Microgrids

Temporary Microgrid	Generation Deployed	Customers Energized
Angwin (Napa County)	.5 MW	49

Backup Power Support:

PG&E used temporary generation to support 19 stand-alone customers. Table 15 lists the facilities that received backup power support during the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS.

Covered Conductor:

The effects of grid-hardening and covered conductors are accounted for in our IPW model, which predicts the probability of utility-caused ignitions. Overhead system hardening is expected to reduce the probability of outages and ignitions in recently hardened sections. The IPW model more heavily weighs ignition and outage rates in recent years which will result in areas with fewer ignitions (e.g., areas that may have been recently hardened, being less likely to be de-energized for PSPS as there is a lower chance of ignition based on historical ignitions and outages).

Section 11 – Lessons Learned from this Event

Section 11.1 - Threshold analysis and the results of the utility’s examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. (D.21-06-014, page 305-306.)

Response:

This section addresses our examination of the adequacy of our PSPS protocols and guidance thresholds. As prescribed in ESRB-8, the decision to de-energize electric facilities for public safety is based on the best judgment of the IOU and is dependent on many factors including and not limited to fuel moisture; aerial and ground firefighting capabilities; active fires that indicate fire conditions; situational awareness provided by agencies; and local meteorological conditions of humidity and winds.⁶² Based on our current PSPS modeling and thresholds, as applied in this PSPS and explained in Section 2, we believe our current PSPS thresholds continue to be adequate and were correctly applied for the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS. See Appendix A for detailed information on our PSPS criteria and thresholds.

PG&E begins its threshold evaluation with a robust historical analysis that is described in detail below. This established the guidance values to be applied for PSPS, which has been optimized to capture data from past catastrophic fires to mitigate customer impacts. To do so, Meteorologists use internal and external tools and subject matter expertise to decide.

Typically, before de-energization, the PSPS customer risk is also evaluated against the wildfire risk on a per circuit basis to further evaluate the adequateness of the event. And, during the PSPS, the advanced weather modeling systems from our network of more than 1,300 weather stations is able to forecast and track weather conditions in real time. Finally, data and post-PSPS analysis results are collected and provided as part of the PSPS Post-Event Report.

Establishing Threshold through Historical Analysis

Our PSPS guidance was established by calibrating a granular, historical dataset. We built our verification dataset by creating, or “backcasting,” the PSPS guidance through our historical dataset. We extracted values for all recent fires that have occurred in PG&E’s service area from 2012 to 2020. We aimed to capture as many historical fires as possible that were caused by PG&E equipment during high wind events (e.g., Camp, Nuns, Kincade, Zogg) while limiting the number of historical PSPS outages to minimize customer impacts. Our analysis included:

- Hourly review of past incidents
- Verification of hypothetical PSPS dates
- PSPS guidance values testing
- A robust guidance sensitivity and calibration analysis

Historical Analysis: CFP_D Quantification

Based on this analysis, PG&E uses a CFP_D value of seven as the quantitative threshold guidance value to consider for PSPS on PG&E’s distribution system.

To establish the CFP_D threshold of seven, we performed multiple sensitivity studies in “backcast” mode for calibration and validation. This involved running 68 different versions of the combined distribution PSPS guidance through hourly historical data throughout multiple years to calibrate PSPS guidance. This included simulating and learning from more than 2,500 virtual PSPS outages. Through this “lookback” analysis, we evaluated:


⁶² See Resolution ESRB-8, p. 8-9.

- The potential size, scope, and frequency of PSPS outages
- Potential customer impacts
- The days PSPS outages would have occurred
- Whether utility infrastructure would have qualified for de-energization

The mFPC and CFP_D guidance that is determined from Technosylva was also evaluated using this process.

The CFP_D guidance value of seven is shown in Figure 43 with respect to recent large fires since 2012. Fires above the CFP_D7 curve tend to be wind driven fire, while non-wind driven fires tend to exist below the CFP_D7 curve. Any fires above seven that meet mFPC indicate PSPS would have been executed, had these models and guidance been in use during these historic events. The results show that deployment of this model could have prevented wildfires, such as Camp, Tubbs, Nuns, Atlas, Kincaid and Zogg fires, if implemented in 2012.⁶³

Figure 43: CFP_D Guidance



This analysis was a critical step to ensure the most catastrophic historical incidents are identified by PSPS guidance while considering the significant impacts to customers from PSPS outages across multiple dimensions (e.g., duration and frequency). This ensures that future PSPS outages will capture conditions similarly during the most catastrophic fires while also balancing impacts to customers.

Historical Analysis: Execution

To execute the analysis at this scale, we utilized cloud computing resources to run PSPS model guidance for every hour at every 2 x 2 km grid cell across the historical data set to determine the number of times and locations PSPS guidance is exceeded. Each location exceeding guidance is then grouped into events to determine the location and size of each PSPS given the weather and fuels present at that time under the parameters of the study version. This allows us to determine

⁶³ Note that the inclusion of a fire in this analysis does not indicate that PG&E is directly responsible for or caused a fire. Instead, the fires are included for the purpose of analyzing the impact of PG&E’s current PSPS Protocols.

if synoptic-driven events (e.g., Diablo wind events) are being identified, and if historical fires attributable to PG&E equipment may have been mitigated.

Verification of PSPS Protocols

In addition to these sensitivity studies, PG&E performed extensive verification of the PSPS protocols using several internal and external datasets. The goal of these analyses was to first determine if certain weather events are being captured (e.g., Diablo and offshore wind events), and second, to determine if lines that have been implicated in historic catastrophic fires would have been identified by the guidance.

The following internal datasets were used in the analysis:

- Climatology of Diablo wind events.
- Hourly high-resolution wind maps from the climatology data set.
- Distribution and transmission outage history.
- The weather signal database.
- Exploratory and dynamic dashboards created with internal and external data.

The following external datasets were used in the analysis:

- National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) North American Regional Reanalysis Archive (NARR) synoptic weather maps.
- Historical fire occurrence data compiled by federal agencies.
- RFWs from the NWS.
- High risk of potential large fires due to wind from the GACC.

The paragraphs below explain how we leveraged external and internal data to verify our PSPS protocols guidance thresholds.

NARR Archive

PG&E has acquired the NARR archive data dating back to 1995 and produced over two million maps that can be utilized to study past events. These maps are also useful to study the past conditions leading up to the PSPS, such as the extent of precipitation events and heat waves. When the PSPS models are run through the climatology, each PSPS identified is compared against the NARR archive by a Meteorologist to determine the large-scale atmospheric features present for each event.

Climatology of Diablo Wind Events

PG&E also leverages the latest academic research on Diablo wind events that use surface-based observations to create a climatology of Diablo wind events. We adapted the criteria and processed it hour-by-hour through the 31-year weather climatology to determine the frequency, magnitude, and timing of Diablo winds. The output of this analysis was a 31-year calendar of Diablo wind events experienced in the PG&E service area. As it relates to PSPS directly, the strongest Diablo wind events were evaluated to verify if PSPS guidance also selects these days for potential PSPS outages. Using the days identified by PSPS guidance and the Diablo PSPS list, a high-level comparison was completed to evaluate overlap of the events.

Any events that did not meet PSPS guidance were evaluated further using additional data sources described in this section. For example, the NARR archive proved useful, as antecedent conditions such as rainfall before a PSPS and the magnitude of the PSPS could be evaluated.

PG&E's Weather Signal Database

PG&E's Meteorology team built, and continues to maintain, a 'weather signal' database that flags each day from January 1, 1995 to present that experienced any weather-related outages on the distribution system. It also lists the main weather driver (e.g., heat, low-elevation snow, northeast wind, winter storm, etc.) for these outages. If distribution outage activity is not driven by weather, the day is classified as a "Blue Sky"⁶⁴ day. This dataset combines weather and distribution outage activity that allows rapid filtering of events based on the main weather drivers. To validate PSPS guidance, we used a combination of "Northeast" wind days and "Blue-Sky" days.

The PSPS guidance was validated against all Northeast wind days in the database. This is similar, but complimentary to the Diablo PSPS analysis as it also accounts for outage activity observed on those days. Events were also compared against "Blue Sky" days to ensure that PSPS would not be recommended for a high percentage of non-weather-impact days where little to no outage activity was observed.

Red Flag Warnings from the NWS

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against RFWs from the NWS. RFWs mean warm temperatures, very low humidity, and stronger winds are expected to combine to produce an increased risk of fire danger. These RFWs were collected for the past six years (2015 – 2020) in shapefile format and used to evaluate the timing and spatial extent of historical RFWs against PSPS guidance. It should be noted that each NWS office in the PG&E service area has different RFW criteria, making direct and quantifiable comparison challenging. However, this dataset is used to evaluate whether RFWs were issued when PSPS guidance was met. Based on historical PSPS analysis, RFWs are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than the area covered by PSPS outages.

High Risk of Potential Large Fires due to Wind from the GAAC

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against historical "High Risk" days from the GACC. The GACCs issue High Risk Day alerts when fuel and weather conditions are predicted that historically have resulted in a significantly higher than normal chance for a new large fire or for significant growth on existing fires. Examples of critical weather conditions are high winds, low humidity, an unstable atmosphere, and very hot weather. Similar to the RFW analysis, this dataset was used to evaluate if High Risk days were issued when PSPS guidance was high. Blue Sky Day is defined as "The same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)." Similar to RFWs, based on historical PSPS analysis, High Risk Days are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than PSPS.

Hourly High-Resolution Wind Maps from PG&E Climatology Data Set

PG&E created hourly maps from high-resolution climatology and a web-based application to display any hour across 30 years. For each PSPS that meets PSPS guidance in the climatology, these maps were evaluated by a Meteorologist to better understand the nature of the event, wind speeds, antecedent conditions, and the spatial extent of strong winds. It's important to note forecast wind speeds are available in the same exact format, allowing Operational Meteorologists to put forecast events in perspective with historical events using the same model.

⁶⁴ The definition of a Blue Sky Day is as follows: "Blue Sky Day is defined the same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)."

Detailed PSPS Dashboards

To evaluate the thresholds, Meteorologists and data scientists utilized the data sources described above to evaluate historical PSPS hour-by-hour to verify the locations and times that are being flagged as meeting PSPS guidance. These dashboards determine if historical fire events would have been flagged by PSPS guidance. Meteorologists evaluated these data sources hourly to verify model performance of the IPW model and suitability for operations. The PSPS guidance can be evaluated spatially using the dashboard map integration, while the size and timing of the PSPS can be evaluated using the timeseries integration.

Section 11.2 - Any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E collects lessons learned input from staff during and after every PSPS EOC activation to identify best practices and biggest opportunities for improvement. See Table 21 below for lessons learned from the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS.

Table 21: Lessons Learned from the PSPS

Issue	Discussion	Resolution
Meteorology	On the morning of November 5, PG&E became aware that the 7-day forecast on the website briefly and inadvertently showed PSPS outages were not planned even though shutoffs were likely. This was due to a human error where incorrect files were loaded onto the PG&E website.	Within approximately one hour PG&E quickly identified and corrected the 7-day forecast to show counties where a PSPS was likely.

Section 12 – Other Relevant Information

Response:

Table 22 and Figure 44 show the maximum wind gust speeds recorded by weather stations in each county within PSPS scope.

Table 22: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded November 5 – 8, 2024 in Impacted Counties

County	Maximum Wind Gust (mph)	Station ID	Station Name
Alameda	61	PG674	Mt. Allison
Butte	49	JBGC1	Jarbo Gap
Colusa	43	PG697	Colusa Hills
Contra Costa	65	PG696	Diablo-Blackhawk
Glenn	46	PG845	Road 65
Kern	65	580SE	SCE Tejon Hills
Lake	80	PG652	Santa Fe Geothermal
Mendocino	48	MASC1	Mendocino Pass
Napa	75	PG162	Mt. Hood
Plumas	62	404PG	Rodgers Flat
Santa Clara	68	PG608	Mt. Umunhum
Santa Cruz	59	PG370	Ormsey Cutoff Trail
Stanislaus	48	045PG	Mt. Oso
Solano	59	PG880	Blue Ridge Road South
Sonoma	88	PG132	Mt. St Helena West
Tehama	64	571PG	Round Mountain
Yolo	57	PG490	Bald Mountain Tower

Figure 44: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded November 5 – 8, 2024 in Impacted Counties



APPENDIX

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
APPENDIX A
SECTION 2 – DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Appendix A: DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Table A-1.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS

* Please see Table A-1.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

** Note: PSPS decision making on Distribution does not occur at a per-circuit level, and instead occurs at the level of our 2 x 2 km weather and fuels model grid. These outputs are used in a GIS system to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Distribution Assets Health Specialists review to scope the event. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting model. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast											Agency			Observed										PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		ws_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_8hr	rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr	rh_2m	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_100hr	lfm_chamise_new	cfpd	NOAA	RFW	GACC_High Risk	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	open_pspstags	Tx impacts_yes_no	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit	
ARBUCKLE 1101	TP23	21	73	9.8	89.7	13.3	0.35	0.06	0.10	61	3.19	707	707	No	28	42	66	20	10	15	58	22	Yes	No	0.06	253.20	
BIG BEND 1101	TP15	22	67	8.1	38.1	15.3	0.20	0.07	0.12	70	3.80	No	No	No	33	49	69	14	14	25	67	17	Yes	No	0.98	173.79	
BUCKS CREEK 1103	TP15	26	66	11.7	38.8	18.7	0.14	0.08	0.13	70	12.30	No	No	No	22	62	61	16	10	18	61	20	Yes	No	0.03	244.77	
CALISTOGA 1101	TP20	36	74	40.7	101	12.9	0.29	0.06	0.11	66	27.75	1697	1697	No	67	88	71	12	20	24	71	15	Yes	No	0.57	351.18	
CALISTOGA 1102	TP05	23	73	6	27.5	13.5	0.29	0.06	0.11	69	11.56	2234	2234	No	30	45	69	14	10	15	59	19	Yes	No	0.05	1470.31	
CALPINE 1144	TP01	27	72	13.2	67.9	14.1	0.27	0.07	0.11	68	9.06	10	10	No	65	80	68	10	8	14	68	16	Yes	No	0.07	345.35	
CALPINE 1146	TP01	23	68	12.5	49.4	15.5	0.26	0.07	0.12	68	10.68	1	1	No	65	80	67	15	8	14	66	17	Yes	No	0.03	1251.27	
CASTRO VALLEY 1108	TP24	23	70	21.1	49.4	16.7	0.26	0.06	0.12	69	8.10	908	5302	5302	33	50	73	14	11	18	58	21	Yes	No	0.15	524.09	
CAYETANO 2109	TP11	28	70	11	138.9	19.7	0.27	0.07	0.11	62	6.11	3150	3150	3150	44	56	69	16	12	18	58	22	Yes	No	0.50	4112.14	
CAYETANO 2111	TP11	20	70	10	128.6	18.1	0.15	0.06	0.11	65	0.70	2087	2087	2087	44	56	68	16	12	18	54	25	Yes	No	0.08	5708.16	
CLARK ROAD 1102	TP15	24	67	9.7	45.4	16.2	0.19	0.07	0.12	69	1.70	10	No	No	33	49	69	14	12	23	67	15	Yes	No	0.40	778.93	
CLAYTON 2212	TP07	23	69	18.5	138.5	19.2	0.35	0.07	0.10	62	8.20	3445	3445	3445	44	65	69	18	18	26	59	20	Yes	No	2.03	247.70	
CLAYTON 2213	TP14	20	69	9.2	59.7	18.3	0.26	0.07	0.12	64	2.05	3232	3232	3232	36	50	67	18	18	26	59	20	Yes	No	0.03	14348.63	
CLAYTON 2215	TP07	22	71	8.9	79	16.8	0.37	0.07	0.12	64	9.32	4523	4523	4523	44	65	69	18	18	26	59	20	Yes	No	0.27	3847.44	
CLOVERDALE 1102	TP17	24	74	14.6	61.2	13.1	0.28	0.06	0.12	67	5.34	46	2435	No	40	49	73	9	9	18	60	16	Yes	No	0.20	978.11	
CORNING 1101	TP21	18	74	8.9	94.9	14	0.39	0.06	0.10	65	1.13	2227	No	No	24	39	66	19	7	10	54	26	Yes	No	2.62	77.94	
CORNING 1102	TP21	22	74	10.6	131.3	13.1	0.33	0.06	0.10	64	2.33	1592	No	No	41	64	66	15	17	23	54	20	Yes	No	0.83	237.48	
CORTINA 1101	TP23	22	74	10.1	75.2	12.1	0.31	0.06	0.10	61	3.31	258	258	No	28	43	68	18	8	11	58	19	Yes	No	0.05	296.95	
CRESTA 1101	TP15	21	68	7.3	31.8	17.2	0.17	0.07	0.12	70	9.79	No	No	No	33	49	64	17	14	25	64	18	Yes	No	0.04	116.28	
DUNBAR 1101	TP09	27	72	15.6	59	15.5	0.31	0.06	0.11	68	9.81	2421	2421	No	36	50	70	15	13	21	58	18	Yes	No	0.56	684.79	
DUNBAR 1103	TP09	28	71	14.2	58.7	14.5	0.28	0.06	0.12	68	14.77	3297	3297	No	44	72	72	10	13	21	57	18	Yes	No	0.27	2859.40	
DUNNIGAN 1103	TP23	19	73	9.2	50.8	14.2	0.38	0.06	0.10	61	4.27	5204	306	No	28	42	66	20	10	15	58	22	Yes	No	0.05	322.38	
EL CERRITO G 1105	TP24	20	67	11.2	26.1	17.3	0.23	0.06	0.12	69	5.13	899	5204	5204	35	57	66	19	15	20	56	23	Yes	No	0.04	722.52	
ELK CREEK 1101	TP22	24	73	14.4	107.2	12.6	0.33	0.06	0.09	58	6.39	986	562	No	34	54	73	13	18	26	55	13	Yes	No	3.18	111.25	
GEYSERVILLE 1102	TP17	24	75	11.5	62.7	12.9	0.25	0.06	0.11	67	8.54	1965	1234	No	65	80	73	10	25	31	60	16	Yes	No	0.30	192.80	

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast										Agency			Observed										PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		ws_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_8hr	rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr	rh_2m	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_100hr	lfm_chamise_new	cpfd	NOAA	RFW	GACC_High Risk	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	open_pspstags	Tx_impacts_yes_no	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
GLENN 1101	TP22	23	74	10.5	130	13	0.39	0.06	0.10	63	5.06	3335	No	No	29	43	67	14	13	17	56	20	Yes	No	1.38	53.68
HICKS 2101	TP16	15	69	10.9	39.9	18.7	0.23	0.07	0.12	67	1.04	3651	4478	4478	50	68	71	15	6	11	56	30	Yes	No	0.41	900.71
HIGHLANDS 1102	TP13	18	72	13.6	69.3	13.1	0.33	0.07	0.11	66	4.42	2425	3651	No	34	54	65	16	18	26	53	21	Yes	No	0.09	5236.00
HIGHLANDS 1103	TP06	25	71	10.9	62.6	13.7	0.40	0.07	0.11	64	6.30	2290	2425	No	30	50	66	15	15	24	55	18	Yes	No	0.25	1461.03
JAMESON 1102	TP10	27	71	20.6	48.5	16.1	0.38	0.06	0.11	68	9.52	2651	2290	No	28	45	69	16	10	15	58	22	Yes	No	0.46	604.52
JAMESON 1105	TP10	26	72	10.1	65.6	15.5	0.39	0.06	0.11	67	6.43	1368	2647	No	28	45	69	15	10	15	59	19	Yes	No	1.00	338.85
LAKEVILLE 1102	TP09	29	70	9.9	103.8	15	0.25	0.06	0.12	68	7.27	No	1368	No	30	42	70	12	8	10	56	20	Yes	No	0.65	2409.58
LAMONT 1104	TP25	19	70	8.6	87.4	12.1	0.23	0.06	0.10	63	0.60	1493	No	No	36	50	67	8	16	24	67	12	Yes	No	0.04	714.49
LOGAN CREEK 2102	TP22	23	75	10.8	136.2	11.9	0.26	0.06	0.10	61	2.70	No	348	No	34	46	73	16	10	13	57	22	Yes	No	0.18	221.90
LOS GATOS 1106	TP16	24	65	26.5	25.2	20	0.24	0.07	0.12	69	18.81	46	2248	2248	27	40	65	20	6	10	56	30	Yes	No	0.39	101.59
LOS GATOS 1107	TP16	26	69	22.9	57	18	0.25	0.07	0.12	66	12.12	585	2307	2307	50	68	68	20	6	11	58	28	Yes	No	1.27	33.52
MADISON 1105	TP03	22	73	7.6	82.1	16.3	0.38	0.06	0.10	62	5.00	2188	585	No	27	43	68	17	9	12	59	20	Yes	No	0.04	724.93
MADISON 2101	TP03	25	75	8.9	101.4	13.3	0.41	0.06	0.10	58	7.64	227	2188	No	36	57	69	14	17	27	58	21	Yes	No	0.46	1128.77
MAXWELL 1102	TP23	22	75	9.8	118.9	11.7	0.22	0.06	0.09	61	2.04	850	227	No	27	42	66	18	6	8	47	34	Yes	No	0.19	144.61
MAXWELL 1105	TP23	22	75	10.9	139.7	11.8	0.29	0.06	0.10	61	2.46	3176	850	No	34	46	69	16	10	13	56	22	Yes	No	0.12	225.43
MC KEE 1111	TP19	19	67	7.3	47.5	20.1	0.16	0.07	0.12	70	0.35	2104	3176	3176	25	41	72	15	8	10	55	34	Yes	No	0.03	9852.72
MIDDLETOWN 1101	TP08	32	74	24.7	79.4	13	0.51	0.06	0.11	67	14.88	573	2104	No	67	88	70	12	25	31	68	16	Yes	No	1.02	898.46
MIDDLETOWN 1103	TP06	16	75	10.2	49.8	13.3	0.34	0.06	0.11	65	1.51	983	570	No	30	46	68	14	9	11	54	24	Yes	No	0.04	4601.47
MILPITAS 1109	TP19	27	70	11.1	115.3	16.5	0.27	0.06	0.12	67	5.09	1409	4351	4351	51	61	72	15	9	11	56	29	Yes	No	0.77	1175.09
MONTICELLO 1101	TP05	28	73	22.5	69.8	14	0.33	0.06	0.11	64	9.23	2693	1392	No	42	59	70	15	17	23	59	18	Yes	No	3.65	36.14
MORGAN HILL 2111	TP16	20	70	18	56.8	18	0.28	0.07	0.11	63	3.57	3812	2693	2693	43	59	71	15	6	11	58	28	Yes	No	0.80	514.29
NAPA 1102	TP09	24	72	8.5	66.9	16.2	0.29	0.06	0.12	70	4.74	2911	3812	No	27	44	71	15	4	6	58	21	Yes	No	0.05	3325.51
NAPA 1112	TP10	21	72	14.3	49.2	16	0.30	0.06	0.12	68	7.36	4936	2908	No	24	45	71	15	10	15	58	22	Yes	No	0.23	2196.14
NORTH DUBLIN 2103	TP11	26	70	10.3	128.2	19.7	0.21	0.07	0.11	66	5.16	3280	4936	4936	44	65	68	16	18	23	54	22	Yes	No	0.21	10689.86
OAKLAND D 1112	TP24	21	67	12.3	23.2	17.9	0.19	0.06	0.12	74	5.31	2588	3280	3280	35	57	69	19	15	20	58	23	Yes	No	0.06	776.31
OAKLAND K 1102	TP24	21	68	20.8	39.9	16.8	0.21	0.06	0.12	73	5.84	2703	2588	2588	41	57	69	18	15	20	58	23	Yes	No	2.89	11.64
OAKLAND K 1104	TP24	21	67	8.7	14.4	19	0.21	0.07	0.12	73	5.84	2794	2703	2703	41	57	69	18	15	20	58	21	Yes	No	0.39	39.70
OAKLAND X 1106	TP24	22	67	14.7	25.4	19.4	0.19	0.07	0.12	74	12.40	2487	3824	3824	41	57	69	18	15	20	58	21	Yes	No	0.04	593.51
PENNGROVE 1101	TP09	28	67	10.8	91.9	16.6	0.23	0.06	0.12	68	4.22	2073	2487	No	26	42	70	12	8	10	56	20	Yes	No	0.16	11289.15
PUEBLO 1104	TP05	25	74	12.6	71.7	15.7	0.33	0.06	0.11	68	8.05	2142	2073	No	30	51	70	15	10	17	57	20	Yes	No	0.72	354.33
PUEBLO 1105	TP05	25	74	10.7	66.6	15.4	0.35	0.06	0.11	68	11.69	2296	2142	No	30	51	70	16	10	17	57	20	Yes	No	0.50	962.03
PUEBLO 2102	TP09	23	74	24.2	54.1	14.6	0.30	0.06	0.11	68	7.18	4713	2296	No	44	72	70	15	13	21	58	18	Yes	No	0.32	221.10
PUEBLO 2103	TP09	27	74	33.5	76.3	14.1	0.30	0.06	0.11	68	11.49	917	4713	No	36	50	71	15	13	21	58	18	Yes	No	1.15	217.05
PUTAH CREEK 1102	TP03	24	73	8.1	85.7	16.3	0.39	0.06	0.10	60	14.33	2206	917	No	42	59	69	15	15	21	59	18	Yes	No	0.50	2579.16
PUTAH CREEK 1103	TP03	23	73	6.8	62.4	16.2	0.39	0.06	0.10	62	8.80	1318	2206	No	25	39	69	15	7	11	59	20	Yes	No	0.11	62558.25
PUTAH CREEK 1105	TP03	25	73	8.9	95.5	16.4	0.32	0.06	0.11	60	11.42	2100	1318	No	27	43	69	15	7	11	59	20	Yes	No	0.09	3021.31
REDBUD 1101	TP13	19	72	13.8	66.7	13.3	0.34	0.06	0.11	66	3.96	3418	2100	No	34	54	67	12	18	26	53	21	Yes	No	1.46	324.57

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast											Agency			Observed										PSPS Risk vs. Benefit	
		ws_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_8hr	rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr	rh_2m	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_100hr	lfm_chamise_new	cpfd	NOAA	RFW	GACC_High Risk	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	open_pssp_tags	Tx_impacts_yes_no	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit	
REDBUD 1102	TP13	19	70	11.6	58.5	13.8	0.35	0.07	0.11	66	2.89	3863	3418	No	32	49	66	13	5	9	53	21	Yes	No	0.23	790.95	
RINCON 1101	TP09	25	70	7.4	39.9	14.7	0.23	0.06	0.12	68	7.46	2016	3863	No	44	72	72	10	11	15	58	18	Yes	No	0.14	3096.99	
RINCON 1103	TP09	24	72	9.3	53	12.9	0.25	0.06	0.12	67	5.64	No	2016	No	44	72	72	10	11	15	58	18	Yes	No	0.86	1540.41	
ROB ROY 2104	TP16	20	68	9.9	23.1	17.9	0.21	0.07	0.12	70	1.81	2408	6164	6361	43	59	73	16	6	8	58	28	Yes	No	0.24	90.85	
ROSSMOOR 1108	TP24	20	69	11.5	58.7	18.4	0.29	0.07	0.12	68	5.05	1038	2408	2408	41	51	66	18	11	18	58	21	Yes	No	0.05	1955.74	
ROSSMOOR 1109	TP24	21	69	14.5	56.7	18.2	0.29	0.07	0.12	70	10.19	3813	1038	1038	41	51	67	18	11	18	58	21	Yes	No	0.11	857.63	
SAN RAMON 2108	TP24	22	69	15.4	67.8	17.5	0.28	0.06	0.12	69	12.23	No	3813	3813	41	51	68	18	11	18	58	21	Yes	No	0.31	1401.88	
SARATOGA 1107	TP16	20	67	28.2	32.3	19	0.20	0.07	0.12	69	12.53	1355	2465	2465	27	40	65	20	5	7	56	34	Yes	No	0.22	101.01	
SILVERADO 2102	TP05	25	75	25.1	85.5	14	0.40	0.06	0.11	67	7.36	968	1355	No	30	46	70	14	10	17	59	18	Yes	No	1.00	149.23	
SILVERADO 2103	TP09	28	73	11.4	44.6	14.5	0.24	0.06	0.11	68	1.95	3788	968	No	44	72	70	15	11	15	57	18	Yes	No	0.05	421.39	
SILVERADO 2104	TP05	26	75	37.7	56.5	13.3	0.37	0.06	0.11	64	20.90	2313	3788	No	30	45	70	14	10	15	58	19	Yes	No	4.75	50.73	
SILVERADO 2105	TP09	20	69	5.2	24	15.9	0.20	0.06	0.11	67	1.58	3577	2313	No	44	72	70	10	11	15	57	18	Yes	No	0.05	539.06	
SONOMA 1102	TP09	27	71	13.8	51	16.3	0.31	0.06	0.11	69	5.82	2273	3577	No	36	50	70	16	13	21	58	19	Yes	No	0.23	616.51	
SONOMA 1103	TP09	27	72	13.5	46	16.1	0.32	0.06	0.11	69	12.62	3292	2273	No	36	50	71	16	13	21	58	19	Yes	No	0.29	1787.23	
SONOMA 1104	TP09	28	70	10.4	97.6	16.4	0.25	0.06	0.11	68	5.84	2238	3292	No	36	50	70	12	13	21	57	19	Yes	No	0.82	554.62	
SONOMA 1105	TP09	27	72	11.5	62.9	15.8	0.30	0.06	0.11	70	14.00	3195	2238	No	36	50	71	16	13	21	58	19	Yes	No	0.39	2046.08	
SONOMA 1106	TP09	15	73	7.4	60.5	15.7	0.31	0.06	0.12	69	3.22	No	3195	No	36	50	70	16	13	21	58	19	Yes	No	0.04	2318.77	
STELLING 1110	TP16	24	63	31.2	34.9	21.8	0.24	0.07	0.12	69	18.81	635	3846	3846	27	43	65	24	6	10	56	34	Yes	No	0.75	42.45	
SUNOL 1101	TP19	19	71	10.6	112.2	18.4	0.27	0.07	0.11	67	1.92	2310	735	735	51	61	66	20	12	16	58	22	Yes	No	0.31	1613.77	
SWIFT 2110	TP19	23	68	9.9	56	16	0.19	0.07	0.11	65	1.35	2849	2305	2310	23	37	70	18	8	10	54	29	Yes	No	0.38	211.12	
TASSAJARA 2104	TP11	24	70	9.8	116.8	19.7	0.29	0.07	0.11	66	8.10	2599	2849	2849	44	65	69	16	18	23	54	22	Yes	No	0.12	24433.06	
TASSAJARA 2112	TP07	29	69	17.8	83.3	19.7	0.32	0.07	0.12	68	22.14	No	2599	2599	44	65	67	18	18	26	57	20	Yes	No	0.23	3556.45	
TEJON 1102	TP25	23	65	11	96	13.6	0.17	0.06	0.10	61	3.35	2204	No	No	42	59	65	12	18	30	65	14	Yes	No	2.10	48.23	
TIDEWATER 2106	TP14	22	70	9.2	92.9	16.6	0.23	0.06	0.11	64	2.24	1851	2138	2204	36	50	67	18	18	26	59	20	Yes	No	0.15	3768.33	
VACA DIXON 1101	TP04	25	72	7.3	60.7	16.5	0.32	0.06	0.10	62	8.63	975	1851	No	42	59	70	15	15	21	59	18	Yes	No	1.17	3105.10	
VACA DIXON 1105	TP04	23	72	6.9	57.7	16.5	0.23	0.06	0.10	62	7.78	2355	975	No	37	53	70	15	15	19	59	18	Yes	No	0.10	64255.54	
VACAVILLE 1103	TP04	22	72	8.2	91.1	15.5	0.30	0.06	0.10	65	11.59	2126	2355	No	31	44	70	15	7	11	59	19	Yes	No	0.11	1405.54	
VACAVILLE 1104	TP04	27	71	9.2	112.6	16.6	0.30	0.06	0.11	66	8.93	2477	2125	No	42	59	70	15	15	21	59	19	Yes	No	0.57	728.76	
VACAVILLE 1108	TP04	27	73	11.7	91.1	15.5	0.32	0.06	0.10	63	11.59	2152	2476	No	42	59	70	15	15	21	59	18	Yes	No	1.79	209.35	
VACAVILLE 1109	TP04	23	72	8.4	100.4	15.5	0.30	0.06	0.11	65	9.88	2113	2152	No	31	44	70	15	6	7	59	19	Yes	No	0.47	805.97	
VACAVILLE 1111	TP04	21	73	7.6	48.3	15.5	0.30	0.06	0.10	64	12.30	1660	2113	No	42	59	70	15	15	21	59	18	Yes	No	4.89	187.82	
VASCO 1102	TP18	18	69	11.3	94.9	18	0.20	0.07	0.11	65	0.55	4144	1660	1660	38	55	68	18	8	12	54	25	Yes	No	0.58	1032.11	
VINEYARD 2108	TP19	17	68	15.8	48.9	19.6	0.19	0.07	0.12	69	0.74	1090	4144	4144	40	51	68	21	12	16	56	23	Yes	No	0.04	1304.59	
WESTLEY 1103	TP12	28	67	10.5	132.3	20.5	0.28	0.06	0.10	62	2.00	2247	2247	No	29	43	70	20	10	14	55	26	Yes	No	0.23	116.74	
WILLIAMS 1102	TP23	25	75	8.8	92.4	11.8	0.21	0.06	0.09	61	2.08	707	707	No	28	40	68	18	6	7	56	22	Yes	No	0.05	471.45	

Table A-1.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Forecast	ws_mph	Sustained wind speeds	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	temp_2m_f	Temperature	degrees F	max	Temperature in Fahrenheit at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	flame_length_ft_8hr	Flame length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr	Rate of spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	rh_2m	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	prob_cat	Fire Potential Index (FPI)	probability outputs	max	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output - Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFP _D model.
Forecast	dfm_10hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 10 hrs	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	dfm_100hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 100 hrs	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	lfm_chamise_new	Live Fuel Moisture Content-shrub	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of Chamise (shrub) plant species. (% of species that is comprised of water).
Forecast	cfpd	Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFP _D)	Scaled Probability	max	The product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob_Cat) and IPW - probability of ignition (prob_ignition). This product is called the (CFP _D) Catastrophic Fire Probability distribution. Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value.
Agency	NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	N/A	Yes/No During Event	NOAA (SPC) Fire Weather Outlook forecast.
Agency	RFW	Red Flag Warning	N/A	Yes/No during event	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	GACC_HighRisk	GACC High Risk	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Observed	Observed ws_mph	Observed Sustained Wind Speed during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed wg_mph	Observed Peak Wind Gust during Event	mph	max	The maximum wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f	Observed Temperature during Event	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%	Observed Relative Humidity During Event	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed ws_mph_AC	Observed Sustained Wind Speed at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed wg_mph_AC	Observed Peak Wind Gust at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f_AC	Observed Temperature at All Clear	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%_AC	Observed Relative Humidity at All Clear	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	open_pspstags	Open PSPS Qualified Tags	N/A	Yes/No during event	PSPS-Qualified Tags include P1 (tree represents an immediate risk) and P2 (tree is damaged or diseased and could fall into nearby power lines) tree tags and Electric Corrective tags (Priority A - emergency, B - urgent, and E/F - risk-based)
Observed	Tx_impacts_yes_no	Impacted by Transmission	N/A	Yes/No during event	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream transmission lines, regardless of whether those distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct distribution PSPS.
Observed	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	MAVF Score	Yes/No during event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to de-energization.
Observed	PSPS Potential Benefit	PSPS Potential Benefit	MAVF Score	Yes/No during event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire.

Table A-2.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Transmission Circuit De-energized During the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS

* Please see Table A-2.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

** Note: PSPS decision making on Transmission does not occur at a per-circuit level, and instead occurs at the granularity of each transmission structure. These outputs are used in a GIS system and dashboard to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Transmission Asset Health Specialists review to scope the event. This includes a review of lines that have little to no impact to customers and electric grid reliability. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting model. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast											Agency			Observed										PSPS Risk vs. Benefit		
		ws_mph	temp_2m_f	flame_length_ft_8hr	rate_of_spread_chr_8hr	rh_2m	prob_cat	dfm_10hr	dfm_100hr	lfm_chamise_new	OA	cdft	NOAA	RFW	GACC_HighRisk	ws_mph	wg_mph	temp_f	RH_%	ws_mph_AC	wg_mph_AC	temp_f_AC	RH_%_AC	High Fire Risk Area (Y/N)	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit (Y/N)	Transmission impacts_yes_no	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
CLEAR LAKE-KONOCTI	TP06	20	71	12.9	48.1	13.3	0.28	0.07	0.12	68	.022	4.53	No	No	No	21	37	67	13	11	18	57	21	Yes	No	No	0.03	13750.78
GEYSERS #5-GEYSERS #3	TP01	23	69	9.1	31.8	15.2	0.24	0.07	0.12	69	.022	2.73	No	No	No	65	80	63	10	14	23	63	16	Yes	No	No	0.03	630.56
LOWER LAKE-HOMESTAKE	TP06	20	73	12.9	67.4	14.4	0.3	0.06	0.12	69	.034	0.65	No	No	No	30	50	66	15	15	24	55	18	Yes	No	No	0.03	7731.54
TULUCAY-NAPA #1	TP10	20	71	12.9	48.1	13.3	0.28	0.07	0.12	68	.013	4.53	No	No	No	24	45	71	15	13	23	65	19	Yes	No	No	0.03	13750.78

Table A-2.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Transmission Circuit De-energized During the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Forecast	ws_mph	Sustained wind speeds	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	temp_2m_f	Temperature	degrees F	max	Temperature in Fahrenheit at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	flame_length_ft_8hr	Flame length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technoslyva.
Forecast	rate_of_spread_chhr_8hr	Rate of spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 8 hours of fire spread simulation from Technoslyva.
Forecast	rh_2m	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	prob_cat	Fire Potential Index (FPI)	probability outputs	max	FPI Model Output - Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFP _D model.
Forecast	dfm_10hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 10 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	dfm_100hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 100 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	lfm_chamise_new	Live Fuel Moisture Content-shrub	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of Chamise (shrub) plant species (% of species that are comprised of water).
Forecast	OA	Transmission Operability Assessment (OA)	Probability	max	IPW Model Output - Probability of Ignition based on the probability of outages by cause. Ignition component of the CFPD model. IPW Model - A model that provides estimates of the probability of an ignition given an outage on an hourly basis.
Forecast	cfpt	Catastrophic Fire Potential (CFP _T)	Scaled Probability	max	The product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob_Cat) and IPW - probability of ignition (prob_ignition). This product is called the (CFP _D) Catastrophic Fire Probability distribution model. Scaled by 1000 to covert to an integer value.
Agency	NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration	N/A	Yes/No During Event	NOAA (SPC) Fire Weather Outlook forecast.
Agency	RFW	Red Flag Warning	N/A	Yes/No during event	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	GACC_HighRisk	GACC High Risk	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Observed	Observed ws_mph	Observed Sustained Wind Speed during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed wg_mph	Observed Wind gust during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f	Observed Temperature during event	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%	Observed Relative Humidity During Event	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed ws_mph_AC	Observed Sustained Wind Speed at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed wg_mph_AC	Observed Sustained Wind gust at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f_AC	Observed Temperature at All Clear-	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%_AC	Observed Relative Humidity at All Clear	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	High Fire Risk Area	High Fire Risk Area	N/A	Yes/No during event	Labeled 'Yes' when Circuit goes through High Fire Risk Area.
Observed	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit	N/A	Yes/No during event	High risk vegetation present on the circuit

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Observed	transmission_impacts_yes_no	Impacted by Transmission	N/A	Yes/No during event	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream transmission lines, regardless of whether those distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct distribution PSPS.
Observed	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	MAVF Score	Yes/No during event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to de-energization.
Observed	PSPS Potential Benefit	PSPS Potential Benefit	MAVF Score	Yes/No during event	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX B

SECTION 3 – DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Appendix B: DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Table B-1. Circuits De-Energized During the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS

Circuits labeled as “non-HFTD” are located outside of the CPUC High Fire-Threat District (HFTD). These circuits or portions of circuits are impacted for one of two reasons: (1) indirect impacts from transmission lines being de-energized or (2) the non-HFTD portion of the circuit are conductive to the HFTD at some point in the path to service.

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PST)	All-Clear Date and Time (PST)	Restoration Date and Time (PST)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	HIGHLANDS 1103	11/5/2024 22:00	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 9:07	LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	99	80	14	6	19	5
Distribution	CORNING 1101	11/6/2024 5:22	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 10:47	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	791	730	58	84	392	3
Distribution	DUNBAR 1103	11/5/2024 19:43	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 11:00	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	120	98	17	5	8	5
Distribution	SONOMA 1104	11/5/2024 19:56	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 9:12	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	306	278	27	14	22	1
Distribution	GLENN 1101	11/5/2024 22:33	11/6/2024 19:13	11/7/2024 9:38	GLENN, TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	100	55	33	4	11	12
Distribution	MIDDLETOWN 1103	11/5/2024 21:56	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 9:54	LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	8	3	0	0	0	5
Distribution	SONOMA 1105	11/5/2024 19:42	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 10:04	NAPA, SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	180	156	13	7	12	11
Distribution	CLAYTON 2215	11/6/2024 7:03	11/6/2024 18:07	11/7/2024 8:20	CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	135	117	16	6	14	2
Distribution	DUNNIGAN 1103	11/5/2024 22:30	11/6/2024 20:07	11/7/2024 9:15	YOLO, COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	12	8	3	0	2	1
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1111	11/5/2024 19:30	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 16:16	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	1939	1871	63	199	408	5
Distribution	CORNING 1102	11/6/2024 5:35	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 13:10	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	253	202	44	16	67	7
Distribution	ROSSMOOR 1108	11/6/2024 7:51	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 7:54	CONTRA COSTA	Tier 3	17	13	4	0	3	0
Distribution	CALPINE 1146	11/5/2024 17:27	11/7/2024 9:35	11/7/2024 16:13	LAKE	Tier 3	1	0	1	0	0	0
Distribution	TASSAJARA 2112	11/6/2024 7:06	11/6/2024 18:07	11/7/2024 8:35	CONTRA COSTA	Tier 3	27	15	12	1	1	0
Distribution	LAKEVILLE 1102	11/5/2024 19:38	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 9:20	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	137	90	24	5	10	23
Distribution	CRESTA 1101	11/6/2024 7:04	11/7/2024 6:43	11/7/2024 9:44	BUTTE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	6	1	3	0	0	2
Distribution	SARATOGA 1107	11/5/2024 23:18	11/6/2024 13:32	11/7/2024 10:17	SANTA CLARA	Tier 3	114	102	12	3	4	0
Distribution	CALISTOGA 1102	11/5/2024 19:36	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 11:43	NAPA	Tier 3	11	7	1	0	0	3
Distribution	MADISON 2101	11/5/2024 19:30	11/7/2024 6:43	11/7/2024 12:59	YOLO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	231	153	34	6	45	44
Distribution	OAKLAND D 1112	11/6/2024 8:35	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 8:47	ALAMEDA	Tier 3	25	23	2	0	1	0
Distribution	ROSSMOOR 1109	11/6/2024 8:00	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 7:59	CONTRA COSTA	Tier 3, Tier 2	52	46	6	2	0	0
Distribution	TIDEWATER 2106	11/5/2024 22:27	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 9:15	CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	68	52	15	1	10	1
Distribution	RINCON 1103	11/5/2024 19:33	11/7/2024 0:06	11/7/2024 10:57	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	320	271	41	14	30	8
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1103	11/5/2024 18:45	11/6/2024 15:12	11/6/2024 17:14	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	37	35	2	4	4	0
Distribution	MAXWELL 1102	11/5/2024 22:31	11/6/2024 19:13	11/7/2024 9:42	COLUSA	Outside HFTD	11	5	2	0	0	4
Distribution	WILLIAMS 1102	11/5/2024 22:26	11/6/2024 19:13	11/7/2024 7:37	COLUSA	Outside HFTD	15	7	5	0	2	3
Distribution	GEYSERVILLE 1102	11/5/2024 22:31	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 11:55	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	164	86	41	2	5	37
Distribution	VASCO 1102	11/5/2024 19:26	11/6/2024 13:32	11/6/2024 17:21	ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	215	151	50	15	22	14
Distribution	LOS GATOS 1107	11/5/2024 23:22	11/6/2024 13:32	11/8/2024 11:42	SANTA CLARA, SANTA CRUZ	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	361	313	46	24	36	2
Distribution	PUEBLO 2102	11/5/2024 20:15	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 16:26	NAPA, SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	155	127	21	3	13	7
Distribution	CALISTOGA 1101	11/5/2024 18:36	11/7/2024 9:35	11/8/2024 4:51	NAPA, SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	272	185	56	7	28	31
Distribution	PUEBLO 1105	11/5/2024 20:05	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 12:08	NAPA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	132	84	27	0	11	21
Distribution	HICKS 2101	11/5/2024 23:13	11/6/2024 13:32	11/6/2024 15:31	SANTA CLARA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	196	178	17	7	28	1
Distribution	PUEBLO 2103	11/5/2024 20:17	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 15:53	NAPA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	473	367	53	19	34	53
Distribution	PENNGROVE 1101	11/5/2024 19:46	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 9:27	SONOMA	Tier 2	69	62	5	2	4	2
Distribution	VACA DIXON 1101	11/5/2024 18:42	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 15:09	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	507	475	31	51	66	1

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PST)	All-Clear Date and Time (PST)	Restoration Date and Time (PST)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	LOGAN CREEK 2102	11/5/2024 22:30	11/6/2024 19:13	11/7/2024 9:27	GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	77	33	28	0	0	16
Distribution	CAYETANO 2111	11/5/2024 20:04	11/6/2024 16:39	11/6/2024 20:46	ALAMEDA	Tier 2	25	22	2	3	4	1
Distribution	JAMESON 1102	11/6/2024 7:20	11/6/2024 19:13	11/7/2024 10:22	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	216	194	21	12	26	1
Distribution	CAYETANO 2109	11/5/2024 19:59	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 9:35	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	168	121	34	12	10	13
Distribution	PUTAH CREEK 1105	11/5/2024 19:48	11/6/2024 20:07	11/7/2024 10:44	YOLO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	36	19	7	4	0	10
Distribution	PUTAH CREEK 1103	11/5/2024 19:30	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 9:01	YOLO, SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	36	32	0	3	6	4
Distribution	SONOMA 1103	11/5/2024 19:47	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 15:30	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	132	116	5	5	9	11
Distribution	REDBUD 1102	11/5/2024 22:36	11/7/2024 0:06	11/7/2024 9:31	LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	97	69	15	9	24	13
Distribution	REDBUD 1101	11/5/2024 22:31	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 9:44	LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	539	495	31	55	197	13
Distribution	TEJON 1102	11/6/2024 5:26	11/7/2024 6:43	11/7/2024 10:16	KERN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	573	471	91	28	177	11
Distribution	WESTLEY 1103	11/5/2024 21:24	11/6/2024 13:32	11/6/2024 16:17	STANISLAUS	Outside HFTD	26	3	21	0	0	2
Distribution	CLAYTON 2213	11/5/2024 22:25	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 9:02	CONTRA COSTA	Tier 2	4	0	4	0	0	0
Distribution	SILVERADO 2104	11/5/2024 19:34	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 18:04	NAPA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 1, Tier 2	1590	1337	138	79	243	115
Distribution	CLOVERDALE 1102	11/5/2024 22:45	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 12:09	SONOMA, MENDOCINO	Tier 3, Tier 2	100	63	16	6	4	21
Distribution	MADISON 1105	11/5/2024 19:56	11/6/2024 20:07	11/7/2024 8:41	YOLO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	6	3	2	1	0	1
Distribution	PUEBLO 1104	11/5/2024 20:04	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 10:14	NAPA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	265	207	39	19	31	19
Distribution	MIDDLETOWN 1101	11/5/2024 18:50	11/7/2024 9:35	11/7/2024 13:43	NAPA, SONOMA, LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	396	330	60	12	92	6
Distribution	MONTICELLO 1101	11/5/2024 19:36	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 16:07	NAPA, SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	1154	942	163	65	165	49
Distribution	CLAYTON 2212	11/6/2024 7:00	11/6/2024 18:07	11/7/2024 9:04	CONTRA COSTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	528	445	78	37	64	5
Distribution	BIG BEND 1101	11/6/2024 7:04	11/7/2024 9:35	11/7/2024 12:46	BUTTE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	286	259	25	27	97	2
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1104	11/5/2024 18:45	11/6/2024 15:12	11/7/2024 10:02	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	244	205	32	14	50	7
Distribution	CLARK ROAD 1102	11/6/2024 7:04	11/7/2024 6:43	11/7/2024 12:39	BUTTE	Tier 3	150	135	12	11	43	3
Distribution	MAXWELL 1105	11/5/2024 22:26	11/6/2024 20:07	11/7/2024 10:05	COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	54	27	18	0	2	9
Distribution	CALPINE 1144	11/5/2024 17:27	11/7/2024 9:35	11/7/2024 16:13	SONOMA, LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	8	2	6	0	0	0
Distribution	SUNOL 1101	11/6/2024 0:10	11/6/2024 19:13	11/7/2024 9:44	ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 1, Tier 3, Tier 2	74	51	20	4	3	3
Distribution	CASTRO VALLEY 1108	11/6/2024 7:53	11/6/2024 15:12	11/6/2024 16:40	ALAMEDA	Tier 3	78	61	14	2	5	3
Distribution	SILVERADO 2102	11/5/2024 19:36	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 16:54	NAPA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	355	196	81	4	16	78
Distribution	NORTH DUBLIN 2103	11/5/2024 19:49	11/6/2024 16:39	11/6/2024 22:02	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	99	77	16	5	8	6
Distribution	MILPTAS 1109	11/6/2024 0:18	11/6/2024 19:13	11/7/2024 11:39	SANTA CLARA, ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	311	237	66	15	35	8
Distribution	STELLING 1110	11/5/2024 23:13	11/6/2024 13:32	11/7/2024 11:00	SANTA CLARA, SANTA CRUZ	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	201	183	17	15	11	1
Distribution	MC KEE 1111	11/6/2024 0:27	11/6/2024 15:12	11/6/2024 17:48	SANTA CLARA	Tier 2	5	3	2	0	0	0
Distribution	EL CERRITO G 1105	11/6/2024 8:21	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 9:29	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	11	1	10	0	0	0
Distribution	NAPA 1112	11/6/2024 6:59	11/6/2024 19:13	11/7/2024 9:38	NAPA, SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	110	91	12	6	3	7
Distribution	OAKLAND K 1104	11/6/2024 8:24	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 1:00	ALAMEDA	Tier 3	228	219	9	6	22	0
Distribution	SILVERADO 2103	11/5/2024 20:20	11/7/2024 0:06	11/7/2024 14:14	NAPA, SONOMA	Tier 3	14	9	3	0	0	2
Distribution	HIGHLANDS 1102	11/5/2024 22:39	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 10:02	LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	28	23	5	2	11	0
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1109	11/5/2024 18:52	11/6/2024 15:12	11/7/2024 9:13	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	161	149	11	27	35	1
Distribution	VACA DIXON 1105	11/5/2024 18:45	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 8:27	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	27	24	0	3	8	3
Distribution	ROB ROY 2104	11/5/2024 23:11	11/6/2024 13:32	11/6/2024 23:07	SANTA CRUZ	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	105	94	10	3	21	1
Distribution	OAKLAND X 1106	11/6/2024 8:04	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 9:18	ALAMEDA	Tier 3	11	1	10	0	0	0
Distribution	VACAVILLE 1108	11/5/2024 19:00	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 15:45	NAPA, SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	815	726	67	70	60	22

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time (PST)	All-Clear Date and Time (PST)	Restoration Date and Time (PST)	Key Communities	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	MBL Program Customers	AFN other than MBL Program Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	SONOMA 1102	11/5/2024 19:53	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 11:14	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	108	94	7	1	12	7
Distribution	LAMONT 1104	11/6/2024 5:20	11/7/2024 6:43	11/7/2024 9:27	KERN	Tier 2	5	0	5	0	0	0
Distribution	NAPA 1102	11/5/2024 20:15	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 9:47	NAPA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	13	7	5	0	0	1
Distribution	DUNBAR 1101	11/5/2024 20:16	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 10:13	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	206	163	28	1	17	15
Distribution	SILVERADO 2105	11/5/2024 19:58	11/7/2024 0:06	11/7/2024 20:36	NAPA, SONOMA	Tier 3	13	6	4	0	0	3
Distribution	VINEYARD 2108	11/6/2024 0:30	11/6/2024 16:39	11/6/2024 17:42	ALAMEDA	Tier 3	6	2	2	0	0	2
Distribution	BUCKS CREEK 1103	11/6/2024 7:01	11/7/2024 6:43	11/7/2024 7:40	PLUMAS	Tier 3	3	2	1	0	0	0
Distribution	ARBUCKLE 1101	11/5/2024 22:30	11/6/2024 20:07	11/7/2024 8:54	COLUSA	Outside HFTD	20	5	4	0	1	11
Distribution	PUTAH CREEK 1102	11/5/2024 19:35	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 11:07	YOLO, SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	234	174	40	16	17	20
Distribution	CORTINA 1101	11/5/2024 22:43	11/6/2024 20:07	11/7/2024 8:24	COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	17	6	10	0	1	1
Distribution	RINCON 1101	11/5/2024 19:52	11/7/2024 0:06	11/7/2024 10:12	SONOMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	46	34	11	4	8	1
Distribution	SONOMA 1106	11/5/2024 19:31	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 8:13	SONOMA	Tier 3	8	3	5	0	0	0
Distribution	JAMESON 1105	11/6/2024 7:12	11/6/2024 19:13	11/7/2024 11:48	SOLANO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	449	322	58	14	50	69
Distribution	OAKLAND K 1102	11/6/2024 8:40	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 3:21	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	1642	1576	66	72	124	0
Distribution	ELK CREEK 1101	11/5/2024 22:24	11/6/2024 20:07	11/7/2024 12:24	COLUSA, GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	814	670	119	47	184	25
Distribution	TASSAJARA 2104	11/5/2024 19:36	11/6/2024 16:39	11/6/2024 17:55	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	59	48	9	1	6	2
Distribution	SWIFT 2110	11/6/2024 0:19	11/6/2024 13:32	11/7/2024 11:04	SANTA CLARA, ALAMEDA, STANISLAUS	Tier 2	109	78	22	3	5	9
Distribution	LOS GATOS 1106	11/5/2024 23:14	11/6/2024 13:32	11/6/2024 18:47	SANTA CLARA, SANTA CRUZ	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	172	166	4	14	23	2
Distribution	SAN RAMON 2108	11/6/2024 8:22	11/6/2024 16:39	11/7/2024 9:54	CONTRA COSTA, ALAMEDA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	160	117	43	8	14	0
Distribution	MORGAN HILL 2111	11/5/2024 23:19	11/6/2024 13:32	11/6/2024 18:14	SANTA CLARA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	368	302	53	23	39	13
Transmission	Other	11/5/2024 17:14	11/07/2024 05:06	11/7/2024 7:46	SONOMA	Tier 3	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	GEYSERS #5-GEYSERS #3	11/5/2024 18:50	11/7/2024 9:35	11/7/2024 11:47	SONOMA	Tier 2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	TULUCAY-NAPA #1	11/6/2024 7:14	11/6/2024 19:13	11/7/2024 12:13	NAPA, SOLANO	Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	LOWER LAKE-HOMESTAKE	11/5/2024 22:03	11/7/2024 5:06	11/7/2024 10:42	LAKE, NAPA	Tier 2	1	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	CLEAR LAKE-KONOCTI	11/5/2024 22:08	11/7/2024 0:06	11/7/2024 10:48	LAKE	Tier 3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total							21,357	17,896	2,496	1,275	3,295	962

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX C

SECTION 4 – DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

Appendix C: DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

Table C-1. Damages & Hazards Found Within the De-Energized Areas

Circuit Name	County	Structure Identifier	Tier 2/3 or Non-HFTD	Damage/Hazard	Type of Damage/Hazard	Description of Damage/Hazard
Big Bend 1101	Butte	100334899	Tier 3	Damage	Vegetation	Broken crossarm.
Calistoga 1101	Napa	102247793	Tier 3	Damage	Vegetation	Broken crossarm.
El Cerrito G 1105	Contra Costa	103966097	Tier 3	Hazard	Vegetation	Tree branch on line.
Los Gatos 1107	Santa Clara	100543835	Tier 3	Damage	Vegetation	Tree branch on line.
Los Gatos 1107	Santa Cruz	100520160	Tier 3	Damage	Vegetation	Broken pole.
Los Gatos 1107	Santa Cruz	100520112	Tier 3	Damage	Vegetation	Broken conductor.
Redbud 1101	Lake	102161855	Non-HFTD	Damage	Vegetation	Tree branch on line.
Rob Roy 2104	Santa Cruz	101682184	Tier 3	Damage	Vegetation	Damaged conductor.
Sonoma 1102	Sonoma	101981251	Tier 3	Hazard	Vegetation	Tree leaning into line.
Sonoma 1102	Sonoma	101981216	Tier 3	Damage	Vegetation	Damaged conductor.
Sonoma 1103	Sonoma	101995322	Tier 3	Damage	Vegetation	Broken conductor.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
APPENDIX D
SECTION 6 – PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

Appendix D: PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

Table D-1. Public Safety Partners Contacted

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Alameda County	Board President	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Board Vice President	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	County Administrator	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	County Clerk Recorder	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Division Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Alameda County	Division Chief of Operations/Emergency Management	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	EMS Disaster and WMD Coordinator	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Fire Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Alameda County	General	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Alameda County	Main Line	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Alameda County	OES Capt	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	OES EOC Lead	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	President of the Board	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Safety & Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Senior Emergency Services Coordinator	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Sheriff	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Superintendent of Water Distribution	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Supervisor	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Technician	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County	Train Ops	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Alameda County	Watch Commander	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Alameda County	Water Operations Manager	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County CCA	General	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 3	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	Cingular Wireless Services, Inc	Tier 3	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	Clearview Systems Inc	Tier 3	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	Comcast Corporation	Tier 3	11/5/2024 8:35 PST

¹ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Alameda County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	Tier 3	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	Crown Castle International	Tier 3	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	Global Valley Networks	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net	Tier 3	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 3	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	Tier 3	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 3	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 3	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Alameda County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Alameda County Emergency Services Facility	City of Oakland Public Works	Tier 3	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Alameda County Fremont	City Clerk	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	City Leadership	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	City Manager	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	Council Member	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	Deputy Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	Deputy Chief of Police	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	Emergency Services Manager	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	Fire Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	General	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	Mayor	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	OES Duty Officer	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	Police Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	Police Watch Commander	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Alameda County Fremont	Public Works Director	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Fremont	Vice Mayor	Tier 1, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Alameda County Hayward	City Clerk	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Hayward	City Manager	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Hayward	Council Member	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Hayward	Council Member	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Hayward	Fire Chief	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Hayward	Mayor	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Hayward	Mayor Pro Tem	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Hayward	Police Chief	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Hayward	Utilities Operations & Maintenance Manager	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Livermore	Chief of Police	Tier 2	11/05/2024 18:20 PST
Alameda County Livermore	City Manager	Tier 2	11/05/2024 18:18 PST
Alameda County Livermore	Council Member	Tier 2	11/05/2024 18:20 PST
Alameda County Livermore	Deputy City Manager	Tier 2	11/05/2024 18:20 PST
Alameda County Livermore	Deputy Fire Chief	Tier 2	11/05/2024 18:18 PST
Alameda County Livermore	Emergency Manager	Tier 2	11/05/2024 18:18 PST
Alameda County Livermore	Mayor	Tier 2	11/05/2024 18:18 PST
Alameda County Livermore	Police Chief	Tier 2	11/05/2024 18:18 PST
Alameda County Livermore	Vice Mayor	Tier 2	11/05/2024 18:20 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Acting Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:05 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Assistant City Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:05 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Chief of Education & Community Safety	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Oakland	City Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:05 PST
Alameda County Oakland	City Clerk	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Communications Center	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Alameda County Oakland	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Council President	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Councilmember At-Large	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Deputy Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Emergency Services Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Oakland	Police Chief (Interim)	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/05/2024 21:04 PST
Alameda County Other Facility	City And County of San Francisco	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Alameda County Other Facility	County of Alameda	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Alameda County Other Facility	Gexpro	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Assistant City Manager	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Assistant To The City Manager	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	City Clerk	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	City Manager	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	City Traffic Engineer	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Council Member	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Director of Engineering	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Director of Information Technology	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Director of Library and Recreation	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Director of Operations and Water Utilities	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Fire Chief	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Mayor	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Non-Emergency	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Alameda County Pleasanton	Police Chief	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Public Information Officer	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Training And Emergency Services Manager	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Alameda County Pleasanton	Vice Mayor	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Admin Analyst II	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Chief Administrative Officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	County Clerk-Recorder	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Deputy Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Butte County	Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Division Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	General Services Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Interim OEMOEM Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Lieutenant	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Public Health Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Sergeant	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County	Vice Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Butte County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Butte County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Butte County Emergency Services Facility	County of Butte	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Butte County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County	Board Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County	County Clerk/Recorder	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County	County Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County	Deputy Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Colusa County	Director	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County	Division Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County	Emergency Service Technician	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County	General	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Colusa County	MHOAC	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Colusa County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County	Vice Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County Communication Facility	Citizens Telecommunications of California Inc.	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation DIP	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	County of Colusa	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	Indian Valley - Bear Valley Fire Protection District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:49 PST
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	Indian Valley Fire Protection District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:49 PST
Colusa County Energy Sector Facility	City of Santa Clara	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County Energy Sector Facility	Western Area Power Administration	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County Tribal	Chairperson	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Colusa County Water and Waste Water Facility	California Department of Forestry	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Colusa County Water and Waste Water Facility	County of Colusa	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	Chair of The Board	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	Chief of Staff	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	County Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	County Clerk Recorder	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	Deputy Fire Chief, Mutual Aid Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	Duty Officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	Duty Officer - 24/7 Staff Call Line	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	Emergency Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	Emergency Preparedness Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Contra Costa County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	OES Warning System	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Contra Costa County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County CCACCA	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Clayton	City Clerk	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Clayton	City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Clayton	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Clayton	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Clayton	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Clayton	Interim City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Clayton	Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Clayton	Non-Emergency	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Contra Costa County Clayton	Police Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Contra Costa County Clayton	Vice Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 3	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	AT&T Pacific Bell	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	City of Concord	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	County of Contra Costa	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Crown Castle International	Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:58 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	SBASBA Towers	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Sprint Corporation	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	TCITCI Cablevision of Walnut Creek	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	U S Coast Guard	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Concord	City Clerk	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Contra Costa County Concord	City Manager	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Concord	Council Member	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Concord	Emergency Services Coordinator	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Concord	Fire Chief	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Concord	Mayor	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Concord	Non-Emergency	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Contra Costa County Concord	Police Chief	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Emergency Services Facility	County of Contra Costa	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Emergency Services Facility	San Ramon Valley Fire District	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Government - Jail Facility	County of Contra Costa	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Contra Costa County Lafayette	City Clerk	Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Lafayette	City Manager	Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Lafayette	Communications Analyst	Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Lafayette	Communications Analyst/Public Information Officer	Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Lafayette	Council Member	Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Lafayette	Councilmember	Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Lafayette	Mayor	Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Contra Costa County Lafayette	Police Chief	Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Lafayette	Vice Mayor	Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Moraga	Chief of Police	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Moraga	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Moraga	Emergency Preparedness Coordinator	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:40 PST
Contra Costa County Moraga	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Moraga	Interim Town Clerk	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Moraga	Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Moraga	OES Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:40 PST
Contra Costa County Moraga	Town Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Moraga	Vice Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Other Facility	Astound Broadband LLC	Tier 2	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Contra Costa County Other Facility	Western States Teleport	Tier 3	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Chief of Police	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	City Clerk	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	City Manager	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Council Member	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Emergency	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Fire Chief	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Mayor	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Non-Emergency	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Contra Costa County Pittsburg	Vice Mayor	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Contra Costa County San Ramon	Chief of Police	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County San Ramon	City Clerk	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Contra Costa County San Ramon	Council Member	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County San Ramon	Emergency Preparedness	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County San Ramon	Engineering Specialist	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County San Ramon	Fire Chief	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County San Ramon	Mayor	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County San Ramon	Public Works Director	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County San Ramon	Vice Mayor	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Walnut Creek	Assistant City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Walnut Creek	Chief of Police	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Walnut Creek	City Clerk	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Walnut Creek	City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Walnut Creek	Communications Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Walnut Creek	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Walnut Creek	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Walnut Creek	Deputy City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Walnut Creek	Emergency Services Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Contra Costa County Walnut Creek	Mayor Pro Tem	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Glenn County	CAO	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County	County Administrative Officer	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County	Deputy Director OES	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County	Director of Public Works Agency	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County	General	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Glenn County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	HFRA, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Glenn County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	HFRA	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Glenn County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Glenn County Emergency Services Facility	County of Glenn	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Glenn County Emergency Services Facility	Elk Creek Fire District	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Glenn County Energy Sector Facility	City of Santa Clara	HFRA	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Glenn County Orland	City Clerk	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County Orland	City Manager	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County Orland	Fire Chief	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County Orland	General	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Glenn County Orland	Public Works Director	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County Other Facility	US Army Corps of Engineers	HFRA	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Glenn County Tribal	Interim Tribal Secretary	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Glenn County Water and Waste Water Facility	Elk Creek Community Service	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Glenn County Water and Waste Water Facility	US Army Corps of Engineers	HFRA	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Kern County	Board Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Kern County	County Administrative Officer	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Kern County	County Clerk	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Kern County	Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Kern County	Emergency Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Kern County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Kern County	MHOAC	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Kern County	Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Kern County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Kern County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Kern County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Kern County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Kern County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Kern County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Kern County Emergency Services Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Kern County Emergency Services Facility	County of Kern	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Kern County Other Facility	Crown Castle USA Inc	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Kern County Water And Waste Water Facility	Lebec County Water District	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Lake County	Battalion Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Lake County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	Chair of The Board	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Lake County	Council Member	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	County Administrative Officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	County Supervisor, District 4	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Lake County	Dispatch	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	District 3 County Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	District 5 Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Lake County	District Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	Emergency Services Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	Health Services Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	Lieutenant	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Lake County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Lake County Communication Facility	Mediacom California LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Lake County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Lake County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Lake County Communication Facility	Williams Communication LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Lake County Emergency Services Facility	Northshore Fire Protection District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Lake County Other Facility	Middletown Rancheria Twin Pine Casino	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Lake County Tribal	Chairman	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County Tribal	Representative	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County Tribal	Secretary	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County Tribal	Treasurer	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Lake County Tribal	Vice Chairman	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	Acting Emergency Services Coordinator	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	Board Chair	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Mendocino County	County Clerk/Assessor/Recorder	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	County Supervisor	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	County Supervisor	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	Fire Chief	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	Interim County Executive Officer	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	Lieutenant	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	Local Cal Fire	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	MHOAC	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	OES Coordinator	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	Sheriff	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County	Supervisor	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Mendocino County CCA	General	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County	Board Chair	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County	County Clerk/Recorder	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County	Emergency Services Officer	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County	Fire Chief	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County	GIS	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County	General	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County	Interim County Executive Officer	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County	MHOAC	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Napa County	Sheriff	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County	Supervisor	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County	Under-Sheriff	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County Calistoga	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County Calistoga	Mayor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County Calistoga	Police Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County CCA	General	Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Napa County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Napa County Communication Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Napa County Communication Facility	Comcast	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Napa County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Napa County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Napa County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Napa County Emergency Services Facility	County of Napa	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Napa County Emergency Services Facility	Napa County Department of Public Works	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:49 PST
Napa County Napa	City Clerk	Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Napa County Napa	City Manager	Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Napa County Napa	Council Member	Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Napa County Napa	Dispatch Center	Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Napa County Napa	Executive Director	Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:40 PST
Napa County Napa	Fire Chief	Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Napa County Napa	General	Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:40 PST
Napa County Napa	Mayor	Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Napa County Napa	Police Chief	Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Napa County Napa	Vice Mayor	Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Napa County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Napa County Saint Helena	City Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County Saint Helena	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Napa County Water And Waste Water Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Napa County Water And Waste Water Facility	City of Napa	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Napa County Yountville	City Manager	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Napa County Yountville	Parks And Rec Director	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Plumas County	CAO	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Plumas County	County Administrative Officer	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Plumas County	County Clerk-Recorder-Registrar	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Plumas County	Director	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Plumas County	Director of Nursing	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Plumas County	Fire Chief	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Plumas County	Program Division Chief-Emergency Preparedness Office	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Plumas County	Sheriff	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Plumas County	Supervisor	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Plumas County Communication Facility	Sprint Corporation	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County	Assistant Chief/Assistant Director/MHOAC	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Board President	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Board Vice Chair	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Chief Operating Officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	County Clerk	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	County Executive Officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	County Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Santa Clara County	Deputy CEO	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Deputy Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Director of Emergency Management	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Duty Officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Santa Clara County	Emergency Preparedness Manager	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	General	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Main Line	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Santa Clara County	Non-Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Policy Director - Office of Supervisor Simitian	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Santa Clara County	Public Health Officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County	Train Ops	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Santa Clara County	Watch Commander	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County CCA	General	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Comcast Cable Communications Management, LLC	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Comcast of California	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Crown Castle International	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Global Valley Networks	Tier 2	11/5/2024 8:35 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	GTE of California	Tier 3	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Heritage Cablevision	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Southbay Cablevision	Tier 2	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Santa Clara County Communication Facility	Verizon Wireless	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Santa Clara County Emergency Services Facility	Las Cumbres Assoc	Tier 3	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	City Clerk	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	City Manager	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Council Member	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Deputy City Manager	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Emergency	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Fire Chief	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Mayor	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Non-Emergency	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Police Chief	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Public Works Director	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Milpitas	Vice Mayor	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County Other Facility	D B Leeson & B S Leeson	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County Other Facility	US National Weather Service	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Acting Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Assistant City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Assistant Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Chief of Staff	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Communications Officer	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Council Member	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Santa Clara County San Jose	Deputy City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Deputy Director	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Director Clean Energy	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Director PRNS	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Director, Office of Emergency Management	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Mayor	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Police Chief	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Clara County San Jose	Senior Advisor	HFRA, Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	ADEC	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	Assistant CAO	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	Board Chair	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	Communications Director	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	County Administrative Officer	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	Emergency Coordinator	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	Fire Chief	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	MHOAC	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Santa Cruz County	Main Office	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Santa Cruz County	Non-Emergency	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Santa Cruz County	OES Duty Officer	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	Sheriff	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	Supervisor	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County	Undersheriff	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County CCA	General	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Santa Cruz County Communication Facility	Comcast Cable	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Santa Cruz County Other Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County	Board Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County	County Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County	County Clerk	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County	Dispatch	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Solano County	Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County	MHOAC - EMS Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County CCA	General	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Solano County Communication Facility	American Tower Corp	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	American Tower Corporation	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	AT&T Wireless Service LLC	HFRA	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	Comcast Cable Communications Management LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	Comcast of California	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	Crown Castle International	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West Corporation	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	TCI	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	TCI of Vacaville	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Solano County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Emergency Services Facility	County of Solano	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Emergency Services Facility	Suisun Fire Protection District	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Emergency Services Facility	Vacaville Fire Protection District	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Fairfield	City Clerk	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Fairfield	City Manager	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Fairfield	Council Member	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Fairfield	Councilmember	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Fairfield	Emergency	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Solano County Fairfield	Fire Chief	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Fairfield	General	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Solano County Fairfield	Mayor	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Fairfield	Police Chief	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Fairfield	Vice Mayor	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Other Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Solano County Vacaville	Assistant City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Solano County Vacaville	Chief of Police	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Vacaville	City Clerk	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Vacaville	City Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Vacaville	Council Member	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Vacaville	Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Solano County Vacaville	General	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Solano County Vacaville	Mayor	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Solano County Vacaville	Utilities Operations and Maintenance Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Solano County Vacaville	Vice Mayor	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	1st District Sonoma County Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Sonoma County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Board Chair Pro Tem	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Board Vice Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Community Alert & Warning Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Sonoma County	Deputy Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Director	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Division Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	EMS	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	EMS Dispatch	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Fire Captain	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	MHOAC	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Main Office	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Sonoma County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Sheriff Dispatch	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Sheriff's Liaison	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Staff Duty Officer	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County CCA	General	Tier 2, Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County Communication Facility	AT&T	Tier 3	11/4/2024 12:57 PST
Sonoma County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Sonoma County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 3, Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Sonoma County Communication Facility	California Highway Patrol	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Sonoma County Communication Facility	Comcast Fresno LLC	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Sonoma County Communication Facility	Frontier Communications Corporation Dip	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Sonoma County Communication Facility	T Mobile West A Delaware Corp	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Sonoma County Communication Facility	T-Mobile USA	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Sonoma County Communication Facility	T-Mobile West LLC	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST

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Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Sonoma County Communication Facility	Verizon	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Sonoma County Emergency Services Facility	Sonoma County Fire District	Tier 3	11/4/2024 12:58 PST
Sonoma County Emergency Services Facility	Sonoma Valley Fire District	Tier 3	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Sonoma County Other Facility	City of Petaluma	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Chief of Police	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	City Council Member	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Council Member	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Deputy Emergency Manager	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Division Chief Fire Marshal	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Mayor	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Police Chief	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Sonoma County Santa Rosa	Vice Mayor	Tier 3	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Stanislaus County	Board Chair	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Stanislaus County	Chief Executive Officer	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Stanislaus County	County Clerk Recorder	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Stanislaus County	EMS Duty Officer	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Stanislaus County	Emergency Manager	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Stanislaus County	Fire Chief	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Stanislaus County	Health Officer	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Stanislaus County	MHOAC	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Stanislaus County	Public Health Duty Officer	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Stanislaus County	Sheriff	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Stanislaus County	Supervisor	HFRA	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Stanislaus County Communication Facility	Federal Bureau of Investigation	HFRA	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Tehama County	Chief Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Tehama County	Communications Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Tehama County	County Clerk / Recorder	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Tehama County	Lieutenant And OES Manager	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Tehama County	OES Director	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Tehama County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST

¹ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Tehama County Communication Facility	Ducor Telephone Co	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Tehama County Communication Facility	Ducor Telephone Corp	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Tehama County Corning	City Clerk	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Tehama County Corning	City Manager	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Tehama County Corning	Police Chief	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Tehama County Emergency Services Facility	California Department of Forestry	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Tehama County Government - Jail Facility	California Department of Corrections	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Tehama County Other Facility	Volunteer Chief	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Tehama County Red Bluff	Chief of Police	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Tehama County Red Bluff	City Manager	Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County	Board Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County	Board Vice Chair	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County	County Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County	County Clerk-Recorder	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County	County OES Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County	Deputy County Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County	Dispatch	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Yolo County	EMS Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County	Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County	Non-Emergency	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:35 PST
Yolo County	Sheriff	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County	Supervisor	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County CCA	General	HFRA, Tier 2	11/03/2024 12:34 PST
Yolo County Communication Facility	AT&T Mobility LLC	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Yolo County Communication Facility	AT&T Services Inc	Non-HFTD or Non-HFRA; within PSPS scope (see footnote)	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Yolo County Communication Facility	GTE Mobile Net of California LP	Tier 2	11/3/2024 12:48 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Assistant Director Facilities & Infrastructure	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Cache Creek Casino Resort Director of Facilities	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Cache Creek Casino Resort General Manager/Coo	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Cache Creek Casino Resort/Chief Financial Officer	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST

¹ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD or HFRA Tier ¹	Date/Time Contacted (PST)
Yolo County Tribal	Director of Communications	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Director of Facilities & Infrastructure	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Director of Security	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Fire Department Battalion Chiefs	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Fire Department Fire Chief	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Health Representative	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Tribal Chairman	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation Director - Tribal Administrator	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST
Yolo County Tribal	Yocha Dehe And Cache Creek Casino Resort Security	HFRA, Tier 2	11/04/2024 12:39 PST

¹ Catastrophic Fire Behavior runs both in and outside of High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA). The PG&E Meteorology Team evaluates non-HFRA areas for catastrophic wildfire risk in unusual circumstances.


PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX E

SECTION 8 – ALL CLEAR ZONE MAP

Appendix E: ALL CLEAR ZONE MAP

Figure E-1. All Clear Zone Map



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX F

SECTION 9 – COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER LOCATIONS

Appendix F: LIST OF PG&E COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTERS

Table F-1. Community Resource Centers Provided by PG&E

The table below provided details of the 29 CRCs that PG&E mobilized during the November 5 – 8, 2024 PSPS event, including specific locations, dates and times opened and closed, total attendance for each location, and amenities provided.

#	County	Site Name	Address	Operating Hours (PST)				Total Visitors	Indoor / Outdoor	Amenities Provided
				Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4			
				Nov 5	Nov 6	Nov 7	Nov 8			
1	Alameda	Costco Wholesale Livermore	2800 Independence Dr	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 13:00	No	154	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
2	Alameda	Formosan United Methodist Church	788 Lewelling Blvd	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 13:00	No	8	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
3	Alameda	Acts Full Gospel Church	1034 66th Ave	No	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 13:00	No	127	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
4	Butte	Concow Elementary School	11679 Nelson Bar Rd	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 14:30	No	37	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
5	Colusa	Stonyford Community Hall	229 Market St	16:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 14:30	No	152	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating, Cooling/Heating, Ice
6	Contra Costa	Clayton Community Church	6055 Main Street	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 10:30	No	78	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
7	Contra Costa	Saint Matthew Lutheran Church	399 Wiget Ln	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 10:30	No	21	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
8	Contra Costa	Costco Wholesale Danville	3150 Fostoria Way	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 10:30	No	22	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
9	Glenn	Elk Creek Junior Senior High School	3430 Co Rd 309	16:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 15:00	No	49	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
10	Kern	Lebec Post Office	2132 Lebec Road	No	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 13:00	No	338	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
11	Lake	Live Oaks Senior Center	12502 Foothill Blvd	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 14:30	No	196	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
12	Lake	Twin Pine Casino and Hotel	22223 CA- 29	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 14:30	No	135	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating, Cooling/Heating, Ice
13	Napa	Pacific Union College	200 Angwin Ave	15:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 18:00	No	187	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
14	Napa	Napa Elks Lodge	2840 Soscol Ave	15:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 18:00	No	500	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
15	Napa	Saint Helena Catholic School	1255 Oak Ave	15:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 18:00	No	113	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
16	Napa	Highlands Christian Fellowship	970 Petrified Forest Rd	15:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 18:00	No	345	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
17	Santa Clara	WestGate Church South Hills Campus	6601 Camden Ave	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 13:30	No	6	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
18	Santa Clara	Morgan Hill Community and Cultural Center	17060 Monterey Rd	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 13:30	No	46	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
19	Santa Clara	Faith Lutheran Church	16548 Ferris Ave	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 13:30; 20:30 – 22:00	08:00 – 13:30	49	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating

#	County	Site Name	Address	Operating Hours (PST)				Total Visitors	Indoor / Outdoor	Amenities Provided
				Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4			
				Nov 5	Nov 6	Nov 7	Nov 8			
20	Santa Clara	Valley Church	10885 N Stelling Rd	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 13:30	No	140	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
21	Santa Cruz	Unitarian Universalist Fellowship	6401 Freedom Blvd	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 13:00	No	8	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
22	Solano	Costco Wholesale Vacaville	1051 Hume Way	16:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 17:00	No	140	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
23	Solano	Green Valley Golf Course	35 Country Club Road	16:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 17:00	No	176	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
24	Solano	Joseph Nelson Community Center	611 Village Dr	16:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 17:00	No	14	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating, Cooling/Heating, Ice
25	Sonoma	First Congregational Church of Sonoma	252 W Spain St	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 17:00	No	52	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
26	Sonoma	Healdsburg Community Church	1100 University Street	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 17:00	No	59	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
27	Sonoma	Presbyterian Church of the Roses	2500 Patio Ct.	18:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 17:00	No	71	Indoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating, Cooling/Heating, Ice
28	Tehama	Rancho Tehama Association	17605 Park Terrace Road	17:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 15:00	No	400	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating
29	Tehama	Flournoy Elementary School	15850 Paskenta Rd	17:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 22:00	08:00 – 15:00	No	60	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, ADA Restroom, Bottled Water, Device Charger, Snacks, Seating

VERIFICATION

I, undersigned, say:

I am an officer of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and am authorized to make this verification for that reason.

I have read the foregoing “PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff Report to the CPUC” for the November 5 – 8, 2024, PSPS and I am informed and believe the matters stated therein to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Oakland, California this 25th day of November 2024.



MARK QUINLAN
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
WILDFIRE, EMERGENCY & OPERATIONS